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GLOSSARY AND ACRONYMS  
ACL. Assistant Commissioner of  Labour or 
Labour Court judge. While ACL is the 
official term, workers will often refer to 
the Labour Court judge as simply judge 
or even just MOM. 
Ali baba. A term used by workers to indicate 
anything illegal, false, unethical, or dodgy. 
For example, “This salary paper ali baba”, 
or “My boss, he always ali baba talking. ” 
AME. Average monthly earnings. The MOM 
calculates a worker’s medical leave wages 
and injury compensation based on the 
worker’s AME, which are based on the 
worker’s earnings (including overtime) 
over the 12 months prior to the accident. 
ASEAN. Association of  Southeast Asian 
Nations. 
Civil claim / common law. An alternative 
to MOM’s work injury compensation 
scheme for seeking compensation for 
workplace accidents. It requires a lawyer 
a n d i s o u t s i d e M O M ’s a m b i t . 
Compensation is potentially higher, but 
the worker needs to prove negligence or 
fault by another party and the process 
may take years if  the case is settled in 
court. When workers say, “I go common 
law”, it means they have withdrawn their 
claim from MOM’s process and have 
engaged a lawyer to pursue a settlement 
through common law.   
COL. Commissioner for Labour. 
EA. Employment Act. Singapore’s main 
labour law, which provides terms and 
working conditions for employees. 
ECT. Employment Claims Tribunal. 
EFMA. Employment of  Foreign Manpower 
Act. This act regulates the employment 
of  foreigners in Singapore. 
FCWDS. Foreign Construction Worker 
Directory System in Singapore. 
FWL. Foreign worker levy. The MOM 
requires employers to pay a monthly levy 
for each worker as a pricing mechanism 
to regulate the number of  foreign 
workers in Singapore. 
HealthServe. Singaporean non-profit 
organisation that provides various health 
services for migrant workers including 
healthcare and advocacy. 
HOME. Humanitarian Organization for 
Migration Economics. Singaporean non-
profit organisation that provides services 
for and advocates on behalf  of  migrant 
workers. 
ILO. International Labour Organisation. 
IPA. In-principle approval. A letter given to a 
migrant worker in his home country after 
MOM approves the Work Permit 
application. The IPA states the basic 
salary, allowances, and deductions. 
i-Report. The incident report or accident 
report describing the workplace accident, 
filed by the employer and/or the worker 
with MOM. Lawyers often file this report 
on behalf  of  their clients. 
Judgment or Order. Settlement agreements 
registered with MOM, Labour Court 
judgments or orders, Employment 
8
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Claims Tribunal judgments, and Notice 
of  Assessment orders under WICA, 
among others. 
KET. Key employment terms. 
LCRP. Labour Court Research Project. 
Liability. Legal responsibility. In the WICA 
context it is the basis of  the injury 
compensation, eg, the employer is liable 
if  the injury is deemed a valid workplace 
injury.  
Light duty. Modified or restricted duties 
which do not interfere with a worker’s 
recovery from an injury. One important 
distinction between light duty and MC is 
that employers are required to pay all MC 
wages during the first year of  the 
worker's recovery, but light duty only for 
the time when the work permit is valid. 
Unlike MC, which is paid up to one year 
whether the work permit is valid or 
invalid, once a worker is on a Special 
Pass, there is no pay for light duty. 
LOD. Letter of  demand. A formal letter, 
usually drafted by a lawyer on behalf  of  a 
client, which makes a demand for 
payment or action. 
LOG. Letter of  guarantee. Employers are 
asked to provide this document to clinics 
or hospitals to guarantee payment for an 
injured worker’s medical tests and 
treatment. 
Makan. Malay word which means “to eat”, 
“meal”, or “food.” 
MC. Medical certificate. A certificate issued 
by the treating doctor showing the 
number of  days a patient should take rest 
from work due to a medical condition. 
MOM. Ministry of  Manpower. 
NOA. Notice of  Assessment. A document 
issued by MOM showing percentage of  
incapacity (ranging from 0 to 100 
percent) as defined by the Guide to 
Traumatic Injuries and the amount of  
work injury compensation. The NOA is 
issued by MOM based on the doctor’s 
assessment of  the incapacity and sent to 
the employee (or his legal representative), 
the employer and the insurer. These 
stakeholders can contest the NOA within 
two weeks of  the date of  service. 
NPO. Non-profit organisation. The 
Singaporean NPOs referred to in this 
paper are Transient Workers Count Too 
(TWC2), the Humanitarian Organization 
for Migration Economics (HOME), 
HealthServe, and the Migrant Workers 
Centre (MWC). We use the term NPO to 
inc lude both organisat ions with 
government affiliation (normally referred 
to as voluntary welfare organisations) and 
those without governmental affiliation 
(normally referred to non-governmental 
organisations).   
NUS. National University of  Singapore. 
PHC. Pre-hearing conference. The PHC, 
conducted by an ACL with the employee 
and the employer (or their legal 
representatives), allows an opportunity 
for the judge to hear arguments from 
both sides as well as to assess the 
evidence available. When sufficient 
material from both sides has been 
presented, the judge will convene a 
Labour Court hearing. Workers rarely use 
this term, usually referring to the sessions 
simply as meetings. 
Points. The degree of  permanent incapacity 
or permanent disability, ranging from 0 
to 100 percent. This percentage, 
9
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multiplied by the worker’s average 
monthly earnings and a factor relating to 
the worker’s age, determines the amount 
of  compensation. 
Q u a n t u m . T h e a m o u n t o f  t h e 
compensation, used in the WICA claim 
context. 
Receiving country. Also referred to as 
destination or host country, the country 
the migrant worker travels to for work. 
SEC. Standard Employment Contract. 
Sending country. Also referred to as 
country of  origin or source county. In 
this report, it is the home county of  the 
migrant worker, the country they will 
return to after their employment in 
Singapore ends. 
Singapore Courts. Includes the State Courts, 
High Court, and Court of  Appeal. The 
State Courts (previously known as the 
Subordinate Courts) form the first tier in 
the judicial hierarchy. They comprise the 
District Courts, Magistrates' Courts, and 
other specialised courts, such as the 
Coroner's Court and the Small Claims 
Tr ibuna l s. The Dis t r i c t Cour t s, 
Magistrates’ Courts and Small Claims 
Tribunals can hear civil matters where 
disputed amounts do not exceed 
$250 ,000 , $60 ,000 and $10 ,000 , 
respectively. The second tier is the 
Supreme Court, made up of  the High 
Court and Court of  Appeal, the latter 
being the highest court in Singapore. The 
Supreme Court has inherent jurisdiction 
to try all civil and criminal claims, unlike 
the State Courts, and it hears appeals 
from these courts. Civil claims with a 
subject matter exceeding $250,000, 
criminal cases involving offences that 
carry the death penalty, an imprisonment 
term of  over 10 years or are non-bailable, 
as well as admiralty, winding-ups, 
bankruptcies and admissions are 
commenced in the High Court, instead 
of  the State Courts. 
SMU. Singapore Management University. 
S-Pass. A type of  work pass for mid-level 
skilled migrant workers who earn at least 
S$2,200 a month and have the relevant 
qualifications and work experience.  
Special Pass. A document which legalises a 
worker’s stay in Singapore while his injury 
or salary claim is considered, but does 
not allow the pass holder to work. The 
MOM issues Special Passes to workers 
when their work pass has been cancelled. 
TWC2. Transient Workers Count Too. 
Singaporean non-profit organisation that 
provides services for and advocates on 
behalf  of  low-wage migrant workers. 
WICA. Work Injury Compensation Act. The 
MOM’s no-fault compensation system 
that includes payment for: permanent 
incapacity, MC days, and medical 
expenses. 
Worker. In this report, worker refers to 
migrant worker and foreign employee. 
WP. Work Permit. A type of  work pass that is 
usually issued to low-wage workers 
within 14 days of  their arrival in 
Singapore. When workers say the boss or 
MOM has “cut my Work Permit”, they 
mean the Work Permit has been 
cancelled. 
WPR. Work pass regulations. 
WSS. Writ of  seizure and sale. 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EXECUTIVE  
SUMMARY 
This research seeks to review and analyze the 
protections afforded to migrant workers in 
Singapore who bring salary and injury claims 
to the Ministry of  Manpower for resolution. 
Our focus is male Work Permit holders from 
Bangladesh, China, and India who make up 
the majority of  the workforce in Singapore’s 
construction and marine sectors. Work Permit 
holders are the lowest wage category of  
foreign workers and comprise nearly a third 
of  the overall workforce. While these workers 
play an important role in building the nation, 
they face workplace issues that many would 
not associate with a modern economy.  
The impetus for this research project was the 
persistent numbers of  migrant workers with 
salary and injury issues who approach 
Singapore’s migrant worker non-profit 
organisations (NPOs) for assistance. While 
Singapore has continued to improve labour 
laws in recent years—to enhance employee 
p r o t e c t i o n s a n d c l a r i f y e m p l o y e r 
responsibilities, for example the 2015 
legislative amendments requiring employers 
to provide key employment terms—the 
persistence of  workplace issues for migrant 
workers shows a disconnect between the 
intent of  these protections and the practical 
realities for a subset of  workers with salary 
and injury issues.  
By analysing the causes of  these issues, as 
well as the salary and injury claim system’s 
responses, this research aims to help policy 
makers reduce gaps and strengthen dispute 
THE IMPETUS FOR THIS RESEARCH 
PROJECT WAS THE PERSISTENT 
NUMBERS OF MIGRANT WORKERS WITH 
SALARY AND INJURY ISSUES WHO 
APPROACH SINGAPORE’S MIGRANT 
WORKER NON-PROFIT ORGANISATIONS 
(NPOS) FOR ASSISTANCE. 
resolution mechanisms available to migrant 
workers. Drawing on legal and sociological 
methods, we employed a two-pronged 
approach. Through a review of  legislation, 
Parliamentary debates, regulations, case law, 
and the claims system we sought to 
understand the legislative intent and the 
current legal and regulatory framework that 
seeks to protect workers and guide resolution 
of  their claims. Our analysis finds that while 
the legislative and regulatory framework 
governing the employment of  migrant 
workers is designed to provide substantial 
protections, four factors appear to undermine 
the se p ro t ec t i ons : m ig r an t worke r 
vulnerability, ambiguous legal language, 
violat ions of  the law, and gaps in 
administration. Our sociological analysis 
draws on 157 qualitative interviews with 
claimant migrant workers, as well as 
interviews and consultations with a range of  
stakeholders, including academics, industry 
representatives, and legal and medical 
practitioners. This is further supported by 
relevant literature on low-wage migrant 
workers in Singapore.  
!11
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Our recommendations were developed both 
through consolidating our legal and 
soc io log i c a l ana l y s i s , and th rough  
consultations with migrant workers, migrant 
worker NPOs, and other experts in the fields 
of  employment law, legal aid, and healthcare. 
In each recommendation area, we reviewed 
policies and legislation in comparative 
jurisdictions, such as Hong Kong, Taiwan, 
Malaysia, United Arab Emirates, Qatar, 
Australia, and Germany. The development of  
our recommendations was guided and 
informed by the key principles that undergird 
regional and international benchmarks and 
labour standards agreed upon by international 
institutions such as ASEAN, the International 
Labour Organization, and United Nations 
agencies. We acknowledge that the 
recommendations have associated costs for 
government, employers, and workers, and 
potential downstream implications. These 
costs may constrain policy options. We have 
sought to identify ways to reduce ambiguity 
and simplify systems to improve efficiency 
and create greater deterrence, which are 
intended to reduce incidents and costs over 
the long term. We present an abbreviated 
version of  our recommendations below. See 
the full version of  our recommendations in 
Chapter 4. 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
1 Require that before arrival in Singapore, Work Permit holders sign a Standard 
Employment Contract (SEC) that sets forth minimum standards embodied in 
the Employment Act (EA), Employment of  Foreign Manpower Act (EFMA), 
and other relevant legislation. 
The SEC will include predetermined minimum contractual parameters and key 
employment terms, and will be made available in a language the worker understands 
to workers before the Work Permit is issued. Changes to employment terms and 
conditions set forth in the SEC made after the employee’s arrival in Singapore that 
are less favourable to the employee must be authorised by MOM. 
 
2 Require payment of  salaries and allowances by electronic transfer or through 
payroll services for all Work Permit holders. 
The Ministry of  Manpower can provide assistance packages to employers, and 
facilitate accessible and affordable bank transfer or payroll service options for Work 
Permit holders, in coordination with employers and local banks. 
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3 Amend Employment Act, Employment of  Foreign Manpower Act, Work 
Injury Compensation Act, and related regulations and policies. 
For the EA, simplify rules regarding salary payments, extend the one-year claim 
limitation to three years for salary claims, and require employers to provide and 
maintain receipts for salary payments, for payments made for actual costs of  meals, 
accommodation and amenities provided to employees, for employee medical 
payments, and for deductions made from salaries. Employers should also maintain 
records of  any payments workers make to agents.  
For EFMA, require that any changes to the Standard Employment Contract to 
reduce employment terms be reviewed and approved by MOM in order to be 
enforceable. This process should involve all parties and take into account the limited 
bargaining power of  migrant workers. For WICA, clarify and strengthen application 
of  the presumption that an injury is related to work if  it occurred at the workplace to 
better reflect legislative intent. Create a six-month time limit on MOM’s initial 
determination of  the validity of  the workplace injury. 
 
4 Improve claims process through access to information and enhancing 
safeguards. 
Our recommendations include providing clear information on procedural rules, 
decision-making criteria, evidentiary requirements as well as time and costs involved, 
and ensuring this information is available in the languages of  Work Permit holders. In 
assessing the credibility of  witnesses for the company, give greater consideration to 
whether the witness is employed by that company and whether he has an interest in 
the outcome of  the claim. MOM or other officers with mediation or settlement 
responsibility should be accredited by a recognised external organisation such as the 
Singapore Mediation Centre and have legal training. Increase access to the Change of  
Employer (COE) scheme for claimants and abolish the employer permission 
requirement, and allow access to the Foreign Construction Worker Directory System 
(FCWDS) for claimants on Special Pass. Enhance employer compliance with 
responsibilities to employees during the claims process by establishing and 
monitoring MOM requirements to provide specific dollar amounts per month for 
food and housing. 
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5 Improve claims reporting mechanisms and injury prevention. 
Recommendations here include the extension of  MOM hours and creation of  
alternative sites so workers can access information or file claims on Sundays and 
evenings. Additionally, require healthcare providers or their surrogates to report to 
MOM when a Work Permit holder is issued more than three days MC, or is 
hospitalised for more than 24 hours. Employ independent safety supervisors on 
worksites and strengthen employee representation on workplace safety and health 
committees. 
 
6 Ensure Work Permit holders have access to the full range of  documentation 
that may be needed to bring a claim.  
This includes the various forms of  documentary evidence migrant workers need for 
both salary and injury claims (eg the IPA, contract, time cards, pay slips, work injury 
incident reports, medical records, etc). Legislation should direct an adverse inference 
and ensure penalties if  employers fail to provide these documents. The power to 
order discovery of  these documents should be utilised, and affordable forensics 
analysis provided if  the authenticity of  a document or signature is reasonably in 
question. Medical facilities should ensure that patients have access to their medical 
documents. 
 
7 Increase transparency and effectiveness of  the mediation and adjudication 
process. 
Our suggestions include the publication of  written Labour Court decisions and 
judgments through the MOM website (or, in the alternative, the law reports), creation 
of  a body of  precedents available to all parties who wish to access them; provision to 
all parties with information from MOM’s investigations; open mediation, Labour 
Court and ECT sessions to a limited number of  nominated observers; and to permit 
migrant workers to be accompanied by volunteer non-legal representatives during 
mediation and adjudication proceedings.  
 
8 Improve access to medical care for Work Permit holders. 
Recommendations here include providing workers with insurance cards to directly 
access medical care up to a limited amount; requiring employers to pay for their 
employees’ medical treatment and procedures that the doctor deems medically 
necessary without a Letter of  Guarantee; maintaining a central register of  Work 
Permit holders’ insurers accessible to healthcare providers to clarify insurance 
coverage; and establishing a government fund or subsidy for migrant workers whose 
medical expenses exceed the S$36,000 insurance coverage limit and whose employers 
are unable to pay. 
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9 Enhance stakeholder engagement and education. 
Recommendations here include creating a central resource center to provide 
information to healthcare providers on issues related to the injury claim process for 
migrant workers; enhancing education to increase understanding of  Members of  the 
Singapore Medical Council, the Law Society and the General Insurance Association 
of  Singapore about migrant worker issues and employer responsibilities before and 
during the claim process; and extending pro bono and/or legal aid services to 
migrant workers. 
 
10 Strengthen enforcement regime. 
Recommendations here include establishing a dedicated unit to help Work Permit 
holders enforce judgments; extend the Special Pass period for Work Permit holders 
to enforce judgments; and require employers to deposit a minimum sum at the start 
of  the claim, and pay judgments and settlement orders directly to MOM or a Public 
Trustee.  
Penalties should be increased and strictly enforced for employers who engage in 
practices such as failing to pay judgments and settlement orders, failing to pay or 
underpaying employee salaries, failing to report workplace injuries within stipulated 
timelines, and failing to meet their responsibilities in paying for meals, 
accommodation and medical care of  employees.
15
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CHAPTER 1:  
INTRODUCTION 
In the past decade, migrant worker support, 
both formal and informal, has grown 
considerably. Migrant worker organizations 
such as Transient Workers Count Too 
(TWC2), the Humanitarian Organization for 
Migration Economics (HOME), HealthServe, 
and the Archdiocesan Commission for the 
Pastoral Care of  Migrants and Itinerant 
People (ACMI), have expanded their 
programmes and collectively provide a wide 
range of  services, from food, housing, and 
financial support to case work assistance, 
skills and language training, as well as 
subsidized medical and dental care.  The 1
Migrant Workers’ Centre (MWC), a bipartite 
initiative of  the National Trades Union 
Congress (NTUC) and the Singapore 
National Employers’ Federation (SNEF), was 
set up in 2009 to promote better employment 
practices and provide aid for distressed 
migrant workers.  There are also religious-2
based organizations and other volunteer 
groups, including arts and community-driven 
initiatives, that perform outreach and organise 
activities with, or related to, migrant workers 
in Singapore.  This expansion has paralleled 3
the growth of  the country’s migrant worker 
numbers,  and has sensitised an increasing 4
number of  people to the working and living 
conditions of  migrant workers in Singapore. 
The expansion also reflects a growing 
demand for services (see Appendix 4), with 
NPOs seeing a steady stream of  migrant 
workers seeking basic needs support and 
assistance with salary and injury claims.  
Additionally, migrant worker NPOs that 
provide case work assistance through 
administrative and liaison support are 
increasingly supplementing these efforts with 
research and policy advocacy. Singapore’s 
labour laws have continued to improve in 
recent years, with attempts to close gaps, 
protect employees and clarify employer 
responsibilities. Yet empirical realities, as 
witnessed by migrant worker NPOs on a 
regular basis, expose what appear to be gaps 
between legislative intent and actual outcomes 
for migrant workers with salary and injury 
claims. This study aims to further close those 
gaps and strengthen the dispute resolution 
mechanisms available to migrant workers. 
This study also aims to contribute to, and 
participate in, the ongoing dialogue and 
mult i-stakeholder effor t to improve 
employment conditions for migrant workers 
in Singapore. 
 Further details on the services provided by TWC2, HOME, HealthServe and ACMI can be found on their websites: TWC2 1
http://twc2.org.sg/; HOME: http://www.home.org.sg/; HealthServe: http://www.healthserve.org.sg/; ACMI: http://
www.acmi.org.sg/. 
 Migrant Workers’ Centre, “Who we are” (accessed 8 November 2016), http://tinyurl.com/mwcsg1. 2
 There are church groups that organize recreational activities or skills training for migrant workers, individual efforts to promote 3
social projects involving migrant workers such as Geylang Adventures (http://www.geylangadventures.com/projects/), as well as 
groups like SAMASAMA (https://www.facebook.com/groups/samasama2016/) that aim to use art and dialogue as a platform 
to change perceptions of  migrant workers. There are also a growing number of  multi-stakeholder collaborations, such as the 
Migrant Worker Poetry Competition (http://www.singaporeworkerpoetry.com/).
 Ministry of  Manpower, “Foreign workforce numbers” (accessed 8 November 2016), http://www.mom.gov.sg/documents-and-4
publications/foreign-workforce-numbers 
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1. THE LABOUR COURT RESEARCH PROJECT 
  
The Labour Court Research Project (LCRP) 
was created in response to the persistent 
number of  low-wage migrant workers who 
approach migrant worker non-profit 
organisations (NPOs) for support and help 
with their salary and injury issues (for more 
details, see Appendix 4). Collectively, NPOs 
that provide support to migrant workers 
assist several thousand workers each year. In 
the specific case of  TWC2, this assistance 
includes support for basic needs as well as 
guidance regarding the salary and injury 
claims process, including claims that are 
unresolved and advance to Labour Court. 
  
This persistence is compounded by the 
egregious nature of  the issues raised. Injured 
workers report an inability to access the 
claims system due to threats of  repatriation 
or the repatriation of  colleagues who could 
act as witnesses. They report difficulty 
accessing medical care, both in the hours or 
days immediately following an injury, and in 
the months, sometimes years, while waiting 
for a claim to be resolved. Workers with 
salary issues report having no access to their 
contracts or have contracts that contain terms 
that violate the Employment Act or have no 
contracts at all. Others report forged 
signatures or being made to sign blank 
vouchers and incorrect pay slips. 
  
Since 2014, TWC2 has run a weekly clinic to 
provide additional assistance to migrant 
workers whose claims proceed to prehearing 
conference and Labour Court. These workers 
face issues related to the longer-term nature 
of  their disputes, including a lack of  support 
for basic needs, as well as a lack of  guidance 
to adequately navigate the adjudication 
process. Volunteers see workers without 
English language skills or experience of  the 
law who are expected to cross-examine 
employers’ witnesses, collect and present 
evidence, and represent themselves in Labour 
Court hearings. 
  
In late 2015, TWC2 received a grant to 
u n d e r t a k e r e s e a r c h a n a l y s i n g t h e 
circumstances that give rise to salary and 
injury claims, the dispute resolution 
mechanisms offered by mediation and 
adjudication, and possible recommendations 
for improvement. With this grant, the LCRP 
began. The LCRP assembled a team of  
academics, students, NPO volunteers and 
other interested stakeholders (over 100 
people in total) to conduct a year-long review 
of  the salary and injury claims system, 
workers’ experiences with their claims, and 
processes used in other jurisdictions. While 
the research began with a focus on Labour 
Court, it was extended to include a review of  
the entire claims process. 
  
A key puzzle for the members of  our team 
was how ‘law on the books’—detailed, 
encompassing, noble in its intentions—
becomes so different in its application that 
legislative intent is undermined. While 
legislative protections exist and continue to be 
strengthened, migrant workers who turn to 
NPOs often express frustration with 
Singapore’s claim system. Their perception of  
complex legal and evidentiary procedures, 
compounded by their tenuous legal status, 
often leave them feeling disempowered. 
We attempt to address this issue from two 
sides, the first legal, the second sociological. 
Our legal analysis is presented in Chapter 2: 
Legislative and Regulatory Framework. In this 
18
LABOUR PROTECTION FOR THE VULNERABLE | CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
!
chapter we seek to understand and highlight 
the legislative intent of  the key legal 
provisions governing migrant workers’ 
employment in Singapore as well as the 
dispute resolution process used to resolve 
salary and injury issues. We review 
Singapore’s statutes and regulations related to 
the employment of  migrant workers and the 
procedures required for filing claims and 
resolving disputes through the Ministry of  
Manpower (MOM)’s media t ion and 
adjudication systems. We identify related 
issues reported by various sources, such as 
newspapers, NPO reports, and other 
academics, and attempt to understand how 
existing laws and/or their administration 
might contain gaps that exacerbate migrant 
worker vulnerability. The legal analysis team 
includes academics, lawyers, law students and 
others with expertise in migrant worker 
issues. 
Our sociological analysis is presented in 
Chapter 3: Key Findings from Interviews. In 
this chapter we seek to understand how 
employment law and the claims process is 
experienced by migrant workers. We 
interviewed 157 migrant workers who sought 
assistance from the following migrant worker 
NPOs: TWC2, HOME, HealthServe, and 
MWC. These semi-structured interviews 
provide an opportunity for workers to share 
their experiences of  working in Singapore 
and of  attempting to resolve salary or injury 
problems. Additional interviews were 
conducted with other stakeholders, including 
NPO staff  and volunteers, industry 
representatives, academics, as well as legal and 
medical practitioners. After a thorough 
analysis, we identify recurring, common 
experiences of  workers, and apparent 
mechanisms that give rise to these problems. 
Through this analysis we gained insights that 
can serve to improve the current system. 
  
One overarching objective guides this project: 
to provide a set of  comprehensive 
recommendations geared towards improving 
the claims system for migrant workers and, 
ultimately, for all stakeholders. These 
recommendations are presented in Chapter 4. 
In writing this chapter we consulted NPOs, 
academics, and a range of  legal, medical, and 
other experts; we also conducted a review of  
policies and legislation that address similar 
issues in comparative jurisdictions. From our 
legal review and our consultation with 
migrant worker practitioners, we have also 
developed a brochure for migrant workers to 
clarify the claims process in Bengali, Chinese 
and Tamil. 
  
The LCRP received institutional review board 
approva l f rom both the S ing apore 
Management University and the National 
University of  Singapore to ensure that our 
research methodologies adhered to the 
highest ethical standards. This was especially 
critical because the majority of  our 
interviewees are from a recognisably 
vulnerable social group. LCRP research has 
been reviewed by academic peer reviewers 
and benefited from the inputs and feedback 
from the Ministry of  Manpower prior to 
publication and dissemination. 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2. METHODS 
The primary source data for this study is 
qualitative interviews with workers and other 
stakeholders involved in the salary and injury 
claims process for migrant workers. Our goal 
is to understand how the claims process for 
salary and injury claims is experienced by the 
migrant workers we interviewed, and to 
examine the processes and mechanisms that 
give rise to persistent problems. Most of  the 
interviews were conducted with claimant 
migrant workers who sought assistance from 
migrant worker NPOs, and a smaller number 
of  inter views were conducted with 
academics, lawyers, medical professionals, 
employers and NPO representatives. 
Addi t iona l ly, perspect ives of  other 
stakeholders are captured through secondary 
data including a study on employer attitudes 
about the claim system based on interviews 
with 15 employers of  migrant workers,  off-5
the-record consultations with practitioners 
and the Ministry of  Manpower, and other 
publicly available secondary sources. This 
study also includes a review of  relevant 
legislation, regulations, and case law. 
Collectively, these sources provide a 
framework for understanding the legal 
underpinnings of  our claims system, as well 
as other stakeholders’ perspectives about the 
claims process. 
2.1. Methodology for primary qualitative 
data 
Semi-structured interviews were conducted 
with 157 claimant migrant workers, three 
academics, five lawyers, five medical 
professionals, one employer, and seven NPO 
representatives. The interviews clarify the 
perspectives of  stakeholders about their 
experience and understanding of  the claims 
process and related issues.  
This study received ethics approval from the 
institutional review boards of  the Singapore 
Management University and the National 
University of  Singapore. All interviewees 
agreed to an informed consent, by either 
signing their consent or verbally indicating 
consent. All interview information has been 
anonymised. 
The 157 claimant workers were selected 
through convenience sampling at the location 
of  the NPO where they were seeking 
assistance. The majority of  the Indian and 
Bangladeshi workers were interviewed at the 
TWC2 meal program in Little India (The 
Cuff  Road Project), while the majority of  the 
Chinese workers were interviewed at the 
HealthServe day shelter in Geylang. 
Interviews were conducted either in the 
worker’s native language or in English for 
workers proficient in English. Similarly, the 
other stakeholders were selected by means of  
convenience sampling  and interviewed in 6
English via conference call or at locations 
suggested by the interviewee. 
Interviewers carried out semi-structured 
interviews with migrant workers which 
covered the following topics: a detailed 
background on events that lead to the making 
of  a claim, experiences of  the claim process 
including mediation and Labour Court, 
reasons for migrating to Singapore and 
experiences of  migration, a brief  background 
on their employer and relations with their 
employer, and background questions on their 
experiences of  signing an employment 
contract and being paid for overtime.  
 Koh, Stanley (2014) “Paper-cuts, unseen falls and invisible back injuries: employer perceptions of  workplace 5
injuries and runaway migrant workers in Singapore.” Bachelor dissertation, School of  Social Sciences, Singapore 
Management University. 
 Convenience sampling is a type of  non-probability statistical sampling method where the elements in the 6
population are selected based on the ease of  accessibility and availability.
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For further information on our methodology, 
consult Appendices 1 and 2. Appendix 1 
contains an explanation of  the method used 
to conduct and analyse the interviews. 
Appendix 2 contains a complete list of  the 
interview questions which were asked of  
migrant workers. 
TABLE 1. Distribution of interviewed migrant workers by nationality and claim type 
 
  
FIGURE 1. Nationality of interviewed workers 
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FIGURE 2. Claim type of interviewed workers 
  
FIGURE 3. Industry of interviewed workers 
2 . 2 . P r o f i l e a n d b a c k g r o u n d o f  
interviewed workers 
Figure 1 shows the distribution of  nationality 
of  the 157 workers we interviewed. Sixty 
percent of  the workers are Bangladeshi, 30 
percent are Chinese, 9 percent are Indian, and 
1 percent was of  other or unknown 
nationalities. 
Figure 2 shows the types of  claims filed by 
the 157 workers. Seventy-nine percent of  the 
workers filed injury claims (59 percent filed 
only injury claims and 20 percent filed both 
injury and salary claims). Thirty-six percent 
of  workers filed salary claims, 16 percent filed 
only salary claims and 20 percent filed both 
injury and salary claims. Five percent of  the 
22
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interviewees either had yet to file a claim or 
did not specify their claim type. 
Figure 3 shows the distribution among the 
three industries of  the 157 workers. Sixty-five 
percent were in the construction industry, 15 
percent in the marine industry, and 20 percent 
were from other industries or did not specify 
their industry. 
2.3. Limitations of  the study 
One limitation of  the study is that the 
population of  sampled workers is inherently 
biased towards workers who have approached 
an NPO for assistance in relation to the claim 
process. This method excludes workers who 
filed a claim and were able to resolve their 
claims successfully and did not have to seek 
assistance from an NPO. At the same time, 
this also excludes workers in the most 
disadvantaged positions, workers who have 
need to or have filed a claim but were 
unsuccessful and were not able to seek help 
from an NPO. We acknowledge this 
limitation; our report is meant to address 
issues faced by the subpopulation of  workers 
who have lodged a claim and sought help 
from NPOs for the significant challenges they 
faced.  
Another limitation is that our study weighed 
in more on worker interviews as compared to 
other-stakeholder interviews. A large reason 
for this is the difficulty in gaining access to 
other stakeholders such as employers, 
professionals, and policy makers due to 
limited availability and reluctance to publicly 
share their insights. We endeavoured to 
present a balanced inquiry through numerous 
formal and informal discussions with legal 
and medical professionals, employers, agents, 
i n d u s t r y r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s , N P O 
representatives, and MOM on top of  our 
interviews with migrant workers. 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CHAPTER 2:  
LEGISLATIVE AND REGULATORY 
FRAMEWORK 
 
In this chapter we review and analyse the 
existing legislative and regulatory frameworks 
governing the employment of  migrant 
workers in Singapore. We draw the reader’s 
attention to the strengths and potential 
weaknesses of  existing legislation and 
regulations.  
This chapter fits into the larger structure of  
the report in two ways: first, by showing how 
the existing legislation and regulations 
provide protections to workers, and second, 
by showing how some of  these protections 
may be undermined by four main factors: 
migrant worker vulnerability, interpretation 
of  legal language, violations of  the law, and 
gaps in administration.  
This chapter is divided into three parts: a 
brief  background on migrant workers in 
Singapore, a review of  the major legislation 
regulating and protecting migrant workers, 
and a review of  the salary and injury claims 
process.  
!25
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1.MIGRANT WORKERS IN SINGAPORE 
Singapore heavily relies on foreign labour, 
particularly in the low-wage sectors. It has 
one of  the highest foreign-to-local labour 
ratios in the world, behind the Gulf  States.  7
Sixty-eight percent of  low-wage manual jobs 
in Singapore are filled by Work Permit 
holders, the lowest wage category of  work 
passes.  In 2015, foreigners numbered 1.4 8
million or 38 percent of  Singapore’s total 
workforce;  with 32 percent or almost 1.2 9
million hired on Work Permits.  The highest 10
concentration of  migrant workers is in 
construction at approximately 80 percent,  11
followed by manufacturing at approximately 
54 percent, then services at about 31 percent.  
Many come to Singapore from countries with 
poor economic conditions, high levels of  
unemployment, and irregular or very low-
wage work. They arrive in search of  financial 
opportunities, and with aspirations to support 
their families back home and to achieve social 
 Singapore sits behind the Gulf  Cooperation Council (GCC) countries (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi 7
Arabia and the United Arab Emirates) where foreign guest workers constitute about 68 percent of  all employment, 
and over 90 percent in Qatar and the United Arab Emirates in 2010. See Naufal G and Genc I. “Labor Migration in 
the GCC Countries: past, present and future”, NUS, Middle East Institute, Singapore Middle East Papers, No. 9/2, 
2 June 2014. Cross referenced with the latest data on the GCC Gulf  Research Centre website (accessed November 
6, 2016). With a few other exceptions such as Brunei and Macau where foreign workers respectively made up about 
44% (in 2009 based on Ministry of  Home Affairs private sector employment by residential status data & 
Department of  Economic Planning & Development total labour force estimates) and 30% (in 2014 based on Macau 
SAR Statistics and Census Service) of  total employment, proportions of  the national workforces consisting of  
foreign workers on work visas in other mid-to-high income countries are typically much lower than Singapore. For 
example: Malaysia 9.5% (“Immigration in Malaysia: Assessment of  its Economic Effects, and a Review of  the Policy 
and System”, World Bank, 2013); Taiwan approximately 6% (Ministry of  Labor); South Korea approximately 3% 
(Roh J, “Korea’s Employment Permit System and Wage Development of  Foreign Workers” Public Policy and 
Administration Review, September 2014, Vol. 2, No. 3, pp. 41-63 & ILO data); Australia approximately 1% (stock of  
457 Visas, though there are other student and holiday visas categories allowing some work. See “A National 
Disgrace: The Exploitation of  Temporary Work Visa Holders”, Senate Enquiry, March 2016). Across the EU 
countries foreign workers made up 7.4 % of  persons in employment in 2015. The split between intra- and extra-EU 
migrants was 3.6 % with citizenship from another EU country, and 3.8 % from outside the EU. Source: Eurostat, 
Labour market and Labour force survey.
 Ministry of  Manpower last modified September 15, (2016) Foreign workforce numbers, http://www.mom.gov.sg/8
documents-and-publications/foreign-workforce-numbers (accessed October 12, 2016). Similar figures are not 
available for Work Permit holders in the marine industry. The ratio of  Work Permit holders to total residents 
employed as ‘Production & Transport Operators, Cleaners & Labourers and in Related Occupations’ was 2.1:1 at 
June 2014. As at June 2014 there were 980,800 Foreign Work Permit holders (MOM) and 465,300 Resident 
employees employed as “Production & Transport Operators, Cleaners & Labourers and in Related 
Occupations” (Source: The Labour Force in Singapore, 2014, MOM). These are approximations as there may be 
some foreign workers in the S-Pass category undertaking some of  the lower skilled occupations listed for Singapore 
Residents. Also, not all foreign Work Permit holders may be in these occupations. Some, possibly foreign domestic 
workers, could be in the “Clerical, Sales and Service occupations” category, though there would be minimal numbers 
of  Residents in this occupation.
 As of  Dec. 2015. “Annual Employment Change by Industry and Residential Status”, Ministry of  Manpower.9
 As of  Dec. 2015. Ministry of  Manpower last modified September 15, (2016). Foreign workforce numbers, http://10
www.mom.gov.sg/documents-and-publications/foreign-workforce-numbers (accessed October 12, 2016). Similar figures are not 
available for Work Permit holders in the marine industry. 
 These percentages include foreign workers in all categories (EP, SP and WP) and were derived by subtracting 11
Resident Employment numbers by industry from Total Employment numbers in the same industry (sourced from 
Administrative Records and the Labour Force Survey) as at June 2014.  While total foreign employment was 
estimated at about 388,000 (or 80%) in the Construction sector using this method, there were 321,200 low-wage 
Work Permit employees making up 66% of  total Construction employment in 2014.
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mobility in their home countries because of  
their work in Singapore.  
1.1. Work Permit system 
  
This report focuses on male migrant Work 
Permit holders (hereafter ‘migrant workers’, 
‘workers’ or ‘employees’) employed in the 
construction and marine sectors. As of  June 
2016, 326,700 migrant workers were 
employed in the construction industry.  12
Specific numbers for those working in the 
mar ine sector are unava i lab le. The 
construction and marine sectors, like other 
industries, are bound by source country 
restrictions, which determine the nationalities 
allowed to work in particular industries.  13
Although the Singapore Government does 
not release a breakdown of  nationalities in 
the foreign workforce, the construction 
industry appears to employ a majority of  
workers from Bangladesh, China and India. 
In January 2016, the High Commissioner of  
Bangladesh estimated that of  the more than 
160,000 Bangladeshi nationals in Singapore, 
over 90 percent work in the construction and 
marine industries.   14
The work pass system regulates the 
employment of  foreign employees in 
Singapore. Work pass types include the 
Employment Pass (for professionals and 
executives who earn at least S$3,300 a 
month),  the S-Pass (for mid-skilled technical 15
staff  who earn at least S$2,200 a month),  16
and the Work Permit (those primarily 
engaged in manual labour and domestic work, 
who have no minimum salary).  Work 17
Permits may be renewed every one or two 
years. The migrant workers who are the focus 
of  this study earn between approximately 
S$400 and S$1,500 per month, with South 
Asian workers generally earning significantly 
lower salaries (in the S$400-S$800 range) than 
their Chinese counterparts.   18
S ing apore u t i l i s e s the sponsorsh ip 
employment system, also known as the kafala 
system, which makes a migrant worker’s 
employment in Singapore contingent on 
 Ministry of  Manpower last modified September 15, (2016) Foreign workforce numbers, http://12
www.mom.gov.sg/documents-and-publications/foreign-workforce-numbers (accessed October 12, 2016). 
 See the individual sector-specific requirements for different industries on MOM’s website: Ministry of  Manpower 13
(2016) Sector-specific rules for Work Permit, http://www.mom.gov.sg/passes-and-permits/work-permit-for-
foreign-worker/sector-specific-rules (accessed 12 October 2016). While commonly termed migrant workers, they do 
not have the ability to migrate to Singapore.
 Platt, Maria, Grace Baey, Brenda SA Yeoh, Choon Yen Khoo, and Theodora Lam (2016) “Debt, precarity and 14
gender: male and female temporary labour migrants in Singapore.” Journal of  Ethnic and Migration Studies 1-18. p. 9. 
 Ministry of  Manpower(2016) Employment Pass, http://www.mom.gov.sg/passes-and-permits/employment-pass 15
(accessed 12 October 2016). This S$3,300 will be raised to S$3,600 a month in January 2017.
 Ministry of  Manpower (2016) S Pass, http://www.mom.gov.sg/passes-and-permits/s-pass (accessed 12 October 16
2016). 
 According to MOM, the Work Permit is “generally issued to foreign low-skilled workers with a monthly fixed 17
salary of  not more than S$2,000”. See “Glossary of  terms”, Ministry of  Manpower (accessed 12 October 2016), 
h t tp ://www.mom.g ov. sg/~/med i a/mom/document s/pre s s - r e l e a se s/2012/annex%20c%20-
%20glossary%20of%20terms.pdf. 
 A Straits Times report in 2012 stated that Chinese construction workers earn monthly wages of  S$1,000 to S$1,500 18
on average, while those from India and Bangladesh earn between S$480 and S$800. Bal’s research on Bangladeshi 
construction workers revealed basic daily rates of  around S$18 to S$20 a day. HOME’s report on Chinese 
construction workers, meanwhile, cited gross monthly salaries that range from S$1,000 to $1,500 a month. See Yan 
Min, Chia and Zaccheus, Melody (2012) “Hard life, but foreign workers labour on”, Straits Times, 10 December 
Charanpal Singh Bal, (2016) Production politics and migrant labour regimes: Guest workers in Asia and the Gulf. London: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 38; HOME (2011) The exploitation of  migration Chinese construction workers in Singapore, 
www.home.org.sg/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/PRC_MCW_Report_final_2011.pdf.
27
LABOUR PROTECTION FOR THE VULNERABLE | CHAPTER 2: LEGISLATIVE AND REGULATORY FRAMEWORK 
!
sponsorship by a single employer. While 
sponsorship systems are present in many 
countries including Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, 
Qatar and the United Arab Emirates, their 
use has been criticised because such 
contingency increases the bargaining power 
of  employers vis-à-vis workers.  In 19
Singapore, employers may cancel a worker’s 
Work Permit and repatriate him at any time 
unless the worker has made or intends to 
make a salary or injury claim. Discretion over 
the validity of  such claims rests with MOM. 
The Work Permit system imposes specific 
regulations and restrictions that are not 
imposed on workers or employers of  other 
work pass categories. Work Permit holders, 
for example, are not entitled to bring their 
families to Singapore, and face restrictions on 
marriage to Singaporeans.  Employers are 20
required to post a S$5,000 security bond 
before a Work Permit holder is allowed to 
enter Singapore. While this employer liability 
is discharged when a migrant worker returns 
home, the security bond is liable to forfeiture 
if  a migrant worker is not repatriated when 
required to leave or if  the migrant worker 
‘absconds ’ and remains i l l eg a l ly in 
Singapore.  This security bond is usually 21
provided in the form of  a banker’s or 
insurance guarantee,  rather than a full 22
payment of  S$5,000. However, the possibility 
of  losing S$5,000 amplifies employers’ 
anxieties around workers’ movements and 
leads to practices such as the withholding of  
migrant workers’ passports.  Employers 23
must pay a monthly levy for each Work 
Permit holder they employ. Currently, the 
foreign worker levy ranges from S$300 to 
S$950 a month for each construction worker, 
and S$300 to S$400 for each worker in the 
marine sector.  Although prohibited by law, 24
considerable numbers of  workers claim that 
their employers recover these costs through 
 Under a sponsorship or kafala system, foreign nationals need a local sponsor or kafeel, in most cases an employer, 19
to obtain residence or a Work Permit. Under this system, workers generally do not have the right to change jobs or 
choose a new employer without the sponsor’s consent. Meanwhile, the employer retains the power to dismiss and 
send the worker back to his/her home country at any time. Workers are considered “effectively bonded” to their 
employers under this system. See Frantz, Elizabeth (2013) “Jordan’s unfree workforce: State-sponsored bonded 
labour in the Arab region”, Journal of  Development Studies, 49: 1072. See also Donald Low (2015) “Foreign worker issues: 
Rethinking Assumptions”, Straits Times, 10 Feb.
 “Singapore’s system for managing foreign manpower”, 231, http://lkyspp.nus.edu.sg/ips/wp-content/uploads/20
sites/2/2013/04/pa_MT_Managing-International-Migration-for-Development-in-East-Asia-Research-
Papers_240215.pdf  ; Ministry of  Manpower (2016) “As a Work Permit holder, how do I apply for approval to marry 
a Singaporean or permanent resident?” http://www.mom.gov.sg/faq/work-permit-for-foreign-worker/as-a-work-
permit-holder-how-do-i-apply-for-approval-to-marry-a-singaporean-or-permanent-resident (accessed 22 November 
2016).
 Ministry of  Manpower (2016) Security bond requirements for foreign worker http://www.mom.gov.sg/passes-21
and-permits/work-permit-for-foreign-worker/sector-specific-rules/security-bond (accessed 12 October 2016).
 Ministry of  Manpower (2016) Security bond requirements for foreign worker http://www.mom.gov.sg/passes-22
and-permits/work-permit-for-foreign-worker/sector-specific-rules/security-bond (accessed 12 October 2016).
 During the Committee of  Inquiry hearing into the Little India riot, it was stated by Ms Jennis Yeo, deputy 23
executive secretary of  the Building Construction and Timber Industries Employees’ Union, that migrant workers 
having to surrender their passports to their employers is “general practice across the industry”. It was also reported 
that if  migrant workers required their passports back, for example, to open a bank account, they had to pay their 
employers up to S$5,000 as a security deposit. See Leong Wai Kit (2014) “Little India riot: COI focuses on labour 
practices faced by foreign workers”, Channel News Asia, 6 March 6, http://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/
specialreports/littleindia/news/little-india-riot-coi-focuses-on-labour/1022892.html (accessed 7 November 2016). 
 Ministry of  Manpower (2016) Schedule of  foreign worker levy changes http://www.mom.gov.sg/~/media/24
mom/documents/services-forms/passes/schedule_of_levy_changes.pdf. .
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deduct ions f rom the i r sa lar ies and 
kickbacks.   25
Two elements of  the work pass system 
compound migrant worker vulnerability: the 
sponsorship system, which grants the 
employer discretion over the worker’s ability 
to remain and work in Singapore; and the 
monthly foreign worker levy, which intensifies 
the employer’s cost pressures and increases an 
employer’s incentive to recover costs from the 
worker.   26
1.2. Recruitment fees 
The Work Permit holders in our study 
typically pay recruitment fees—locally known 
and referred to as ‘agent fees’—for their job 
placement in Singapore. Fees vary according 
to nationality, sector and whether the worker 
is working at his first job, in which case the 
fees are higher.  Research shows that 27
Bangladeshi workers pay the highest agent 
fees, reportedly between S$5,000 and 
$15,000,  while earning the lowest salaries 28
(S$400–$800 a month).  A 2014 study 29
reported that Bangladeshi construction 
 Kickbacks are outlawed as per the Employment of  Foreign Manpower (Work Passes) Regulations: Fourth 25
Schedule, Part III, paragraph 10, which says: “The employer shall not demand or receive any sum or other benefit 
from an employment agency or any other person in connection with the employment or change in employment of  a 
foreign employee.” “Boss charged with collecting over $100,000 in kickbacks from foreign workers”, Straits Times, 11 
Oct. 2016, http://www.straitstimes.com/singapore/courts-crime/boss-of-wooden-case-making-firm-charged-with-
collecting-over-100k-in; “Some who employ foreign workers still demand kickbacks”, Stratis Times, 13 April 2015, 
http://www.straitstimes.com/singapore/some-who-employ-foreign-workers-still-demand-kickbacks; “Boss 
demands S$100,000 in kickbacks from foreign workers”, Straits Times, 11 October 2016, http://
www.straitstimes.com/singapore/courts-crime/boss-of-wooden-case-making-firm-charged-with-collecting-
over-100k-in; “Crackdown on employers who get kickbacks to hire foreign workers”, Straits Times, June 20, 2008 
(accessed October 12, 2016), http://news.asiaone.com/News/AsiaOne+News/Singapore/Story/
A1Story20080620-71920.html; “Employer tells worker: salary deduction is for Government levy”, TWC2, June 27, 
2013 (accessed October 12, 2016), http://twc2.org.sg/2013/06/27/employer-tells-worker-salary-deduction-is-for-
government-levy/; Bal, Charanpal Singh (2016) Production politics and migrant labour regimes: Guest workers in Asia and the 
Gulf. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 37–38.
 Bal, Charanpal Singh (2016) Production politics and migrant labour regimes: Guest workers in Asia and the Gulf. London: 26
Palgrave Macmillan, 30–32. 
 See Chapter 1. In a 2010 report by HOME and TWC2, it was reported that Indian migrant workers pay between 27
S$6,000 and S$7,000 in recruitment fees; Bangladeshi workers pay between S$8,000 and S$10,000 (a figure that 
appears to have increased significantly over the last few years); and, Chinese workers pay between S$3,000 and 
S$7,000 for jobs in construction, and S$8,000 to S$10,000 for service sector jobs. See HOME and TWC2 (2010) 
Justice Delayed, Justice Denied: The Experiences of  Migrant Workers in Singapore, p. 6. 
 Workers interviewed in this study were also asked about fees paid to agents. Among all workers, 62% paid fees of  28
over S$5,000, with one having paid S$20,000. A recent straw poll conducted by TWC2 in mid-2016 suggests that 
agent fees are rising for Bangladeshi construction workers, with the men interviewed having paid between S$10,000 
and S$16,000. See TWC2 (2016) Foreign workers chained by debt, governments have a moral duty to act, http://
twc2.org.sg/2016/10/16/foreign-workers-chained-by-debt-governments-have-a-moral-duty-to-act/ (accessed 10 
December 2016). 
 Yan Min, Chia and Zaccheus, Melody (2012) “Hard life, but foreign workers labour on”, Straits Times, December 29
12.
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workers take an average of  16.5 months to 
repay their recruitment fee.  Other research 30
indicates that, while salaries in the 
construction and marine sectors are flat or 
declining, agent fees continue to rise.   31
The migration industry is as complex as it is 
profitable, with its growth linked to the 
formalisation of  labour recruitment 
regimes.  In the case of  Singapore, policy 32
shifts towards hiring skilled labourers in the 
construction industry meant new skill 
requirements and a subsequent expansion in 
the number of  training centres and overseas 
testing centres in sending countries.  In 33
Bangladesh, the more established training 
centres work with testing centres,  employers 34
as well as agents to provide a host of  services, 
from skills training and testing to job 
placement and travel arrangements.  Various 35
intermediaries are involved in linking migrant 
workers with training centres and agents. At 
each stage of  the training, examination and 
recruitment process, additional payments are 
demanded, with little or no documentation 
provided on what these payments are for.  36
The limited number of  exam slots vis-à-vis 
the large number of  migrant workers who 
pay and undergo skills training also results in 
practices such as the ‘auctioning’ of  exam 
slots, which further increases costs for 
migrant workers.  After Bangladeshi migrant 37
workers pass the examinations and obtain the 
skills certificate, they are then required to pay 
the balance of  their agent fees. Prospective 
workers sometimes pay the fees in 
Bangladesh or arrange through friends for the 
payment to be made in Singapore. In either 
case, migrant workers claim that a significant 
 Baey, Grace and Yeoh, Brenda (2015) “Migration and precarious work: negotiating debt, employment, and 30
livelihood strategies amongst Bangladeshi migrant men working in Singapore’s construction industry”, Migrating 
Out of  Poverty Research Programme Consortium Working Paper 26, University of  Sussex, Brighton, United 
Kingdom.
 TWC2 (2013) Survey uncovers exorbitant agent fees suffered by Bangladeshi workers, http://twc2.org.sg/31
2013/08/29/survey-uncovers-exorbitant-agent-fees-suffered-by-bangladeshi-workers/ (accessed 10 December 
2016).
 Baey, Grace and Brenda Yeoh, Brenda (2015)“Migration and precarious work: Negotiating debt, employment, 32
livelihood strategies amongst Bangladeshi migrant men working in Singapore’s construction industry”, Migrating 
Out of  Poverty Research Programme Consortium Working Paper 26, University of  Sussex, Brighton, United 
Kingdom, p.19. 
 In 2000, Singapore’s Building and Construction Authority introduced its Skills Evaluation Certificate Scheme, 33
which was made mandatory in 2005 for all migrant workers who wish to work in the construction industry in 
Singapore. See Baey, G & Yeoh, B “Migration and precarious work”, 19. 
 There are apparently 100 training centres in the capital city of  Dhaka alone. See TWC2 (2016) The name of  the 34
devil is process: How regulatory process creates and sustains the disempowerment and injustices faced by migrant 
labour http://twc2.org.sg/2016/09/12/the-name-of-the-devil-is-process/ (accessed 20 October 2016). Watch the 
video titled “The name of  the devil is process, part 2”, for details on the recruitment industry in Bangladesh.
 Baey, G & Yeoh, B “Migration and precarious work”, 19.35
 Bal, Charanpal Singh (2016) Production politics and migrant labour regimes: Guest workers in Asia and the Gulf. London: 36
Palgrave Macmillan, 63–65. 
 As revealed in this TWC2 video on the recruitment industry in Bangladesh, there are 800 exam slots in Dhaka a 37
month, but there are approximately 1700 trainees competing for these exam slots, with this mismatch between 
supply and demand resulting in training centres auctioning off  exam slots and more money exchanging hands. See 
“The name of  the devil is process, part 2”, TWC2.
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portion of  this fee is remitted to agents or 
employers in Singapore.   38
Bangladeshi construction or marine sector 
workers who have previously worked in 
Singapore are also made to pay recruitment 
fees, with recruitment often arranged through 
social networks that may involve brokers who 
are migrant workers themselves. These 
payments may be made in Bangladesh or 
Singapore though, again, usually with no 
paper trail and no money-back guarantee if  
workers are terminated prematurely or the 
Work Permit is not issued. While the 
Employment Agencies Act (EAA) is meant to 
regulate the payment of  agent fees and curb 
profiteering,  migrant workers lack evidence 39
to prove payments to local agents. 
Furthermore, the Ministry of  Manpower’s 
stance is that “debts paid overseas and the 
regulation of  employment agents in foreign 
countries are beyond the jurisdiction of  the 
Singapore Government”.   40
  
2. LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK FOR REGULATION AND PROTECTION 
In Singapore, salary and injury issues of  
migrant workers are regulated by three 
primary pieces of  legislation and their related 
regulations and policies (see Table 2): 
● The Employment Act (EA) 
● The Employment of  Fore ign 
Manpower Act (EFMA) 
● The Work Injury Compensation Act 
(WICA) 
The MOM is the ministry responsible for 
administering these three legislative acts and 
the salary and injury dispute resolution 
system. The MOM oversees an integrated set 
of  functions—regulatory, educational, 
investigatory, mediational, visa, and quasi-
judicial—which together provide avenues for 
reducing the number of  injury and salary 
disputes, and for resolving such disputes 
when they do arise. 
In the sections that follow, we provide an 
overview of  the EA, the EFMA, and WICA. 
We also explain the protections provided to 
workers by these laws, and also how such 
protections can be undermined by factors 
such as migrant worker vulnerability, 
interpretation of  legal language, violations of  
the law, and administrative gaps. 
  
 Bal details how various layers of  agents and sub-agents, recruiters (both licensed and unlicensed) as well as 38
employers get a cut of  migrant workers’ agent fees. Money that is collected in Bangladesh moves through a parallel 
banking system called the hundi system to partners in Singapore, and such transactions are not officially documented. 
Bal, Production politics, 64.
 Ministry of  Manpower (2012) MOM regulates local recruitment fees; penalises errant agencies http://39
www.mom.gov.sg/newsroom/press-replies/2012/mom-regulates-local-recruitment-fees-penalises-er; Employment 
Agencies Act (Chapter 92), Employment Agencies Rules 2011, Section 12. Retrieved from http://statutes.agc.gov.sg/aol/
search/display/view.w3p;query=DocId%3A2d7a278e-f5c5-43a0-a0aa- (accessed October 20, 2016.)
 Ministry of  Manpower (2012) MOM regulates local recruitment fees; penalises errant agencies http://40
www.mom.gov.sg/newsroom/press-replies/2012/mom-regulates-local-recruitment-fees-penalises-er (accessed 20 
October 2016.) 
31
LABOUR PROTECTION FOR THE VULNERABLE | CHAPTER 2: LEGISLATIVE AND REGULATORY FRAMEWORK 
!
TABLE 2. Legal snapshot: Work permit holders in Singapore  
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2.1. Employment Act 
The Employment Act (EA) is the primary 
statute governing employer-employee 
relations in Singapore for those earning less 
than S$4,500 a month.  The EA serves a 41
dual function: to safeguard employee rights; 
and to regulate employment relations. As a 
safeguard of  employment rights, the EA 
provides particular protection for vulnerable 
workers, such as restrictions on working 
hours, mandated rest days, and rates for 
overtime pay. The EA outlines the rights and 
obligations of  employees and employers, and 
provides an employment dispute resolution 
mechanism.  In enacting the EA, Parliament 42
explicitly aimed to eradicate discrimination  43
and curb intra- and inter-industry malpractice 
and abuse.   44
Since 1968, the EA (in both its original form 
as well as through subsequent amendments 
reflected therein) has attempted to achieve a 
balance among the Government’s interests in 
job creat ion and economic g rowth, 
employers’ interests in keeping business costs 
low, and employees’ need for protection and 
the provision of  minimum safeguards.  The 45
EA governs employment relationships of  
most categories of  workers in Singapore 
regardless of  nationality, including Work 
Permit holders (with the exception of  foreign 
domestic workers and seamen).  It sets forth 46
provisions governing payment of  salary, 
overtime rates, work hours, employment 
terms, and deductions from salary.  
The major provisions of  the EA applicable to 
Work Permit holders are:  
● the terms of  contracts;  
● the payment of  salary, overtime and 
excessive hours;  
● deductions from salary;  
● the statute of  limitations for salary 
claims;  
● penalties for violations of  the EA.  
Following a review of  these provisions, we 
consider recent amendments to the EA, such 
as mandated key employment terms (KETs), 
pay slips, and record-keeping. 
2.1.1. Terms of  contracts  
The EA specifies that any contractual 
employment terms or conditions that are less 
favourable than the terms prescribed by the 
EA are illegal, null and void to such extent, 
pursuant to Section 8.  This means that 47
contracts may not legally include provisions 
that run counter to EA provisions, such as 
 The Employment Act (Cap 91, 2009 Rev Ed) came into force on 15 August 1968. It does not cover foreign 41
domestic workers or seamen.
 Yim, B Employment Law and Materials, citing Singapore Parliamentary Debates, 2008.42
 “[a] prerequisite for the growth of  an industrial society is respect and status for those who work with their hands 43
as well… [as it is] iniquitous that those in the factory floor and in the servicing industries whose creative skills are 
required for economic growth are given less favourable terms than those who sit in offices...” Singapore Parliament 
Reports (1968), Vol 27, Issue 9, 475–476.
 “[W]ithout discipline, there can be no efficiency and without efficiency, it is impossible to increase productivity”, 44
to attract investments. Singapore Parliament Reports (1968), Vol 2 573. See Chandran, Ravi (2015) Employment Law 
in Singapore (4th Ed) p 115, Singapore, Lexis Nexis.
 Chandran, Ravi (2015) Employment Law in Singapore (4th Ed), p. 116 Singapore, Lexis Nexis.45
 Work Permit holders are defined as any person “under a contract of  service with an employer”, except for any 46
person who is employed in a managerial or executive position, seaman, domestic worker or person employed by a 
Statutory Board or the Government. The EA also applies to persons employed in a managerial or executive 
position. The EA excludes domestic workers and seamen.
 Every term of  a contract of  service which provides a condition of  service which is less favourable to an 47
employee than any of  the conditions of  service prescribed by this Act shall be illegal, null and void to the extent 
that it is so less favourable. Employment Act (Cap 91, 2009 Rev Ed) Part II, s 8.
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provisions where employees agree to be 
underpaid for overtime, or where employees 
agree to work in excess of  72 hours a month 
(the maximum hours allowed).   48
2.1.2. Payment of  salary, overtime, 
rest days and excessive hours  
The EA also specifies that the time period for 
the calculation of  an employee’s salary may 
not exceed one month.  This means that 49
employees are to be paid at least once a 
month.  Employees are due overtime wages 50
when they work more than eight hours a day 
or 44 hours in a single week,  and the pay 51
rate for overtime shall be no less than 1.5 
times an employee’s basic hourly rate of  pay.   52
Every worker is entitled to one rest day per 
week .  MOM employment pract ice 53
guidelines state that the maximum interval 
allowed between two rest days is 12 days.  54
The EA allows a different rate of  pay on rest 
days, depending upon whether the employee 
or the employer requests the extra work.  If  55
the employee requests the work, the rate is 
then calculated at the basic rate of  pay for up 
to a full day’s work, or at 1.5 times the hourly 
basic rate of  pay for more than a full day’s 
work. If  an employer requests the work, the 
 Employment Act (Cap 91, 2009 Rev Ed) Part III, s 21, and, Part IV, 38(5). 48
 Employment Act (Cap 91, 2009 Rev Ed) Part III, s 20. 49
 Employment Act (Cap 91, 2009 Rev Ed) Part III, ss 20 and 21. Salary is to be paid within seven (7) days of  the 50
expiry of  the salary period and overtime is to be paid within fourteen (14) days of  the expiry of  the salary period 
during which the overtime work was performed. The requirement of  payment within seven (7) days of  the salary 
period expiry is also replicated in the EFMA Regulations. EFMA Regulations, Fourth Schedule, Part III at 3. 
 Employment Act (Cap 91, 2009 Rev Ed) Part IV, s 38(4),51
 Ibid. However, the overtime pay rate on a rest day can be below 1.5 times the basic pay rate per Section 37 (2) and 52
(3).
 Employment Act (Cap 91, 2009 Rev Ed) Part IV, s 37, EA. The employer is not allowed to compel his worker to 53
work on a rest day unless the nature of  the worker’s job involves that of  a succession of  shifts.
 Ministry of  Manpower (2016) Hours of  work, overtime and rest days http://www.mom.gov.sg/employment-54
practices/hours-of-work-overtime-and-rest-days (accessed November 8, 2016); Ministry of  Manpower (2015) 
Calculate pay for work on rest day (http://www.mom.gov.sg/employment-practices/salary/calculate-pay-for-work-
on-rest-day (accessed November 8, 2016)
 Employment Act (Cap 91, 2009 Rev Ed) Part IV, s 37(2) and (3) (emphasis added):- 55
(2) An employee who at his own request works for an employer on a rest day shall be paid for that day— 
(a) if  the period of  work does not exceed half  his normal hours of  work, a sum at the basic rate of  pay for 
half  a day’s work; 
(b) if  the period of  work is more than half  but does not exceed his normal hours of  work, a sum at the basic 
rate of  pay for one day’s work; or 
(c) if  the period of  work exceeds his normal hours of  work for one day— 
(i) a sum at the basic rate of  pay for one day’s work; and 
(ii) a sum at the rate of  not less than one and a half  times his hourly basic rate of  pay for each hour or part thereof  
that the period of  work exceeds his normal hours of  work for one day. 
(3) An employee who at the request of  his employer works on a rest day shall be paid for that day— 
(a) if  the period of  work does not exceed half  his normal hours of  work, a sum at the basic rate of  pay for 
one day’s work; 
(b) if  the period of  work is more than half  but does not exceed his normal hours of  work, a sum at the basic 
rate of  pay for 2 days’ work; or 
(c) if  the period of  work exceeds his normal hours of  work for one day— 
(i) a sum at the basic rate of  pay for 2 days’ work; and 
(ii) a sum at the rate of  not less than one and a half  times his hourly basic rate of  pay for each hour or part thereof  
that the period of  work exceeds his normal hours of  work for one day. 
34
LABOUR PROTECTION FOR THE VULNERABLE | CHAPTER 2: LEGISLATIVE AND REGULATORY FRAMEWORK 
!
rate is calculated at the basic rate of  pay for 
less than half  a day’s work and two times the 
hourly rate for one half  to one full day’s 
work. For hours worked in excess of  a full 
day’s work on a rest day, the overtime rest day 
rate of  1.5 times the basic rate of  pay is 
used.   56
The EA caps the amount of  overtime 
allowed at 72 hours per month.  If  an 57
employee works over 12 hours a day, the 
employer must request an over time 
exemption from the ministry three months in 
advance of  the work performed.  58
While these provisions provide substantial 
protections to workers, they also contain 
potential issues that are relevant to our 
discussion of  the claims process for migrant 
workers. First, the difference in rates of  pay 
for employer- and employee-requested 
overtime on rest days has the potential to 
permit employers to pressure workers to 
request work on rest days. It is not clear in the 
EA how it should be determined or 
evidenced who made the request for work. 
Second, the calculation of  rates of  pay for 
overtime work is recognisably cumbersome.  59
Considering whether the workweek is five 
days or six days, whether the Saturday 
overtime rate applies, and how to calculate 
the overtime rate on Sundays and public 
holidays is difficult for employees and 
employers. Third, as there is no minimum 
wage in Singapore, the limits on overtime 
hours and provision of  rest days are difficult 
for employers, employees, and regulators to 
enforce, as excessive working hours may be 
necessary for a worker to sustain himself.  
2.1.3. Salary deductions 
The EA specifies that employees may only 
have certain authorised deductions made 
from their salary. Such deductions may 
include the actual costs of  meals, housing, 
and services, among others, in accordance 
 Ibid.56
 Employment Act (Cap 91, 2009 Rev Ed) Part IV, s 38(5).57
 Ministry of  Manpower (2016) Hours of  work, overtime and rest days http://www.mom.gov.sg/employment-58
practices/hours-of-work-overtime-and-rest-days (accessed November 8, 2016). An overtime exemption must be 
applied for three months in advance of  the performance of  the work. Ministry of  Manpower (2016) Apply for 
overtime exemption http://www.mom.gov.sg/eservices/services/apply-for-overtime-exemption. (accessed 
November 8, 2016)
 For example, MOM policy does not include an easy guide to when employees are entitled to 1x, 1.5x or 2x salary 59
for overtime or what constitutes a request for overtime. Ministry of  Manpower (2016) Paying Salary (http://
www.mom.gov.sg/employment-practices/salary/paying-salary. 
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with Section 27(1) of  the EA.  EA 60
amendments added in 2014 provide that 
deductions shall not constitute more than 25 
percent of  total salary in each salary period, 
down from the previous limit of  50 percent.  61
Section 30 of  the EA allows deductions for 
the actual costs of  housing, amenities, or 
services only where such housing, amenities 
or services have been accepted by the 
worker.    62
As with overtime and working hours, these 
provisions provide protections. However, 
such protections have the potential to be 
undermined. As with overtime at the request 
of  an employee, allowing deductions based 
on acceptance by the worker implies that the 
worker has an ability to refuse.  Additionally, 63
Work Permit holders who are paid in cash 
may have no documentation of  deductions 
from their salary, whether legal or illegal, 
rendering them unable to prove that 
deductions have taken place. In contrast, 
employment systems in many other 
jurisdictions require payment of  salaries 
through third party transfers (such as 
payment through a bank account or a payroll 
 Employment Act (Cap 91, 2009 Rev Ed) Part III, s 27(1). Such deductions include:  60
(a) deductions for absence from work; 
(b) deductions for damage to or loss of  goods expressly entrusted to an employee for custody or for loss of  money 
for which an employee is required to account, where the damage or loss is directly attributable to his neglect or 
default; 
(c) deductions for the actual cost of  meals supplied by the employer at the request of  the employee, subject to the 
overall cost limitation placed in section 32(1); 
(d) deductions for house accommodation supplied by the employer, unless house accommodation is accepted by the 
employee as a term of  his employment; in any event, the deduction shall not exceed (i) an amount equivalent to the 
‘value’ of  the accommodation and/or (ii) one-quarter (or such other proportion prescribed by the Minister) of  the 
salary payable to the employee in respect of  any one salary period; 
(e) deductions for such amenities and services supplied by the employer as the Commissioner may authorise; 
(f) deductions for recovery of  advances or loans or for adjustment of  over-payments of  salary; 
(g) deductions for Cooperative Society Dues, such as, inter alia, income tax payable by the employee, Central 
Provident Fund contributions as well as those (made at the request of  the employee) for the purpose of  a 
superannuation scheme or provident fund or any other scheme which is lawfully established for the benefit of  the 
employee and is approved by the Commissioner; 
(h) any other deductions which may be approved from time to time by the Minister.
 Yim, Benjamin (2016) Employment Law In Singapore: Cases and Materials, Singapore Academy publishing p. 361
 Employment Act (Cap 91, 2009 Rev Ed) s 30(1), EA: A deduction under section 27(1)(d) or (e) shall not be made 62
from the salary of  an employee unless the house accommodation, amenity or service has been accepted by him, as a 
term of  employment or otherwise. See also ss 30(2)-(3): Such deduction shall not exceed an amount equivalent to 
the value of  the house accommodation, amenity or service supplied and, in the case of  a deduction under section 
27(1)(e), shall be subject to such conditions as the Commissioner may impose. As described herein, this acceptance 
may not be realisable and the EA does not include how it should be confirmed or evidenced.
 There is no mention of  how acceptance should be confirmed or documented. Additionally, another situation 63
where migrant workers may be unable to refuse deductions is the case of  ‘savings money’. Chan A. Hired on 
Sufferance, China’s Migrant Workers in Singapore. p 29. NPOs report the persistent practice of  deductions for savings 
money, particularly among subcontractors in construction. The deduction may be in the amount of  $50 to $100 a 
month for the ostensible purpose of  helping the worker save for their eventual return to their home country. 
Employers also tell their workers that this deduction is used to ensure their “good behaviour”. HOME, The 
exploitation of  migration Chinese construction workers in Singapore, 2011, p.7–8, http://www.home.org.sg/wp-
content/uploads/2015/07/PRC_MCW_Report_final_2011.pdf. While savings money is not an allowable 
deduction, it is difficult for migrant workers to refuse or contest this deduction. Savings money can become a 
further point of  vulnerability, since the employer not only holds the potential power to terminate and repatriate the 
worker, but to do so without returning the savings money, especially if  the amounts are not documented. Ministry 
of  Manpower (2016) Allowable salary deductions http://www.mom.gov.sg/employment-practices/salary/salary-
deductions.
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service system). Such a system automatically 
generates an auditable paper trail.   64
The provision of  food and housing becomes 
difficult after a worker has made a claim. 
Employers provide for meals and housing 
through deductions from salary. When salary 
ceases post-claim, there is no salary to deduct 
from. This could be addressed by MOM 
establishing and monitoring requirements that 
the employer monetise food and housing 
costs during the claim process, irrespective of  
whether these allowances were agreed upon 
as an employment term. This would also 
encourage the employer to assist with the 
prompt resolution of  the claim. 
2.1.4. Statute of  limitations for 
salary claims 
The EA gives the Commissioner of  Labour 
the power to investigate salary claims within 
one year of  the offence and issue orders in 
respect of  that claim.  This one-year claim 65
limitation   is considerably shorter than the 
six-year limitation period for civil lawsuits 
founded in contract and tort in Singapore, 
and for similar laws in comparative 
jurisdictions.  66
  
This limitation period poses a practical issue 
because bringing a salary claim to MOM is 
almost certain to result in job loss and an 
investigation that may take months to a year 
to resolve, and likely end with repatriation. 
This job loss has the potential to undermine 
the intention of  the statute of  limitations, 
which is to bring about timely reporting of  
salary issues. Instead it appears that migrant 
workers are disinclined to exercise the right to 
protection of  their salaries except in extreme 
circumstances, such as complete non-
payment of  salaries for extended periods, or 
when another problem, like a workplace 
injury, has already resulted in a breakdown in 
their relationship with their employer  
2.1.5. Penalties for payment delays, 
arrears, and unauthorised deductions 
Under the EA, failure to pay salary within the 
prescribed periods and making illegal 
deductions are both punishable by a 
 See Chapter 4, Recommendation 2. Since 2015 Qatar and the UAE have required payment of  migrant workers 64
through an electronic transfer system to ensure payments are made and documented. (##) Khatri, S.S & Kovessy, P 
(2015) “Qatar Emir approves law mandating electronic wage payments for workers”, Doha News February 8  http://
dohanews.co/qatars-emir-approved-changes-countrys-labor-law/ (accessed 16 Nov 2016). See UAE Ministry of  
Labour, Wages protection system guidelines  https://www.mol.gov.ae/newmolgateway/english/
wpsGuidelineEng.aspx#1 (accessed 16 Nov 2016).
 The one (1)-year time limit is pursuant to the Employment Act (Cap 91, 2009 Rev Ed) s 115(2). In effect from 1 65
April 2016.
 The Hong Kong Labour Tribunal applies a six (6)-year time limit. Limitation Ordinance (Cap. 347) http://66
www.judiciary.gov.hk/en/crt_services/pphlt/html/labour.htm. According to Section 6 of  Singapore’s Limitation 
Act, the time limit for contract and tort actions is 6 years. However, in a legal claim against negligence, nuisance, and 
breaches of  duty where the damages claimed consists of  or includes personal injuries, the limitation period is either: 
3 years from the date on which the cause of  action accrued; or 3 years from the earliest date on which the plaintiff  
has the knowledge required for bringing an action for damages in respect of  the relevant injury whichever is the 
later date. 
http://statutes.agc.gov.sg/aol/search/display/view.w3p;ident=ef1a385d-131a-406b-9522-
bca3a6546299;page=0;query=DocId%3A%2291ce1da3-ed28-4047-
a82d-2bcd69c78bfe%22%20Status%3Ainforce%20Depth%3A0;rec=0#pr24A-he-. 
https://singaporelegaladvice.com/law-articles/what-are-limitation-periods-and-how-do-they-affect-my-capacity-to-
sue/
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minimum fine of  S$3,000 for first-time 
offenders and S$6,000 for repeat offenders.  67
The effectiveness of  these penalties in 
motivating employers to comply with the 
obligation to pay salaries depends on the 
extent to which such penalties, when 
enforced, would outweigh the benefits of  
engaging in the activity that breaches the EA. 
2.1.6. Recent amendments to the 
Employment Act 
Key employment terms (KETs) and pay 
slips. Recent amendments to the EA mandate 
that employers provide employees with key 
terms of  employment and pay slips.    The 68
related regulations list the details which must 
be itemised in salary slips and include basic 
salary, overtime hours worked, salary period, 
specific allowances and deductions.  This 69
information can be given in paper form or 
electronically “in a manner that enables the 
information contained in the electronic 
record to be accessible and useable by the 
employee for subsequent reference”.  This 70
change has the potential to enable workers to 
monitor the payment they receive, and 
determine the accuracy of  the amounts paid 
and deducted. It also has the potential to 
create a paper trail to serve as evidence for a 
salary claim in the case of  employer non-
compliance.  
Record-keeping / reporting requirements. 
Section 95 of  the EA was amended to require 
employers to make and keep employment and 
salary records relating to each employee for a 
prescribed period. These records must be 
readily accessible to employees.  As listed in 71
the regulations, employee records include 
personal details, first and last dates of  
employment, public holidays, holidays and 
leave taken, and, for each salary period, the 
hours worked, overtime worked, overtime 
paid, itemised deductions taken from salary, 
and net salary paid in total.   72
Penalties specific to KETs, pay slips and 
records. Failure to provide key employment 
terms, pay slips and/or maintain adequate 
employee records are considered less severe 
b r e a ch e s o f  t h e E A , r e su l t i n g i n 
administrative penalties  rather than a 73
 The 2014 EA Amendment sec. 34(2). Employment Act (Cap 91, 2009 Rev Ed) Part III, s 34. The EFMA also 67
authorises the imposition of  fines of  up to S$20,000 where an employer deducts salary for, or forces an employee to 
pay, “any fee, cost, levy, penalty, charge or amount that the employer shall bear and be liable for” such as costs for 
medical insurance, work pass issuance, security, training and repatriation. Employment of  Foreign Manpower Act 
(Cap 91A, Rev Ed 2009) Part V, s 25(4).
 S, Employment (Amendment) Act 2015; s 10; Employment Act (Cap 91, Rev Ed 2009) Part XII, s 96.68
 Employment (Employment Records, Key Employment Terms and Pay Slips) Regulations 2016, Third Schedule. 69
 Employment Act (Cap 91, Rev Ed 2009) Part XII, s 96(3).70
 Employment (Amendment) Act 2015, s 9; Employment Act (Cap 91, 2009 Rev Ed) Part XII, s 95.71
 Ministry of  Manpower (2016) Employment Records http://www.mom.gov.sg/employment-practices/72
employment-records . Ministry of  Manpower (2016) Guide to key employment terms and itemised payslips http://
www.mom.gov.sg/~/media/mom/documents/employment-practices/kets/guide-to-kets-and-itemised-pay slips-
english.pdf  (accessed 10 December 2016). The EFMA Regulations also require employers to maintain a record of  
monthly salary paid to employees and to provide this information to public officials on request. Employment of  
Foreign Manpower (Work Passes) Regulations (Cap 91A 2012) Fourth Schedule, Part IV, paragraph 6 and Fifth 
Schedule, Part II, paragraph 4.
 Employment Act (Cap 91, 2009 Rev Ed) Part XVA, ss. 126A and 126B. See Ministry of  Manpower (2016) 73
Amendment to the Employment Act http://www.mom.gov.sg/employment-practices/employment-act/
amendments-to-the-act . Where MOM has issued an order for an employer to furnish records or rectify a breach 
and the employer does not comply, they may be penalised with a fine of  up to S$5,000 and/or imprisonment of  up 
to six months. Employment Act (Cap 91, 2009 Rev Ed) Part XII, s 101. 
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criminal offence. The MOM has signalled its 
intention to provide “soft enforcement” of  
the new KET requirements and to focus on 
employer education in the first year of  
implementation.  74
The EA amendments can serve to strengthen 
the paper trail needed to provide evidence to 
support a claim. By making it compulsory for 
employers to generate documentation related 
to payments and deduct ions, these 
amendments help to effect the protections set 
forth in the EA.  
There are, however, potential gaps in this 
paper trail, namely, that employers can 
continue to pay their work Permit holders in 
cash, and potential issues around illegal 
deductions and the IPA remain.  
The amendments do not require employers to 
produce or maintain receipts for agent fees 
paid in Singapore, or for deductions made 
from employee salaries for actual costs of  
meals and lodging incurred or amenities 
provided, or require documentation of  an 
employee’s acceptance. Without these 
requirements, employers could potentially 
overstate costs deducted or mask illegal 
deductions, such as savings money or renewal 
fees, as legal deductions on pay slips and 
salary records.  
Electronic or third party payment of  wages 
remains optional; it is only required if  the 
employee requests it. For the reasons 
discussed above, migrant workers may not be 
in a position to make such a request, and 
without documented proof  of  payment (or 
nonpayment) workers would have difficulty 
bringing a successful salary claim. 
Another potential issue rests with the IPA (in-
principle approval—more details on IPAs are 
provided in a later section of  this chapter), 
which lists the employee’s basic salary, 
deductions, and allowances that were 
provided to MOM when the employer 
applied for the employee’s Work Permit. 
MOM does not always consider the IPA as 
b ind ing ev idence of  the ter ms of  
employment. Yet it may be the employee’s 
only record of  the employment terms he 
agrees to in coming to Singapore to work. 
The new EA amendments regarding KETs 
do not mention the IPA, so legislative intent 
regarding the employment terms set forth in 
the IPA is unclear. If  MOM requires a 
contract signed by both parties as evidence of  
employment terms, and this contract is not 
signed until the worker arrives in Singapore, 
this offers the opportunity for that contract 
to decrease the terms set forth in the IPA. 
The worker will already have incurred the 
costs of  coming to Singapore to work and 
will not be in a position to contest these 
terms, because in doing so he may forfeit his 
employment.   75
2.2. Employment of  Foreign Manpower 
Act 
The Employment of  Foreign Manpower Act 
(EFMA) was enacted to “regulate the 
employment of  foreign employees and 
 “Itemised pay slips a must from today” Straits Times, 1 April 2016. 74
 See Chapter 4, Recommendation 1 regarding the requirement of  a Standard Employment Contract signed prior 75
to an employee’s arrival in Singapore.
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protect their well-being.”  The EFMA and 76
its precursor legislation sought to regularise 
and regulate employment of  foreigners via 
the work pass system in response to the 
unacceptable and unregulated presence of  
illegal foreign workers.  The EFMA covers 77
all work pass holders, including Work Permit 
holders, and sets forth the employer’s 
obligations and responsibilities.  It does not 78
provide a direct right of  action for workers.   79
EFMA provisions and regulations relevant to 
low-wage migrant workers, including Work 
Permits, changes to IPA terms, salary 
payments, levies, quotas, security bond, 
compulsory S$15,000 medical insurance, and 
penalties, are discussed below.  
2.2.1. In-principle approval and 
Work Permits 
To hire a foreign employee, an employer must 
include the terms of  employment, including 
basic salary and deductions, on the Work 
Permit application.  If  approved, MOM 80
issues an in-principle approval (IPA) showing 
these terms and provides it to the employer 
who sends it to the worker in the country of  
origin, usually through an agent. Figure 4 
shows two examples of  redacted IPAs. The 
Singapore immigration authorities will only 
allow a worker to enter Singapore with a valid 
IPA. 
 
  
 Ministry of  Manpower (2016) Employment of  Foreign Manpower Act, http://www.mom.gov.sg/legislation/76
employment-of-foreign-manpower-act (accessed 10 December 2016).  On legislative purpose, see also Singapore 
Parliament Reports, Vol 56, 1990 at 449. The EFMA was originally enacted in 1965 as the Regulation of  
Employment Act, which became the Employment of  Foreign Workers Act in 1990, which was renamed as the 
Employment of  Foreign Manpower Act (Cap 91A) in 2007. Yim, B Employment Law in Singapore, p. 113-118.
 See Yim, B Employment Law in Singapore, p. 113, regarding the history of  regulation of  non-citizen employment 77
and the Regulation of  Employment Act, Cap 272, 1985 Ed. 
 Employment of  Foreign Manpower (Work Passes) Regulations, 2012. EFMA, Part II, Section 5(1).78
 Justice without Borders Manual (2014) A Practitioner’s Manual for Migrant Workers p. 24. JWB & NUS.79
 Employment of  Foreign Manpower (Work Passes) Regulations, 2012. EFMA Section 7.80
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FIGURE 4. Examples of in-principle approvals for Work Permit applicants  
The EFMA work pass regulations set out the 
conditions of  employment required of  
employers of  foreign workers. Pursuant to 
the IPA for a Work Permit holder, employers 
shall, among other things: 
● Be responsible for, and bear the costs 
of, the upkeep (including the provision 
of  food and medical treatment) and 
maintenance of  the foreign employee 
in Singapore; 
● Ensure that the foreign employee has 
acceptable accommodation;  81
● Not demand or receive any sum or 
other benefit from an employment 
agency or any other person in 
connection with the employment or 
change in employment of  a foreign 
employee (that is, demand or accept 
‘kickbacks’).  82
Pursuant to the Work Permit, employers shall, 
among other things: 
● Purchase and maintain medical 
insurance with coverage of  at least 
 Such accommodation must be consistent with any written law, directive, guideline, circular or other similar 81
instrument issued by any competent authority.
 Employment of  Foreign Manpower (Work Passes) Regulations 2012, First Schedule, Part III, para 5.82
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S$15,000 per year for the foreign 
employee’s in-patient care and day 
surgery;  83
● Provide safe working conditions and 
acceptable housing;  84
● Pay the worker his salary for the 
month no later than seven days after 
the last day of  the salary period;  85
● Not repatriate the foreign employee 
when such repatr iat ion would 
frustrate or deny any statutory claim 
that has been filed or is intended to be 
filed by the foreign employee for 
salary arrears under the Employment 
Act (Cap. 91) or work injury 
compensation under the Work Injury 
Compensation Act (Cap. 354);  86
● Give the foreign employee reasonable 
notice of  his repatriation and bear the 
cost thereof.   87
2.2.2. Changes to terms of  IPA/
contract substitution 
The EFMA aims to protect workers against 
contract substitution or a reduction in 
employment terms by their employer once 
they arrive in Singapore. The EFMA work 
pass regulations specifically require as a Work 
Permit condition:  
1)  The employer shall not — 
(a) reduce the foreign employee’s 
basic monthly salary or fixed 
monthly allowances to an amount 
less than that declared in the work 
pass application, or 
(b) increase the amount of  fixed 
monthly deductions to more than 
that declared in the work pass 
application,… except with the 
foreign employee’s prior written 
agreement; and that: 
(2)   Before implementing such 
reduction or increase the 
employer shall inform the 
Controller [MOM] in writing 
of  the proposed reduction or 
increase.   88
This regulation sets out an important 
safeguard for workers which disallows 
changes to their key terms of  
employment without notice to MOM. 
However, when employers fail to 
provide notice of  reductions to the 
M O M , t h e r e a p p e a r t o b e 
enforcement gaps, with workers who 
seek assistance at NPOs reporting 
cases of  contract substitution or 
similar practices, in which their terms 
of  employment are reduced upon 
arrival in Singapore without penalty. 
 Where the employer purchases a group medical insurance policy for his foreign employees, the employer shall not 83
be considered to have satisfied the obligation under this condition unless the terms of  the employer’s group medical 
insurance policy are such that each and every individual foreign employee is concurrently covered to the extent 
required under the conditions in this Part. Employment of  Foreign Manpower (Work Passes) Regulations 2012, 
First Schedule, Part IV, para 2.
 Such accommodation must be consistent with any written law, directive, guideline, circular or other similar 84
instrument issued by any competent authority. Ibid. 
 Employment of  Foreign Manpower (Work Passes) Regulations, Fourth Schedule, Part III, para 3.85
 Employment of  Foreign Manpower (Work Passes) Regulations, Fourth Schedule, Part III, para 15.86
 Unless the Controller permits the foreign employee to bear such costs, once the foreign employee consents in 87
writing: see the Employment of  Foreign Manpower (Work Passes) Regulations 2012, Reg. 18(2) and, ibid, Fourth 
Schedule, Part IV, para 13. 
 Employment of  Foreign Manpower (Work Passes) Regulations, Fourth Schedule, Part IV, paragraph 6A. Violation 88
of  this provision may result in the employer being fined up to S$10,000 or imprisoned. Employment of  Foreign 
Manpower Act (Cap 91A, Rev Ed 2009) Part IV, s 22(1)(a)(i). However, as noted above, the worker has no direct 
right of  action for a breach of  this provision. 
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Moreover, the new contract terms 
may be upheld. A lack of  clarity in 
administrative decisions regarding the 
rates of  pay and deductions shown in 
the IPA vis-a-vis employment 
contracts and actual payment terms 
further complicates the salary claim 
process.   89
2.2.3. Payment of  full basic salary 
regardless of  hours worked 
The EFMA work pass regulations stipulate 
that employers must pay employees the full 
amount of  their basic monthly salary in 
accordance with the IPA, regardless of  
whether the employer provides full-time 
work.    90
2.2.4. Request of  payment by bank 
transfer    
The EFMA work pass regulations state that if  
an “employee so requests, the salary shall be 
paid through direct transfer into the foreign 
employee’s bank account in a bank 
established in Singapore”.   91
Payment by bank transfer or third party 
provides the paper trail to protect workers 
from wage manipulation, evidence that is 
unavailable when a worker is paid in cash. As 
discussed above, this regulation is effective 
only when the worker is in a position to make 
such a request.  92
2.2.5. Levies, quotas, and security 
bond  
Pursuant to the EFMA, the monthly foreign 
worker levy is imposed on employers of  
Work Permit holders in order to discourage 
over-reliance on foreign employees.  The 93
quota on the number of  Work Permits issued 
further restricts the hiring of  foreign 
 As discussed in Chapter 3, it is reported that MOM officers sometimes uphold these new contract terms rather 89
than the IPA terms when a dispute arises. NPOs and workers report that MOM officers have stated that the IPA is 
not a binding contract of  employment. Rather, it is the approval of  an application for a Work Permit only and, as 
such, is merely an administrative document. There is a legal argument that could be made that EFMA does provide 
an indirect right of  action. For instance, it could be argued that a contract in violation of  EFMA, such as a 
reduction of  salary without notifying MOM, is illegal and therefore gives right to a civil action under contract law. 
An alternative argument proposed is that the provisions in EFMA provide an implied statutory term of  
employment contract and a breach of  that term amounts to breach of  contract. Maclean D., Yap C., Mitsugi M, 
Jayaraman S, Teh S, Hayre S. (2014)A Practitioner’s Manual for Migrant Workers: Pursuing Civil Claims in Singapore and from 
Abroad. Singapore: Prepared by Justice Without Borders, in partnership with the National University of  Singapore, 
Faculty of  Law, Pro Bono Group, p. 24. However such arguments have not been tested in the Courts. Perhaps S 
Pass regulations, which apply a minimum floor salary, provide an example of  note. The EFMA Regulations require 
as a condition of  S Passes that: Any employer who intends to reduce the fixed monthly salary of  the foreign 
employee, below that of  the fixed monthly salary as declared in the work pass application [$2,200], shall submit a 
request to the Controller for reassessment of  the foreign employee’s work pass eligibility, prior to such salary 
reduction. This establishes a framework to ensure that S Passes are only granted/reissued with a salary level 
reviewed and approved by MOM in an amount above S$2,200 per month. There is no similar minimum salary 
amount for Work Permit holders, so stronger enforcement against reductions from the IPA basic salary is especially 
important. Employment of  Foreign Manpower (Work Passes) Regulations, (Fifth Schedule, Part II, p 12.
 [T]he employer shall, regardless of  whether there is actual work for the foreign employee but subject to any other 90
written law, pay the foreign employee not less than the amount declared as the fixed monthly salary in the work pass 
application … or if  the amount of  fixed monthly salary is at any time subsequently revised in accordance with 
paragraph 6A of  Part IV, the last revised amount. Employment of  Foreign Manpower (Work Passes) Regulations 
(2012) Fourth Schedule, Part III, para 4. 
 Employment of  Foreign Manpower (Work Passes) Regulations, ( Fourth Schedule, Part IV, para 5.91
 NPOs report that when this suggestion has been raised, MOM cites the cost and inconvenience to employers and 92
that employees already have the right to ask. See Tan, Amelia (2014) Easier for companies to open bank accounts 
for foreign workers (13 October) http://www.straitstimes.com/singapore/easier-for-companies-to-open-bank-
accounts-for-foreign-workers
 Section 11(1), EFMA; see Chandran, Employment Law, supra n 8, p 638. The levy also applies to S-Pass holders. 93
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workers.  Additionally, employers of  non-94
Malaysian Work Permit holders are required 
to furnish a S$5,000 security bond per 
worker.   95
2 .2 .6 . Compulsor y S$15 ,000 
medical insurance 
Since 2010, MOM has required employers to 
maintain S$15,000 in medical insurance for 
their employees to cover non-workplace 
accident medical needs,  including expenses 96
for in-patient care and day surgery.  This 97
medical insurance is meant to ensure that 
employers meet their obligations under the 
EFMA to bear the costs of  a Work Permit 
holder’s upkeep and maintenance, including 
medical treatment.  
2.2.7. Penalties 
Before 2012, all infringements of  EFMA 
provisions were criminal offences. Since the 
2012 amendments were made, some 
infringement are now classified as less severe, 
and are instead subject to administrative 
financial penalties.  The employer is now 98
required to pay a fine for the failure to 
comply with regulatory conditions of  the IPA 
and for making deductions from a foreign 
employee’s salary without prior notification to 
MOM.   99
Since 2012, fines and/or imprisonment are 
prescribed for new offenses including 
deducting salary from a foreign employee as a 
condition of  employment or continued 
employment. Also introduced was a 
presumption that officers of  a company who 
 Ibid, p 639.Upon issuance, the Work Permit should be provided to the employee to be kept in his possession. 94
Section 13(1), EFMA. The Work Permit should not be held by any other person other than the Work Permit holder, 
including the employer of  the Work Permit holder. Workers report that employers routinely hold their passports and 
Work Permits. Retention of  passports is an offense under Section 47(5) of  the Passports Act( Cap 220, 2008 Rev 
Ed).
 Chandran, R at 639 citing the Employment of  Foreign Manpower (Work Passes) Regulations, Reg 12(1) ; Ministry 95
of  Manpower (2016) Security bond requirements for foreign worker, http://www.mom.gov.sg/passes-and-permits/
work-permit-for-foreign-worker/sector-specific-rules/security-bond (accessed 8 November 2016). MOM 
submission to COI 18 Mar 2014 following “Little India Riots” show Malaysian Work Permit holders  at 400,000. 
Employers of  Malaysian Work Permit holders, estimated at more than half  of  all male Work Permit holders in 2013, 
do not need to furnish a security bond.
 Ministry of  Manpower (2010) New S$15,000 minimum for foreign worker medical insurance, http://96
www.mom.gov.sg/newsroom/announcements/2010/new-15000-minimum-for-foreign-worker-medical-insurance 
(accessed 8 November 2016).
 Employment of  Foreign Manpower (Work Pass) Regulations, Fourth Schedule, Part IV, para 4. Prior to 2006, 97
Public Hospitals and Polyclinics treated foreigners and citizens alike in terms of  access to government health 
subsidies.  This was revised at the end of  2007, when government subsidies to foreigners were removed and 
transited to a model where employers were required to buy compulsory medical insurance for their employees to 
cover non-workplace accident medical needs. The initial amount set in 2007 was a minimum of  $5, 000,  which was 
subsequently revised to a minimum of  $15,000 in 2010. https://www.moh.gov.sg/content/dam/moh_web/
PressRoom/Articles/2006/FAQs_subsidy_revision_v1.pdf 
http://www.mom.gov.sg/newsroom/press-releases/2007/introduction-of-employer-financed-medical-insurance-
requirement-for-foreign-workers 
http://www.mom.gov.sg/newsroom/announcements/2010/new-15000-minimum-for-foreign-worker-medical-
insurance
 Yim, B p. 121.98
 Where a prescribed infringement has a corresponding criminal offence, then the Government can decide based 99
on the culpability of  the wrongdoer. For example, an employer who failed to purchase medical insurance for his 
Work Permit holders might be treated differently depending on whether his failure was due to his intention to save 
cost or due to his negligence: Yim, B p. 121.
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fail to exercise reasonable supervision over 
the company will be liable for the criminal 
offence or administrative infringement 
penalty.   100
2.2.8. Case law 
Although the work pass regulations are not 
legislative in nature, they provide guidance on 
how to determine a breach.  As former 101
Justice of  Appeal VK Rajah JA observed in 
Lee Chiang Theng v Public Prosecutor:  
The importance of  regulating employers 
of  foreign workers was clearly expressed in 
Hansard [Parliamentary intention] across 
the years. When moving the amendment 
bill in 2007, Dr Ng Eng Hen, then the 
Minister for Manpower, stated that 
(Singapore Parliamentary Debates, Official 
Report (22 May 2007) vol 83 at col 928): 
The ability of  our companies to access 
foreign manpower is a comparative 
advantage. But our foreign worker policy 
cannot be based on a laissez-faire 
approach, which will be detrimental to our 
overall progress. To protect the well-being 
of  foreign workers, we have imposed 
conditions on employers for their housing, 
remuneration and medical coverage. … 
… [I]t is important to emphasise that employers 
who persistently fail to discharge their legal 
responsibilities towards foreign workers will 
ordinarily have custodial sentences imposed on 
them. I ought to also emphasise that a 
single serious transgression in relation to 
this genre of  offences might also attract a 
custodial sentence. When precisely the 
custody threshold is crossed wil l 
necessarily have to be fact centric. The 
seriousness of  the offence will, of  course, 
be exacerbated when a large number of  
foreign workers are brought to Singapore 
and the employer fails to fulfil their legal 
responsibilities towards them.  
Other possible aggravating considerations 
are,  inter alia: (a)  a persistent failure by an 
e m p l o y e r t o d i s c h a r g e h i s 
responsibilities,  eg the employer has been 
in continuous breach for an extensive 
period of  time with no efforts of  
rectification, (b)  an employer’s failure to 
discharge its responsibility that renders the 
employee susceptible to physical harm or 
otherwise results in a situation that 
compromises the worker’s overall welfare 
or well being, and (c)  an employer’s 
cumulative commission of  various 
offences under the EFMA or different 
conditions in the Work Permit with regard 
to the same worker (eg failing to pay the 
salary  and  housing the worker in 
unacceptable conditions).”  102
This demonstrates that the Singapore Courts 
will adopt a strict approach towards 
disciplining employers who breach EFMA 
provisions, against their workers’ interests. 
2.3. Work Injury Compensation Act 
The third major piece of  legislation that 
provides protection to migrant workers in 
Singapore is the Work Injury Compensation 
Act (WICA). The legislative intention is to 
s imp l i f y and exped i t e work in ju r y 
compensation by providing an alternative to a 
civil suit through the Singapore Courts. 
WICA is designed to balance the interests of  
injured workers with those of  the employer 
or insurer. S imi l a r to work in jur y 
compensation regimes in other countries, 
WICA balances these interests by providing a 
no-fault system, with statutory limits on 
compensation.   103
 Yim, B p. 128.100
 Chandran, R Employment Law, supra n 8, pp 636-637.101
 [2012] 1 SLR 751 at [33].102
 The basic aim of  the WICA is, in effect, “to provide for prompt payment of  compensation to an injured 103
employee or his dependents without requiring the employee or his dependents to sue the employer in common law 
which may turn out to be a lengthy, costly and uncertain endeavor”. Chandran, R Employment Law, supra n 8, p 478.
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Each party receives and gives up something 
of  value for a more streamlined system of  
handling injured workers’ claims. Employers 
are spared the expense of  defending 
themselves against civil actions filed against 
them by injured employees, and in return 
receive a cap on damages for permanent 
incapacity suffered by the injured employee. 
While employers are required to provide 
medical care, medical leave wages and lump 
sum compensation for permanent incapacity 
and death (through insurance), they are not 
liable to compensate the injured employee for 
his pain and suffering.  Injured employees 104
do not need to prove that the employer was at 
fault, or that they were fault-free, only that 
the injury is work-related. WICA is meant to 
offer a quicker resolution of  the claim than 
through the Singapore Courts.  
While the core of  worker compensation law 
reflects a compromise between the employer 
and the injured employee, the equilibrium 
between the two competing interests is not 
evenly balanced. In order to effect the 
remedial intent of  worker compensation 
legislation, meaning to create a remedy for the 
harm to the injured party, presumptions are 
used to help tilt the scales in favor of  the 
employee.  This means that if  an injury 105
occurs at work, it is presumed to be work-
related.   106
WICA makes the employer liable if  the 
worker (i) sustains personal injury in a work-
related accident, or (ii) contracts an 
occupational disease in the course of  
employment.  WICA provides statutory 107
limits on compensation through specifying 
the calculation and caps for medical leave 
wages, medical expenses and lump-sum 
payment for permanent incapacity or 
 Thomas A. Robinson, Thomas A.,J.D.(2014) The Role of  Presumptions Within the Workers’ Compensation 104
Arena https://www.lexisnexis.com/legalnewsroom/workers-compensation/b/recent-cases-news-trends-
developments/archive/2014/01/21/the-role-of-presumptions-within-the-workers-compensation-arena.aspx?
Redirected=true (accessed November 9, 2016).
 Ibid. 105
 This also includes injuries that occur on the way to and from work if  in employer-provided transport. 106
 WICA, ss 3 and 4, read with the Second Schedule.107
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WICA is designed to 
balance the interests 
of injured workers with 
those of the employer 
or insurer.
“
”
With respect to WICA, 
it is important to 
highlight two potential 
issues. First, while 
WICA is designed to be 
an expeditious, no-
fault system, 
employers are able to 
contest the claims and 
rebut the presumption 
of a workplace injury 
through presentation 
of witnesses.
“
”
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death.  In order to ba lance these  108
compensation caps, the system is meant to 
interpret favorably that a worker’s injury 
related to work is a valid workplace injury. In 
line with its aims and function as ‘social 
legislation’, Singapore’s courts have held that 
WICA “should be interpreted purposively in 
favour of  employees who have suffered 
injury during their employment”.  The 109
courts have construed the statutory 
presumption that an injury is related to work 
insofar as it occurs at the workplace  110
 WICA, s 7, read with the Third Schedule. The WICA Compensation Limits are, as follows: 108
The amount of  compensation payable depends on several factors, namely, whether (a) the injury is of  a permanent 
nature or (b) death results. A lump sum compensation is calculated in accordance with the following formula set out 
in the Act -  
● In the event of  Permanent Incapacity: Employee’s Average Monthly Earnings x Age Multiplying Factor x 
Percentage of  Earning Capacity 
● In the event of  Death: Employee’s Average Monthly Earnings x Age Multiplying Factor 
The First Schedule to WICA lists the injuries that are deemed to result in permanent incapacity, and the extent to 
which earning capacity is lost for each of  such injury. For example, the loss of  two limbs is listed in the First 
Schedule as an injury of  permanent incapacity, which causes a 100 percent loss of  earning capacity. If  a worker 
suffers an injury that is deemed to result in permanent incapacity, the amount of  compensation payable is calculated 
by multiplying the percentage of  incapacity by the average monthly earnings of  the employee by an appropriate 
factor set out in the Third Schedule to the WICA, in accordance with the age of  the worker. 
In the event of  permanent total incapacity, additional compensation amounting to one-quarter of  the amount 
otherwise payable can be claimed. 
The monetary limits on the amount of  Compensation receivable under WICA were increased in 2015, as follows: 
(i) For accident from 1 January 2016, the current limits on compensation claimable under the WICA are –  
● Death: A maximum of  S$204,000 (instead of  S$170,000), and a minimum of  S$69,000 (instead of  
S$57,000); 
● Total Permanent Incapacity: A maximum of  S$262,000 (instead of  S$218,000), and a minimum of  
S$88,000 (instead of  S$73,000); 
● Medical Expenses: Up to S$36,000 (instead of  S$30,000) or 1 year from the date of  the accident 
(whichever first); and 
(ii) Compensation under the WICA can now be made for Return to Work (RTW) treatments which help injured  
workers recover and transit to their existing jobs, including case management, functional capacity evaluation and 
rehabilitative assessment for purposes of  rehabilitating injured workers. 
See Third Schedule, WICA.
 Pang Chew Kim v Wartsila Singapore Pte Ltd [2012] 1 SLR 15 at [27]. 109
 WICA (Chapter 354) Part II, Compensation for Injury, section 3, Employer’s liability for compensation: 110
3.—(1) If  in any employment personal injury by accident arising out of  and in the course of  employment is caused 
to an employee, his employer shall be liable to pay compensation in accordance with the provisions of  this Act. 
Section 3(1) must be read with s 3(6) which states: 
(6)    For the purposes of  this Act, an accident arising in the course of  an employee’s employment shall be deemed, 
in the absence of  evidence to the contrary, to have arisen out of  that employment. 
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broadly. A health incident that occurs during 
working hours is considered a workplace 
injury, even when the employee is not 
working.  111
With respect to medical expenses, WICA 
requires employers to pay, and be insured for, 
up to S$36,000 of  expenses.  Like other 112
compensation payable under WICA, a 
determination of  a valid work injury must 
first be made. The intention of  the S$36,000 
WICA insurance coverage is to ensure “a fair 
balance between compensation for employees 
and the obligations placed on employers and 
their insurers”.  MOM states that this limit 113
is adequate as it “will fully cover more than 95 
percent of  claims where  hospitalisation is 
required”.  114
With respect to WICA, it is important to 
highlight two potential issues. First, while 
WICA is designed to be an expeditious, no-
fault system, employers are able to contest the 
claims and rebut the presumption of  a 
workplace injury through presentation of  
witnesses. This adversarial contestation can 
delay resolution and thus medical care, and 
also disadvantage workers by introducing 
evidentiary burdens. The use of  migrant 
workers or others on an employer’s payroll is 
also problematic, for it is not clear that such 
persons, when asked to appear or give 
testimony, are in a position to say no. The 
ACLs should be astute not to readily accept 
witness testimony from former work 
colleagues who say they did not see the injury, 
where there are reasonable grounds to believe 
that these colleagues are under pressure from 
their employer to give such evidence.  
The second issue is the amount of  WICA 
insurance coverage for medical care. The 
S$36,000 insurance coverage means that 
catastrophic injuries are not fully covered by 
WICA insurance. Injuries requiring lengthy 
hospitalisation or numerous surgeries can 
result in employers going bankrupt, workers 
receiving insufficient medical care, or 
hospitals taking a loss. While the S$36,000 
limit does cover the majority of  injuries, the 
current system fails to provide a solution for 
the payment of  medical treatment for 
catastrophic injuries, which leaves hospitals to 
manage the debt. 
 In Allianz Insurance Co (Singapore) Pte Ltd v Ma Shoudong [2011] 3 SLR 1167, the High Court held that the cardiac 111
arrest of  a deceased employee arose in the course of  employment as the cardiac arrest that led to the employee’s 
death occurred while the employee was resting during work hours. The burden of  proof  thus shifted to the 
employer under s 3(6) of  the Act to show that the accident had not arisen out of  the employment. Similarly, in Pang 
Chew Kim [2015] 1 SLR 15, the employee suffered cardiac arrest at a hotel where he was waiting to be picked up by 
colleague to the meeting venue as part of  working trip.  The court held the employee was in the “course of  
employment” at the material time because the entire trip was a working trip, although there was no actual work 
being done at the time.
 WICA Section 23. Employees may bring proceedings to enforce a claim against the insurer as if  he were the 112
employer. Section 32, WICA. The amount for expenses has gone through several revisions, notably in 2012 (from 
$25,000 to $30,000)1 and in 2016 (from $30,000 to $36,000). http://www.mom.gov.sg/newsroom/announcements/
2012/changes-to-work-injury-compensation-act 
http://www.mom.gov.sg/workplace-safety-and-health/work-injury-compensation/changes-to-wica-in-2016
 Yim, B p. 285, Chandran, R. Employment Law in Singapore, 4th Ed, p. 478 citing Singapore Parliament Reports, Vol 113
84, Issue 2, 2008 at Col. 260.
 “Committee of  Supply Speech by Mr Hawazi Daipi, Senior Parliamentary Secretary for Manpower, 09 March 114
2015, 5:00 PM, Parliament.” Mr Hawazi Daipi, Senior Parliamentary Secretary for Manpower, Parliament http://
www.mom.gov.sg/newsroom/speeches/2015/committee-of-supply-speech-by-mr-hawazi-daipi-senior-
parliamentary-secretary-for-manpower-09-march-2015-500-pm-parliament 
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3. THE CLAIMS PROCESS 
In this final section we discuss the injury and 
salary claims process with a view to 
proposing recommendations to improve the 
process for migrant workers. Following the 
review of  the three major pieces of  
legislation protecting and regulating migrant 
workers, this section gives an overview of  the 
various administrative, mediation, 
adjudication, and enforcement steps that a 
worker (and his employer) encounters when 
filing a formal salary or injury claim.  
This review of  the claims process contains 
five subsections: the salary claim process, the 
injury claim process, Labour Court, the newly 
created Employment Claims Tribunal, and 
enforcement. We highlight the protections for 
migrant workers, and also explain the factors 
that can undermine these protections. 
3.1. Process for salary claims 
Salary claims  can be formally submitted 115
online by those with a SingPass or through 116
an appointment with an MOM labour 
relations officer.  The officer will determine 117
if  the claim meets EA guidelines and respond 
within three working days with a decision on 
whether to permit or deny the claim. If  
MOM accepts the claim, investigations will 
ensue, followed by mediation meetings led by 
MOM involving the employer and the 
migrant worker. Legal representation is not 
allowed for salary claims, and expeditious 
settlements are encouraged.  
With respect to the salary claim process, we 
note that the adjudication phase of  the salary 
claim process for claims arising from the EA 
or employment contracts will move to the 
Employment Claims Tribunal in April 2017. 
This is discussed below in 3.4. 
Figure 5 presents an overview of  MOM’s 
salary claim process.   
 For the purposes of  the Employment Act (Cap. 91), any person "under a contract of service with an employer" 115
except for any person who is employed in a managerial or executive position (unless his/her basic monthly 
salary falls below S$4,500 a month), or a seaman, domestic worker or person employed by a Statutory Board or 
the Government, qualifies as an “employee” and is thus covered by the Act: see EA, s 2, within which the 
respective terms referred to herein are defined. 
 SingPass refers to Singapore Personal Access, basically an e-service that links a user to over 60 Government 116
agencies in Singapore. Only select Work Permit holders have access to SingPass, but it is not specified how eligibility 
for SingPass is granted. See Singpass (2016) SingPass: Frequently asked questions http://www.ifaq.gov.sg/
SINGPASS/apps/fcd_faqmain.aspx#FAQ_130407 (accessed 29 October 2016).
 Making an appointment for a meeting at MOM poses a hardship for workers because they have to leave work, 117
alerting employer, or may have to pay to take day off; MOM isn’t open evenings or weekends. The following 
information is needed to make a salary claim: SingPass account (for online submissions); details of  the company that 
the case is made against, eg, name, Unique Entity Number (UEN), mailing address and contact details; Personal 
particulars, eg, name, NRIC/FIN number, home address and contact details; Employment details, eg, period of  
employment (start date and end date), occupation and salary.
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FIGURE 5. Overview of the MOM salary claims process (working draft - in progress) 
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FIGURE 6. Overview of the MOM work injury compensation process (working draft - in 
progress) 
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3.2. Process for injury claims under WICA 
Eligible employees can claim compensation 
from their employer under WICA for injuries 
sustained at work.  To succeed in his claim, 118
a worker must establish that his injury arose 
“out of  and in the course of  his 
employment”.  Like a salary claim, the 119
statute of  limitations is one year, meaning the 
injury claim must be made within one year of  
the date of  injury. The compensation amount 
is bound within a minimum and maximum 
amount to adequately compensate workers 
with very low salaries, and limit compensation 
for workers with high salaries. 
Figure 6 presents an overview of  the MOM 
work injury process. 
Pursuant to WICA and MOM guidelines, the 
employer bears the responsibility to pay the 
worker’s medical bills, provide medical leave 
wages upon receiving Medical Certificates 
(MCs), inform the insurer, and file an incident 
report with MOM. If  the worker receives MC 
for three days or more, is hospitalised for 24 
hours or longer, or if  an occupational disease 
has been detected, a report must be filed 
within ten days of  the incident.  The worker 120
is to alert MOM if  the employer fails to pay 
medical bills or medical leave wages.   The 
worker may also file an incident report 
whether or not the employer does.  MOM 121
then carries out an investigation into the 
incident to determine the validity of  the claim 
and whether a workplace safety violation has 
occurred.   
Once the injury or condition has stabilised, 
the medical facility treating the worker is 
requested by MOM to provide a medical 
assessment regarding the percentage of  
permanent incapacity. The MOM then issues 
a Notice of  Assessment (NOA), which 
includes the amount of  compensation 
payable to the worker for the permanent 
incapacity, any unpaid medical leave wages 
and any out-of-pocket medical expenses paid 
by the worker. The employer should pay the 
MC wages on a monthly basis, and the 
medical costs in a timely manner. Any party 
(the worker, the employer or the insurer) may 
object to the NOA, by written notice, within 
14 days of  the NOA.  If  there are no 122
objections to the NOA, the employer or the 
employer’s insurer is required to pay the 
compensation amount within 21 days of  
service of  the NOA.  
An objection may be made either to the (i) 
quantum or (ii) liability, ie, the basis of  the 
injury compensation itself  (eg. where a party 
disputes whether there was, in fact, a valid 
workplace injury or not). If  the objection is 
to (i) the quantum, or amount, of  the 
compensation (the issues here could be either 
the percentage of  permanent incapacity as 
assessed by the doctor or the average monthly 
 WICA also covers occupational diseases, or a disease from exposure to biological or chemical agents contacted 118
at work. It also includes injuries incurred while travelling to or from work in company transport: see WICA, ss 3 and 
4.
 WICA, s 3. The following caps apply to WICA claims: 119
(a) Medical Expenses (including treatments facilitating early return to work) - Up to S$36,000 or one year from 
accident date, whichever is reached first 
(b) Medical Leave Wages – Up to 60 days of  hospitalisation medical leave at full pay and up to 14 days outpatient 
medical leave at full pay. Thereafter, medical leave at 2/3 pay for up to a year from the accident date. 
(c) Permanent Incapacity (PI) – Minimum S$88,000 multiplied by %PI, Maximum S$262,000 multiplied by % PI. 
Death - Minimum S$69,000, Maximum S$204,000. 
 Part II of  the Work Injury Compensation Regulations; WICA 2011 s 11 provides the procedure for making a 120
claim for compensation. 
 Work Injury Compensation Regulations (Cap 354, Rg 1, 2010 Rev Ed), Reg 4. 121
 Ibid.122
52
LABOUR PROTECTION FOR THE VULNERABLE | CHAPTER 2: LEGISLATIVE AND REGULATORY FRAMEWORK 
!
earnings used to calculate the compensation 
amount rather than whether it was a valid 
workplace injury), then MOM will convene an 
Injury Compensation Medical Board 
examination to conduct a new medical 
a s s e s s m e n t . T h e d e c i s i o n o f  t h e 
compensation board is final. If  the objection 
is to (ii) liability, then the case may proceed to 
MOM’s Labour Court. After hearings, the 
ACL will issue a judgment.   123
As discussed earlier, if  the employer denies 
the injury is work-related, then the employer 
is not responsible for payment of  medical 
leave wages and may delay paying for medical 
treatment until the validity of  the claim is 
established. Legal representation is allowed 
for workers with injury claims and the system 
remains in MOM (rather than move to the 
Singapore Courts as is the case for salary 
claims under the Employment Claims 
Tribunal). While WICA is intended to be an 
efficient administrative system outside the 
court process, and simple enough to be 
managed without a lawyer, our review of  
experiences of  WICA in Chapter 3 suggest 
considerable issues.  
3.3. Labour Court 
When either a salary or injury claim cannot be 
settled by mediation, it may then proceed—
after pre-hearing conferences—to Labour 
Court, an administrative tribunal housed in 
MOM. Its powers der ive from the 
Employment Act, and it is designed to 
“inquire into and decide any dispute between 
an employee and his employer or any person 
liable”.  Labour Court is intended to 124
function as a low-cost dispute resolution 
option to bringing a case to the Singapore 
Courts for resolution. Labour Court is 
presided over by a Commissioner for Labour 
(COL), an officer appointed by the Minister 
of  Manpower who may, in his/her discretion, 
confer his/her duties and powers upon the 
Assistant Commissioner for Labour (ACL). 
As Labour Court is meant to be a low-cost 
system in which individuals can represent 
themselves without a lawyer, it is not bound 
by rules of  court, evidence or procedure. This 
gives the presiding ACL the discretion to 
decide the manner in which proceedings 
should be conducted, including the evidence 
to be admitted and the witnesses to be 
allowed.  The Employment Act specifies 125
that the ACL may adjudicate by ordering 
payment to either party as he/she considers 
just.   126
With respect to Labour Court, several issues 
are important to note. First, the informality 
of  Labour Court—freed from traditional 
rules of  court, evidence, and procedure—
 Ibid.123
 Employment Act Section 115.124
 Employment Act Section 119(2). The COL “shall not be bound to act in a formal manner or in accordance with 125
the Evidence Act (Cap. 97) but may inform himself  on any matters and in such manner as he thinks just.” He is to 
act according to equity, good conscience and the merits of  the case without regard to technicalities. Section 119(2), 
Employment Act.
 Section 116, ibid. The ACL is authorised under the law to pass sentences and prohibition orders, order redress, 126
and impose fines and/or prison terms depending on the severity of  the offence. Ibid.
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creates something of  a double-edged sword. 
While it allows for flexibility, it can also lead 
to excessive discretion, by an ACL, who are 
public officers (or senior officers) of  MOM, 
who is not required to have legal training.  127
Second, the Labour Court system has been 
criticised for a lack of  transparency about its 
procedures and process.  Labour Court 128
hearings are not open to the public, decisions 
are not published, and participants report that 
they are not informed about evidentiary 
standards or criteria used to make decisions 
beforehand. Third, migrant workers, who 
must represent themselves in salary cases and 
who often also do represent themselves in 
injury cases, lack the language skills and 
training to develop and present their 
argument, collect and organise evidence, and 
engage in cross examination as opposed to 
the trained lawyers appointed by the 
employers or the employer’s insurance 
company. These issues will be discussed in 
further detail in Chapter 3.  
3.4. Employment Claims Tribunal 
In April 2017, the ECT will replace the MOM 
Labour Court for salary-related claims arising 
f rom the EA, Ret i rement and Re-
Employment Act, the Child Development 
Co-Savings Act, and salary-related contract 
issues.  It will reside in the Singapore 129
Courts, rather than in the MOM. The ECT 
will cover employees of  all salary levels 
including Work Permit holders for claim 
amounts up to S$20,000.  Mediation, to be 130
conducted by the Tripartite Alliance for 
Dispute Management (TADM),  will be 131
mandatory before the ECT hears a claim. 
During the public comment period prior to 
the finalisation of  the ECT, suggestions were 
made to move mediation out of  MOM and 
utilise independent mediators certified by a 
recognised mediation authority such as the 
Singapore Mediation Centre. At present it is 
not clear if  the mediators appointed to the 
TADM will be officers or ex-officers from 
MOM. The current time limits for making 
 Section 2A of  WICA and http://www.mom.gov.sg/newsroom/press-releases/2009/labour-court-127
recovers-800000-in-salary-claims-from-jan--apr09. ACLs are "senior officers of  MOM": see Annex A.
 Justice without Borders Manual (2014) A Practitioner’s Manual for Migrant Workers p. 24. JWB & NUS. 128
Chan, Aris. "Hired on Sufferance: China’s Migrant Workers in Singapore." Hong Kong SAR: China Labour Bulletin 
(2011). http://www.labour.gov.hk/eng/public/pdf/wsd/PWIO%20guide_eng.pdf. Often workers do not know if  
they have moved into the adjudication phase of  the claims process or at what stage they are. The MOM forms and 
Labour process steps do not use uniform names or titles. When workers move to Labour Court, they lose their 
MOM case officer, leaving them without access to information about how to navigate the process. 
 Employment Claims Act. The ECT will take over the Labour Court’s function of  hearing statutory salary-related 129
disputes on employee entitlements under the Employment Act, Retirement and Re-employment Act and the Child 
Development Co-Savings Act. These include unpaid salary, overtime pay, salary in lieu of  notice, employment 
assistance payment and maternity benefits. In addition, the ECT will hear contractual salary-related claims from 
employees. Such claims include payment of  allowances, bonuses, commissions, salary in lieu of  notice and 
retrenchment benefits, provided that these are expressed in monetary terms in the contract. Straits Times (2016) 
Singapore Parliamentary Debates, Employment Claims Bill (16 August 2016) vol 94 (Mr Lim Swee Say, the Minister 
for Manpower). http://www.straitstimes.com/politics/parliament-employment-claims-tribunal-will-start-in-
april-2017-with-more-salary-protection. Second reading: http://sprs.parl.gov.sg/search/topic.jsp?
currentTopicID=00009809-WA&currentPubID=00009800-WA&topicKey=00009800-WA.00009809-
WA_3%2Bid-79677a08-c88f-4099-b610-770ca0f74f27%2B.
 Or S$30,000 for claims with union involvement. Ministry of  Manpower (2016) Employment Claims Bill 2016, 130
Second Reading Speech at Parliament http://www.mom.gov.sg/newsroom/speeches/2016/0816-employment-
claims-bill-2016-second-reading-speech-by-minister. (accessed 9 November 9 2016).
 This Tripartite Alliance for Dispute Management will be set up by April 2017. See Seow, J (2016) “Parliament: 131
Employment Claims Tribunals will start in April 2017 with more salary protection for PMEs”, Straits Times, August 
16 http://www.straitstimes.com/politics/parliament-employment-claims-tribunal-will-start-in-april-2017-with-more-
salary-protection (accessed 7 November 2016).
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claims and limiting liability—one year for 
salary disputes and six months for salary in 
lieu of  annual leave and salary in lieu of  
notice—will continue to apply.  
 
How EFMA protections for migrant worker 
salary claimants will be adjudicated in the 
future is unclear. The ECT will only hear 
claims pursuant to the EA and salary-related 
contract issues (the other Acts included are 
not likely to apply to migrant workers). The 
Minister stated in the second reading of  the 
Employment Claims Bill (the Bill) that the 
MOM Commissioner for Labour will only 
continue to hear non-salary-related disputes, 
transfer for employment, and recovery of  
salary not paid in legal tender.  It is not clear 132
how or where EFMA protections for Work 
Permit holders will be enforced. These 
include protections against decreases in 
salaries, increases in deductions, entitlements 
to fixed basic monthly salaries, and 
maintenance of  basic needs. It is also not 
clear how a case which involves both EA and 
EFMA violations would proceed, and if  it 
would involve two simultaneous cases 
proceeding through different systems.  133
Suggestions were also raised during the public 
comment period regarding non-legal 
representation, to enable workers to avail 
themselves of  assistance with the claims and 
adjudication process. The Bill’s final hearing 
clarified that “generally speaking, claimants 
must make their claims in person”,  134
meaning without representation. Some 
Members of  Parliament expressed the 
concern that if  the worker is unable to 
express himself  or unable to present his case, 
then the judgment may not be a fair one.  135
However, MOM has confirmed in its 
guidance that no representation will be 
allowed.  136
We note several points, with the caveat that 
many details of  the ECT have been left to 
subsidiary legislation that has not yet been 
finalised and so cannot be commented upon. 
First, the ECT may be seen as a promising 
improvement to the Labour Court system, in 
that it is to formally be part of  the Singapore 
Courts (namely, the Community Justice and 
Tribunals Division (CJTD) of  the State 
Courts) and claims will be adjudicated by 
magistrates who are legally trained.  137
Additionally, the Rules of  Court can be used 
to summon witnesses, establish facts and give 
ev idence,  removing some of  the 138
evidentiary inconsistencies present in the 
current Labour Court system. Second, it is 
unclear how well EFMA protections will be 
upheld once the ECT is in effect, as the ECT 
does not have authority for claims under the 
EFMA. Third, the ECT appears to lack the 
same safeguards that the current salary 
 Singapore Parliamentary Debates, Employment Claims Bill, ibid; http://www.mom.gov.sg/newsroom/speeches/132
2016/0816-employment-claims-bill-2016-second-reading-speech-by-minister.
 It is not clear if  EFMA violations will result in civil liability. 133
 But in cases where the employee does not have the capacity to represent himself, his next-of-kin may apply to 134
the courts to be appointed as a deputy under the Mental Capacity Act. Once appointed as a deputy, the next-of-kin 
may then submit a mediation request on behalf  of  the employee”. Singapore Parliamentary Debates, Employment 
Claims Bill, ibid. 
 The reply was that the Tribunal Magistrates appointed to the ECT will be legally qualified and they will decide on 135
each case, its merits and in accordance with the relevant legislation, case law and legal principles. Singapore 
Parliamentary Debates, Employment Claims Bill, ibid. 
 See point 24: Singapore Parliamentary Debates, Employment Claims Bill, ibid; http://www.mom.gov.sg/136
newsroom/speeches/2016/0816-employment-claims-bill-2016-second-reading-speech-by-minister.
 Employment Claims Act ss 9 and 11. See also http://www.mom.gov.sg/newsroom/speeches/2016/0816-137
employment-claims-bill-2016-second-reading-speech-by-minister.
 Employment Claims Act 33(2)(g) and (h) .138
55
LABOUR PROTECTION FOR THE VULNERABLE | CHAPTER 2: LEGISLATIVE AND REGULATORY FRAMEWORK 
!
mediation and adjudication system lacks 
relating to assistance and representation.  
3.5. Enforcement 
The final stage of  the claims process is 
enforcement. Employers or insurers are 
ordered to make payment within 21 days of  a 
successful final judgment or order for 
compensation by Labour Court. If  the 
employer fai ls to pay, the worker’s 
enforcement options are impractical and 
unaffordable. We observe that the costs—in 
terms of  both time and money, as well as the 
complexity of  enforcing an order through the 
Singapore Courts—are serious obstacles, 
while outcomes are unpredictable and 
recovery rates low.  Here is a summary of  139
the key options currently offered by the 
system to enforce claim judgments, as well as 
commentary on the limitations of  each 
option. 
3.5.1. Letter of  demand 
If  an employer does not pay the judgment 
sum stated in the court order, a letter of  
demand (LOD) may be sent on behalf  of  a 
worker setting out the list of  outstanding 
amounts. While it need not be drafted by a 
lawyer, it is unlikely a migrant worker could 
prepare an LOD without legal assistance. An 
LOD from a lawyer or law firm may add 
weight to the demand, with the implicit threat 
of  legal action. The LOD, as a mechanism for 
enforcement, is limited because the migrant 
worker is unlikely to be able to afford the 
legal fee required to draft the letter, and the 
employer can ignore the LOD without 
penalty.  
3.5.2. Writ of  seizure and sale 
Under a writ of  seizure and sale (WSS),  the 140
worker requests the court to seize and sell 
movable property belonging to the employer 
to pay the judgment debt. Stakeholders report 
that the current cost to workers of  WSS is 
approximately S$1,000, including a S$270 
stamp duty charge, and S$50 an hour for 
bailiff  charges (a bailiff  is required to seize 
the debtor’s property). The worker may also 
be required to make a minimum deposit of  
between S$150 to S$800 depending on the 
value of  the debtor’s property.  Seized 141
assets, such as office furniture and equipment, 
are then generally sold at auction, for which 
the auctioneer collects a fee. The WSS is an 
inappropriate mechanism for enforcement 
because judgment amounts, particularly for 
salary claims, are too low to outweigh the 
costs, and the employer’s assets available for 
seizure are often of  such low value that they 
are rarely worth seizing.  
3.5.3. Garnishee proceedings 
Under this process, the worker may recover 
the amount his employer owes him directly 
 Minister for Manpower Lim Swee Say in Parliamentary Debates 11 May 2015 that of  the 1,630 salary cases taken 139
to Labour Court in 2014, one-third of  judgments were not fully paid by employers. “... [O]ne-third of  them, due to 
financial difficulties faced by the companies, received either partial payment or, in some cases, no payment. We 
investigated further into those employers who were not able to make full payment and we discovered that 80% of  
the employers were able to make full payment but 20% of  them, were unable to pay due to financial difficulties and, 
in some cases, even closing down of  business. As a result, there was no recourse for the workers and for the Labour 
Court to recover the payment.”
 WSS can be issued under O 47 r 1 of  the Rules of  Court (2014 Rev. Ed.) 140
 Justice Delayed Justice Denied, p. 10. 141
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from third parties in debt to his employer.  142
Such third persons are described as 
‘garnishees’. A garnishee order could be 
ordered against a bank or other deposit-
taking institution in respect of  the judgment 
debtor’s credit balance.  The worker would 143
need to know the employer’s bank account 
details, or the identity of  the employer’s 
debtors. These garnishees would then be 
notified by the court, resulting in court costs, 
excluding lawyers’ fees, of  between S$600 and 
S$2,000. As with other enforcement methods, 
the costs of  garnishee proceedings mean that 
this option is only viable if  a company is 
financially healthy, and if  the amount claimed 
is more than S$4,000 (more than most salary 
claims). Furthermore, the worker is not likely 
to have information about the employer’s 
bank account details or debtors.  
3.5.4. Debt collector  
A final option is for workers to engage the 
services of  a debt collector, who usually 
charges a commission fee of  up to 40 percent 
of  the total compensation recovered. 
 
3.5.5. Statutory relief  fund 
One alternative enforcement mechanism, not 
currently available in Singapore, but used in a 
number of  other jurisdictions, is the creation 
of  a statutory relief  fund. Such a fund could 
be established by the Government (or by a 
tripartite alliance of  the Government, 
employers, and unions) to provide 
compensation in cases where employers do 
not or cannot pay.  
Suggestions about such a system are not new 
in Singapore. The Second Hearing of  the 
Employment Claims Bill in August 2016 
highlighted a short-term relief  fund to be 
administered by the Tripartite Alliance for 
Dispute Management, available to help local 
employees when companies are unable to 
make payment due to insufficient assets or 
halted operation.  One potential alternative 144
to the existing enforcement mechanisms 
would be to extend the short-term relief  fund 
of  the Tripartite Alliance to migrant workers 
with a successful judgment but without 
recourse against employers who cannot or 
will not pay. This recommendation is 
discussed further in Chapter 4. 
This chapter presents an introduction to 
migrant workers in Singapore, a review of  
their legislative and regulatory protections, 
and of  the salary and injury claims system. 
While the purpose of  this chapter is to 
provide an overview, we also present our 
understanding of  how the current system that 
is intended to provide protections for migrant 
workers, can be undermined by various 
factors. In Chapter 3 we elaborate on this 
understanding by reviewing primary source 
evidence that we collected through interviews 
with claimant migrant workers and other 
stakeholders such as lawyers, medical 
professionals, and NPO staff  and volunteers. 
 Singapore Civil Procedure (2016) at [49/0/2]. 142
 Paragraph 18 of  the First Schedule, Supreme Court of  Judicature Act empowers the court to attach deposits 143
even if  they have not matured and despite restrictions imposed on the mode of  withdrawal. O 49 R 1(3) of  the 
ROC further states that “any debt due or accruing due” includes current or deposit account with a bank or other 
financial institution, whether or not the deposit has matured and notwithstanding any restriction as to the mode of  
withdrawal. This effectively allows the worker to claim against the employer’s accounts, which is a useful point to 
bear in mind. 
 Singapore Parliamentary Debates, Employment Claims Bill, ibid; http://sprs.parl.gov.sg/search/topic.jsp?144
currentTopicID=00009809-WA&currentPubID=00009800-WA&topicKey=00009800-WA.00009809-
WA_3%2Bid-79677a08-c88f-4099-b610-770ca0f74f27%2B; http://www.mom.gov.sg/newsroom/speeches/
2016/0816-employment-claims-bill-2016-second-reading-speech-by-minister. 
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CHAPTER 3:  
KEY FINDINGS FROM INTERVIEWS 
1. INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter we consolidate our research 
on the practical functioning of  the claims 
process. Chapter 2 shows the intent of  the 
law and the claims process, and also raises 
theoretical areas of  concern with the laws and 
issues raised by stakeholders. We now 
supplement this legal analysis with a review 
of  our qualitative data, which includes 
interviews with 157 claimant migrant workers  
as well as informal discussion with a range of  
stakeholders, including academics, industry 
r e p r e s en t a t ive s , l e g a l and med i c a l 
practitioners, and NPO staff  and volunteers. 
This is further supported by relevant 
literature on low-wage migrant workers in 
Singapore. Through this, we examine how 
efforts to provide legal protections to workers 
can be undermined by four significant 
factors: migrant worker vulnerability, 
ambiguous legal language, violations of  the 
law, and gaps in administration. 
The analytical methods used in this chapter 
are outlined in Appendices 1 and 2, and 
involved the identifying of  key themes that 
eme r g ed f r o m th e i n t e r v i ews a n d 
consultations. The quotes we present are a 
sample of  the comments made by 
interviewees with respect to each finding; 
they are either the direct words of  the 
interviewee in first-person form or field notes 
that capture the interviewee’s words in third 
person form (field notes are indicated where 
applicable). We chose quotes which are clearly 
illustrative of  the larger theme identified. The 
rest of  the chapter progresses systematically 
through the findings of  our research. We 
organise the findings under three main 
sections: the context, the claims process, and 
critical support gaps.  
There is a growing body of  work on migrant 
workers in Singapore, with recent research 
focusing on male migrant workers in 
59
Our research 
generally affirms the 
findings of previous 
literature on low-wage 
migrant workers in 
Singapore, including 
the types of the 
problems 
encountered with the 
claims process and 
factors that 
contribute to migrant 
worker vulnerability. 
“
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particular.  Our study aims to make a 145
unique contribution through analyses of  both 
legislation and the everyday experiences of  
workers and other stakeholders in the claim 
system. Our research generally affirms the 
findings of  previous literature on low-wage 
migrant workers in Singapore, including the 
types of  the problems encountered with the 
claims process and factors that contribute to 
migrant worker vulnerability.  
  
2. THE CONTEXT: MIGRANT WORKER VULNERABILITY 
  
Before discussing migrant worker experiences 
of  the claim process itself, we provide a brief  
review of  the larger context within which a 
migrant worker brings a claim. The most 
important dimensions of  this context which 
came up repeatedly in interviews was migrant 
worker vulnerability, particularly migrant 
worker vulnerability to job loss, repatriation 
or deportation, and the financial hardships 
associated with these events.  
 Bal, Charanpal Singh, “Dealing with Deportability: Deportation Laws and the Political Personhood of  145
Temporary Migrant Workers in Singapore” Asian Journal of  Law and Society. 2 (2015): 267-284. 
Bal, Charanpal Singh, Production Politics and Migrant Labour Regimes: Guest Workers in Asian and the Gulf (US: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2016). 
Chan, Aris. "Hired on Sufferance: China’s Migrant Workers in Singapore." Hong Kong SAR: China Labour Bulletin 
(2011). http://www.labour.gov.hk/eng/public/pdf/wsd/PWIO%20guide_eng.pdf. http://www.clb.org.hk/en/
content/hired-sufferance-chinas-migrant-workers-singapore 
Chok, Stephanie J.M. “Labour Justice and Political Responsibility: An Ethics-Centred Approach to Temporary Low-
Paid Labour Migration in Singapore” (PhD Thesis, Murdoch University, 2013). 
Harrigan, Nicholas, and Koh Chiu Yee ‘Vital Yet Vulnerable: Mental and emotional health of  South Asian migrant 
workers in Singapore’. Lien Centre for Social Innovation Social Insight Research Series, Singapore Management 
University (2015). 
Harrigan, N.M., Koh, C.Y. & Amirrudin, A. (2016) 'Threat of  Deportation as Proximal Social Determinant of  
Mental Health Amongst Migrant Workers.' J Immigrant Minority Health. doi:10.1007/s10903-016-0532- 
Humanitarian Organization for Migration Economics and Transient Workers Count Too. Justice Delayed, Justice 
Denied: The Experiences of  Migrant Workers in Singapore. Singapore: HOME and TWC2, 2010. http://
twc2.org.sg/2010/12/15/justice-delayed-justice-denied/ (accessed October 12, 2016). 
Justice without Borders Manual (2014) A Practitioner’s Manual for Migrant Workers p. 24. JWB & NUS. 
Koh, Stanley, “Paper-cuts, unseen falls and invisible back injuries: employer perceptions of  workplace injuries and 
runaway migrant workers in Singapore.” (Bachelor dissertation, School of  Social Sciences, Singapore Management 
University, 2014).  
Ministry of  Manpower and Migrant Workers Centre, “Ministry of  Manpower and Migrant Worker Centre Foreign 
Worker Study 2011,” www.mom.gov.sg/Documents/statisticspublications/MOM-and-MWC-FW-survey.pdf; 
Ministry of  Manpower and Migrant Workers Centre, “Ministry of  Manpower and Migrant Worker Centre Foreign 
W o r k e r S u r v e y 2 0 1 4 ” , w w w. m o m . g o v . s g / D o c u m e n t s / s t a t i s t i c s p u b l i c a t i o n s /
Foreign%20Worker%20Survey%202014.pdf 
Platt, Maria, Grace Baey, Brenda SA Yeoh, Choon Yen Khoo, and Theodora Lam. "Debt, precarity and gender: 
male and female temporary labour migrants in Singapore." Journal of  Ethnic and Migration Studies (2016): 1-18. 
Junjia Ye, “Migrant landscapes: A spatial analysis of  South Asian male migrants in Singapore”, in Changing 
Landscapes of  Singapore: Old Tensions, New Discoveries, eds. Ho, E., Woon, C.Y. and Ramdas, K. (Singapore: NUS Press) 
pp 142-157; Junjia Ye, Class Inequality in the Global City: Migrants, Workers and Cosmopolitanism in Singapore (UK: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2016). 
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2.1. Job loss for those who make 
claims 
Among our 157 interviewees, the problem of  
job loss as a consequence of  making a claim 
was prevalent. This happened in three ways: 
cancellation of  Work Permits, inability to 
work on Special Pass, and repatriation at the 
end of  (even successful) claims. 
When a migrant worker files a salary or injury 
claim with the Ministry of  Manpower, the 
employer usually cancels the claimant’s Work 
Permit within a month or two of  the claim. 
This relieves the employer of  the requirement 
to pay the foreign worker levy. The MOM 
then issues the migrant worker a Special Pass, 
which allows him to remain in Singapore 
protected from repatriation while the claim is 
investigated and processed, but deprives him 
of  the right to work. Workers may remain on 
Special Pass for months or years, without the 
legal ability to work and so without the means 
to pay for food, lodging, and medical 
expenses. Special Pass holders are not 
permitted to resume work when the claim is 
concluded, no matter what the outcome. This 
means that even at the end of  a successful 
claim, a worker on Special Pass faces almost 
certain repatriation to their country of  origin. 
Lawyers interviewed affirm this sequence of  
events, and the punitive consequences of  the 
Special Pass system: 
  
[If  workers file a claim,] eventually [the] 
company is going to cancel your Work 
Permit and apply Special Pass for you. 
—Jenny Lim, Lawyer  
[The current] system ... cannot achieve 
the objectives of  the [Employment] 
Act [for fair resolution of  claims]. For 
example, the Special Pass. The current 
system puts many workers on Special 
Pass. Workers have to languish in 
Singapore until their claim finishes. 
—James Ng, Lawyer  
  
Our interviews with migrant workers on 
Special Pass reveal reports of  substantial 
financial hardship, with particularly severe 
consequences for workers with recruitment 
fee debt, and those with dependent families. 
The first quote below is from a worker who 
has been on Special Pass for two and half  
years, and doesn’t have enough money for 
basic living expenses. Both workers quoted 
needed to borrow money for basic living 
expenses like food.   
  
[For two and half  years] I have been 
holding the Special Pass as my Work 
Permit had been cancelled by my 
employer ... I don’t have any money for 
salary, transport, food, and my other 
expenses. ... my employer gave me 
S$2-5 every two to three days ... I do 
not have any money to pay for my 
treatment. I sleep … at the worksite, 
and I have to borrow money for my 
transport and food. 
—Liu Minmin, migrant worker from 
China with an injury claim  
While I was going through all this to 
get my money back, MOM was okay. 
But to survive day to day I need more 
money, so have to borrow—so have 
added pressure of  now owing more 
people money. Especially now, now 
they are coming back to me asking for 
the money. I also have family members 
I need to support. So very stressful, 
money [I owe to other people is] piling 
up. I wait for Labour Court money, I 
can’t work, I spend money to be here. I 
told my family I am getting the MOM 
money, as MOM said I would get the 
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Labour Court money, but the current 
state is that I might not get the money, 
as the company is winding up and 
cannot pay. If  I was just allowed to 
work, then I would at least have some 
money to support myself—for food, 
lodging, etc. Then I could support 
myself  and would not have to borrow. 
Even going to MOM cost money. 
— K a m a l I s l a m , wo r ke r f r o m 
Bangladesh with a salary claim  
  
Permission for workers to change employers 
is granted only in exceptional cases, and at 
present is not granted for men who are 
waiting for salary or injury cases to conclude. 
Offering the opportunity to work might not 
seem sensible for men whose injuries prevent 
them from engaging in strenuous manual 
work, which is the norm for construction and 
shipyard workers. But for workers with 
relatively minor injuries, and those whose 
injuries heal sufficiently for the worker to 
rejoin the workforce, earning a salary would 
relieve the previous employer of  the need to 
fund basic needs for this man who is no 
longer in his employ. 
  
Salary claims can be protracted for many 
reasons, leaving the men and their families in 
need of  financial support. These men would 
benefit from earning an income especially 
when the company accused of  non-payment 
may be in financial straits and ultimately 
unable to abide by the settlement order if  in 
favour of  the workers. 
  
While the ability to work while waiting for a 
claim would relieve much of  the hardship of  
the Special Pass, workers’ experiences tend to 
be like the one quoted below, who is 
prevented by his previous employer from 
obtaining a change of  employer (COE): 
  
[Monir] asked his MOM officer for a 
COE [change of  employer] so that he 
could [work and] finish paying his agent 
fees. However, his MOM officer said 
that this was up to his employer, and 
his employer had to consent to it. He 
feels that this is very stupid because 
after he has made a claim against his 
employer, there is no way his employer 
will approve his COE. His employer 
wants him to be sent home and to 
suffer for making his claim. 
—Field notes from interview with 
Monir, worker from Bangladesh with a 
salary claim  
  
2.2. Repatriation and threats of  
repatriation 
A further and related source of  vulnerability 
for migrant workers is the risk  and threat of  
repatriation before making a claim. Many of  
our inter v iewees repor t threats of  
repatriation against themselves and actual 
repatriations of  colleagues. Repatriation is 
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If I was just allowed to work, then I would at least 
have some money to support myself—for food, 
lodging, etc. Then I could support myself and would 
not have to borrow. Even going to MOM cost money. 
—Kamal Islam, worker from Bangladesh with a salary claim. 
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generally feared by workers because of  the 
poor economic opportunities in their home 
countries, the significantly lower income that 
they can earn in their home countries in 
comparison to in Singapore, and the debt 
burden they may still have because of  the 
large recruitment fee they had to pay initially. 
The following two excerpts capture what 
workers believe are the motives and 
mechanisms behind threats of  repatriation 
and actual repatriation: 
  
My employer threatened to end my 
contract and send me home. He did 
not want to pay me or let me receive 
treatment.  
—Zhou Weimin, worker from 
China with an injury claim  
  
My employer was explaining to me 
that reporting it [the accident] to 
MOM will tarnish the company’s 
reputation. He was willing to give 
me money for my medical fees and 
let me continue working for two 
more years once I recovered, if  I 
chose not to report it to MOM. 
However, if  I still wanted to report 
it to MOM, he will end my contract 
and send me home. 
—Cui Lijing, worker from China 
with an injury claim  
 Explicit threats of  deportation, however, 
were often not even necessary for workers 
who know of  other workers who were 
repatriated and understood their precarious 
legal and immigration situation. 
  
[Mahabur] had [known] another co-
worker who had met with an 
accident. His employer had not 
given him any problem with the 
injury at the start but sent the 
worker back after one month. [Since 
Mahabur was now injured, he] was 
scared this would happen to him. 
—Field notes from interview with 
Mahabur, worker from Bangladesh 
with an injury claim 
If  I went to MOM earlier, I would 
have lost my job because my 
employer will want to send me back 
to Bangladesh. 
—Farhan Sarder, worker from 
Bangladesh with a salary claim 
These quotes show how the ease with which 
an employer can repatriate (or deport) a 
worker puts the worker in a vulnerable 
position, appearing to reduce the likelihood a 
worker will bring a claim in a timely manner, 
or even bring a claim at all.  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3. THE CLAIMS PROCESS 
In this section, we discuss stakeholder 
experiences and appraisals of  the claims 
process. We review four different dimensions 
of  the claims process: mediation and 
adjudication, evidence, employer retaliation, 
and enforcement. 
3.1. Mediation and adjudication process 
As discussed in Chapter 2, workers with 
salary or injury claims go through a mediation 
process at MOM. If  the claim cannot be 
settled through mediation, then it may 
proceed to pre-hearing conference and 
adjudication in MOM’s Labour Court. We 
review and discuss three major concerns 
raised by workers and NPOs about the 
mediation process: pressure in mediation to 
‘meet in the middle’, lack of  guidance and 
transparency of  decision-making, and 
consequent confusion and disempowerment 
of  workers. 
3.1.1. Meeting in the middle 
Our review of  the interviews suggest that the 
current mediation process can sometimes put 
pressure on parties to meet in the middle and 
this has the potential to disadvantage workers 
with legitimate claims. Workers explain that 
their employer’s initial offer for settlement 
was significantly below what they had 
claimed. In effect, workers are being asked to 
accept a reduced amount of  compensation 
for hours they have already worked. Workers 
told interviewers that if  the employer 
objected to the amount proposed, then the 
mediated settlement was lowered. The 
claimant workers, not fully apprised of  the 
mediation process and its objectives, may not 
be aware that they can ‘walk away’ from this 
voluntary settlement offer. In the belief  that 
this was all that was on the table, the claimant 
workers may feel coerced into accepting a 
proposal that they feel is less than satisfactory. 
Moreover, even if  they understand it is 
possible, workers may not have the 
experience or ability to renegotiate the 
settlement offer upwards. 
[Abdul Kalam] went to MOM around mid 
May to make a claim. They gave an 
appointment for late May, then he 
discussed the issue with his boss and 
supervisor. They reached a settlement 
when the worker agreed to accept a lower 
sum than what he was due. 
—Field notes from interview with Abdul 
Kalam, worker from Bangladesh with a 
salary claim 
Where a group of  workers has similar claims 
against their employer and some individuals 
opt to settle, others often feel pressured to do 
the same, despite inconsistencies in the 
settlement amounts offered or their own 
beliefs as to the strength of  their legal claims. 
In such circumstances, dealing with individual 
cases one-by-one (as opposed to mediating a 
multi-disputant settlement) results in 
inconsistencies. Workers with similar claims 
may receive significantly different settlement 
sums, without transparent reasoning for or 
explanation of  differences. 
NPOs point to a 2014 case involving more 
than 50 men from the same company, 
Prosper Environmental & Engineering Pte 
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Ltd.  An early group of  eight men filed 146
complaints over salary short payment and 
deductions from salary that were not agreed 
to; the claim amount was an average of  
S$8,000 per worker. After mediation at 
MOM, the men were repatriated after 
receiving an average of  S$4,808 each. The 
men felt they had little choice but to accept 
the lower amounts and return home.  147
A week later, additional Prosper migrant 
workers came forward and filed claims related 
to similar salary underpayments and 
deductions by the employer. They were told 
by MOM that if  their employer refused to 
pay, they would have to apply to the High 
Court and would need to pay for the filing 
costs and legal assistance required. When 
asked about the different responses given to 
the first group of  eight men and the 
subsequent employees, they said that “MOM 
explained that the claims for the first group 
of  workers were settled at a conciliation 
meeting as the employer wanted to resolve 
the issue quickly. It was not meant as an 
acknowledgement of  the legitimacy of  the 
workers’ demands” or, presumably, of  the 
employer’s wrongdoing.  148
We note that these problems—of  workers 
feeling pressured to settle for a reduced 
amount, and the failure to acknowledge the 
employer’s wrongdoing—are related to the 
larger problem of  using mediation to resolve 
disputes with vulnerable groups due to the 
substantial difference in bargaining power 
between parties.  As noted by M. Rajah, 149
traditional mediation models assume that the 
power between parties must be relatively 
equal.  Mediation involves an emphasis on 150
compromise, but as another commentator 
notes, mediation may not be “suitable in a 
case of  great power inequality, as the stronger 
party lacks the incentive to compromise”.  151
Simi lar ly, a fa i lure to acknowledge 
wrongdoing seems likely to favour the more 
powerful party—in this case the employer—
as it protects them from the case being used 
as precedent for future claims by other 
workers. 
 TWC2 (2016) Who prospers in this salary saga? http://twc2.org.sg/2014/03/18/who-prospers-in-this-salary-146
saga/ (accessed 8 November 2016)
 Ibid.147
 Ibid 148
 An effective mediation that takes into account differences in bargaining power would be culture-sensitive and 149
adaptive, having considered the particular vulnerabilities of  migrant worker disputants. Mediators ought to be 
trained to be personally aware of  all cultural factors and how they may impact the mediation process. For example, 
certain ethnic minorities may be alarmed by raised voices. See Sonia Shah-Kazemi, “Cross-cultural Mediation: A 
Critical View of  the Dynamics of  Culture in Family Disputes” (2000) 14(3) International Journal of  Law, Policy and 
the Family 302, 313. Similarly, some Bangladeshi and Indian workers interviewed reveal a lack of  understanding of  
the importance of  documentary evidence – cultural ‘mismatches’, such as this, ought to be carefully explained to 
disputants by the mediator. It is critical that both the mediator and the mediation process accommodate the specific 
ethnocentric needs that arise in the context of  cross-cultural worker-employer disputes, to insure a fair and just 
mediation outcome." 
 Rajah, M. (2015) “Cooking Curry in a Cultural Melting Pot: An Argument for a Mandatory ‘Community 150
Mediation’ Framework in Singapore” Asian Journal on Mediation p.123
 Chan, G. K. Y. (2008) “Access to Justice for the Poor” The Singapore Judiciary at Work, Pacific Rim Law and Policy 151
Journal 17 (3). Employers may be able to withstand a lengthy mediation process, while workers are disproportionately 
incentivized to settle because during the mediation process they cannot work and thus are likely to incur costs, 
adding to their indebtedness. 
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3.1.2. Lack of  guidance and 
transparency  
The effectiveness of  mediation is also 
compromised by a lack of  guidance around 
the evidentiary requirements for successful 
claims, the decision-making criteria used for 
previous adjudications, and the general 
practice of  barring NPOs and other support 
persons from attending mediations and 
hearings with migrant workers. 
Workers express concerns about not being 
told, or not understanding the evidentiary 
requirements for both injury claims and salary 
claims. Lawyers and NPOs expressed similar 
concerns about the difficulty workers have 
preparing their own evidence for mediation 
or Labour Court. 
I went there the very first time to report 
my injury case. The [MOM] officer got me 
to sign a form, but I am not sure what I 
signed. Then, he asked me to go to 
another officer to write my statement. I 
had to pay S$10 for them to write it out 
for me. But, throughout this whole process 
[more than six months], the procedure or 
required documents were not made known 
to me.  
—Ma Weifang, worker from China with an 
injury claim 
 
[Abdul Kalam] did not have necessary 
evidence and timesheets. The judge 
scolded him and gave him an ultimatum 
and told him to submit all the necessary 
evidence by 5  pm the next day. [Abdul 
Kalam] managed to submit some evidence, 
but it was incomplete, and the judge got 
angrier, telling him to find a lawyer to sort 
out his documents within one week.  
—Field notes from interview with  Abdul 
Kalam, worker from Bangladesh with a 
salary claim 
It’s technically possible for a worker [to 
prepare their own evidence], but difficult. 
The person helping the worker to prepare 
must have some legal knowledge and must 
be able to communicate with the worker. 
Otherwise it is impossible for the worker 
to figure it out. To take a matter through 
the WICA process, let alone Labour Court, 
you need a lot of  experience and guidance. 
The workers lack even the basics. A lot of  
times, the workers are unsure about the 
date of  the accident. They don’t know 
what information to bring. They explain 
one way and then explain another way, 
without realising the issue this presents.  
—James Ng, lawyer  
Lawyers and NPO staff  also expressed 
frustration about their inability to access 
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records of  previous decisions, which would 
assist them to understand the grounds for 
decisions and would enable them to help 
future workers prepare their claims. Lawyers 
and NPO staff  reported that access to Notes 
of  Evidence, the court documents which 
explain the grounds for a Labour Court 
decision, is only available if  the worker 
appeals the decision to the Singapore High 
Court and pays the corresponding filing fees. 
This poses a problem because the claimant 
often doesn’t know if  grounds for an appeal 
exist without knowing the grounds for the 
decision. The S$5 per page fee for Notes of  
Evidence are prohibitive when the Notes can 
be 50 pages or more in length.    152
MOM should give the grounds of  decision 
so parties can make informed objections. 
Take adjudication out of  MOM … [Notes 
of  evidence] are relevant in making the 
decisions as to whether the case should 
proceed to trial. Parties should get a copy 
of  the Notes of  Evidence [but don’t].  
—James Ng, lawyer  
As explained in the previous chapter, a 
worker with a salary claim is not allowed legal 
or other representational help in mediation or 
adjudication. This requires a worker to 
represent himself  without being accompanied 
in the hearing. For injury claims, a worker 
may engage a lawyer, but the WICA system is 
meant to be able to be navigated without legal 
help. Hiring a lawyer to present a strong case 
is unaffordable to many workers with injury 
claims, while pro bono schemes in Singapore 
are not available to migrant workers. The 
problems workers face without dedicated 
legal or other forms of  representational 
support is articulated by one lawyer familiar 
with the migrant worker claims context:  
[W]hen I see the migrant workers at 
Labour Court, they seem very helpless … 
it is very important they get a lawyer. Just 
imagine them not being able to write a 
coherent written submission! Even if  you 
don’t have a lawyer, you need a competent 
person to be able to advise the court by 
helping the worker. There are so many 
angles to it, if  you are not an expert, you 
can’t turn the attention of  the court … 
[Up to S$50,000 cases they can or should 
get help from NGOs] … but beyond that 
[they] must get a lawyer. 
Here’s an example of  [what is expected in] 
the written submission, where you see 
there are many details and exactly what the 
respondent is disputing. For instance, what 
happened during the whole process and 
what could have aggravated the situation. 
 MOM website: “I want to appeal to the High Court. How do I get documents of  the inquiry proceedings?” 152
Answer: “Make a request to the MOM officer listed in the Order’s cover letter, asking for notes of  evidence related 
to your case. We will give you a certified copy of  those notes, at the cost of  $5 per page. You’ll need to make a non-
refundable partial payment in advance. The notes should be ready within a month, depending on the complexity of  
your case.” 
Ministry of  Manpower (2015) I want to appeal to the high court how I get documents of  the inquiry proceedings 
http://www.mom.gov.sg/faq/claims-and-complaints/i-want-to-appeal-to-the-high-court-how-do-i-get-documents-
of-the-inquiry-proceedings (accessed 8 November 2016). Compare this with access and costs in the Singapore 
Courts. The Appellant is entitled to the first set of  record of  proceedings and the Grounds of  Decision at no 
charge. Subsequent sets of  record of  proceedings or the Grounds of  Decision will be charged at a rate of  $0.50 for 
each page subject to a minimum of  $10. https://statecour ts.gov.sg/CriminalCase/Pages/
InformationaboutFilingaNoticeOfAppeal.aspx.  
http://statecourts.gov.sg/CriminalCase/Documents/Application Form for Court Records - Form 26.docx 
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Lastly, it is pertinent to explain what 
exactly is the claimant trying to get. Then, 
I follow it up with the law. How can a 
layman be expected to do this? 
—Hiran Devan, lawyer  
3 . 1 . 3 . C o n f u s i o n a n d 
disempowerment 
One of  the consequences of  inadequate 
guidance, language barriers, and lack of  legal 
or other experience to navigate the claims 
process was that workers express feelings of  
confusion and disempowerment. 
The whole Labour Court process is 
extremely disorganised. There were a few 
times when my company changed their 
mind [about attending] and cancelled the 
hearing, I was not informed at all. …   I 
wasn’t sure what was going on in a few 
hearings and wasn’t asked to prepare any 
materials … I wish MOM or my company 
would have explained the whole process 
for me, as I was very confused. It was such 
a difficult time for me, and I was still 
injured on top of  that … Also, why did my 
case drag on for so long? I can’t afford the 
additional expenses since I’ve stopped 
working.  
—Yan Yanjing, worker from China with an 
injury claim 
[Ali Sultan] was advised by another 
Bangladeshi man to make a claim with 
MOM. It went to Labour Court from 
there. There was no one to guide him 
through the process. … He didn’t prepare. 
He didn’t know what was going on. He 
just submitted his documents/evidence at 
the beginning of  the case, and then just 
went with whatever happened during his 
hearings. … He was confused. He said a 
lawyer would have been nice, but he 
couldn’t afford one.  
—Field notes from interview with Ali 
Sultan, worker from Bangladesh with 
injury and salary claims 
This sentiment of  confusion, while prevalent, 
was not uniform, and workers’ varied 
experiences point toward potential solutions. 
Workers’ reports of  their experiences with 
the claims process tend to focus on two 
issues: first, whether the worker is treated 
with courtesy, care, and respect; and second, 
whether he receives appropriate quasi-legal 
support, whether from MOM officers, 
lawyers, doctors or NPO staff. We can see in 
t h i s f i r s t q u o t e t h a t t h e m a n n e r , 
communication skills, and demeanor of  
MOM staff  can vary considerably, and makes 
a substantial difference to the workers’ 
experience of  the claim process. 
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Yes, I went to MOM twice. The first time I 
went there, I spoke with this older lady 
MOM officer, but her attitude was very 
bad. A lot of  things I didn’t understand, so 
I went back, and during the second time, a 
younger woman spoke with me and she 
was very good. She asked me for all the 
details and wrote everything down. I think 
overall MOM was very helpful and gave 
me confidence in seeking justice so far.  
—Xiong Xiali, worker from China with an 
injury claim 
In the second quote the worker explains that 
MOM staff  was proactive in urging the 
employer to follow the law, giving the worker 
confidence in the claims process. 
Yes, I went to MOM and the MOM officer 
was very helpful. When manager took me 
to cancel my Work Permit, MOM case 
officer ask manager why no take me to 
proper hospital. He told manager, if  next 
time still never take me to hospital, will go 
police and many, many problem.  
—Selim Miah, worker from Bangladesh 
with an injury claim 
3.2 Evidence 
As discussed in Chapter 2, workers with 
salary or injury claims can have considerable 
problems furnishing the evidence required to 
substantiate their claim. In this section we 
review and discuss three major areas of  
concern with evidence brought up by workers 
and NPOs: documentary evidence for salary 
claims, documentary evidence for injury 
claims, and witness testimony, particularly the 
possibility of  the coercion of  witnesses who 
work for the employer. 
3.2.1. Documentary evidence for 
salary claims 
Analysis of  our interviews with workers 
revealed that a considerable number report a 
lack of  access to documentation required to 
substantiate salary claims. This includes 
difficulty accessing IPAs, contracts, time 
sheets, pay slips, and receipts for deductions.  
Contracts. Workers raised issues 
relating to employment contracts. Many 
workers report not having employment 
contracts. As explained by the workers quoted 
below, many who did sign employment 
contracts reported that they were not allowed 
to read the contract or were not given a copy.  
I signed a contract in China and one in 
Singapore. … Even if  my employer gives 
me less than what is stated on the contract, 
I have nothing to fight against him. He 
keeps the contract after we have signed it. 
—Cai Weiwei, worker from China with an 
injury claim 
[Interviewer: Before coming to Singapore, 
did you sign a contract?]  
I did, but it didn’t have the other party’s 
signature! It’s a useless piece of  paper 
because I could sue in court but have no 
evidence since I was the only one who 
signed it. I don’t even have a copy of  it! 
The contract was taken to me by my agent. 
—P0060, Zhou Yangfang, worker from 
China with an injury claim 
As we can see in the following examples, 
withholding of  contracts from workers 
appears to be deliberate and not simply for 
safekeeping.  
[Kamrul Islam] signed a contract but was 
not allowed to keep a copy of  it. He tried 
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to take a picture of  it once but was told 
that this was not allowed. 
—Field notes from interview with Kamrul 
Islam, worker from Bangladesh with injury 
and salary claims 
[Mahabur] demonstrated that the company 
man had a hand on the paper as he was 
signing, and snatched the contract away as 
soon as he had finished signing. He asked 
if  he could have a copy. When I asked 
what the man’s response was, he said, 
“Company man many angry.”  
—Field notes from interview with 
Mahabur, worker from Bangladesh with an 
injury claim 
Some bosses might not give contracts 
because they are not legally trained so 
don’t know how to draft legal contracts, or 
they are outside all day, or they don’t have 
time. But, from the other side of  things, 
sometimes they want to as to make sure 
there is no paper trail, no proof.  
—Caleb Tan, lawyer  
The withholding of  contracts from some of  
our interviewees suggests that some 
employers are consciously trying to stop the 
creation of  a paper trail, and prevent workers 
from having the documentary evidence to 
bring a salary claim if  they are ever 
underpaid. 
Deductions and cash salary payments. 
Some workers also report deductions from 
their salary that were not previously agreed 
upon or that appeared to be illegal. There 
were also reports of  instances where 
amounts of  payment given in cash were less 
than the amount indicated on the salary 
envelope. The quotes below show examples 
of  each of  these situations. 
[Aynal Haque and his co-workers] had 
no evidence. The company took back all 
papers. Nothing was given to them to 
prove they had received payment. There 
were no itemised pay slips, and they 
were not allowed to keep a copy of  their 
contract. There was also no record of  
the illegal deductions as payment was 
made in cash.  
—Field notes from interview with Aynal 
Haque, worker from Bangladesh with a 
salary claim 
[Rafiqul] gave an example of  how the 
deduction would be made from his salary: 
if  he was owed S$500 in wages, his 
employer would give him an envelope 
which stated S$500 on the outside, but in 
fact only contained S$400. This happened 
to many workers. “One month S$500 
coming, boss gave S$400, paper writing 
S$500. So many people have.” [Rafiqul] was 
very upset that this deduction was not 
documented and that he was not able to 
understand what sums were being deducted 
from his salary. 
—Field notes from interview with Rafiqul, 
worker from Bangladesh with injury and 
salary claims 
Again, we can see from these quotes that 
some employers appear to be deliberately 
preventing the creation of  a paper trail, and 
denying employees access to the documentary 
evidence they would need to bring a salary 
claim. 
Manipulation of  documentation. Workers 
reported a range of  employer practices 
including the creation of  false pay slips, 
forced signing of  blank documents, forced 
signing of  documents that were not 
understood, and forging of  signatures and 
pay slips. The following two cases are 
illustrative of  the problems workers faced. 
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The morning I arrived, I was brought to 
do a medical check-up and the factory that 
I was working at … After that, boss passed 
28 blank salary vouchers to me to sign. He 
told me to write my name, FIN number 
and just sign. He said everyone else did it 
too, so I didn’t dare to disobey. 
—Sarwar Khan, worker from Bangladesh 
with a salary claim 
The first time the boss claimed the [salary] 
withholdings were repayment for a loan. 
The second time, he printed a salary slip 
and forged a signature. “I say to officer, Sir, 
this is not my sign! This one boss is illegal 
making!”  
—Farhad Ali, worker from Bangladesh with 
injury and salary claims 
In these quotes, workers accuse their 
employers of  deliberate illegal behaviour. We 
note that if  a worker signs blank documents, 
such as blank salary vouchers, it would be 
almost impossible for him to prove a future 
salary claim.  
Manipulation of  contract terms. Other 
workers report that their contract terms were 
manipulated in ways that appear to be illegal 
under the Employment Act, such as 
specifying an overtime rate that was less than 
the mandated legal rate of  1.5 times the basic 
pay rate. An example of  this is explained in 
the quote below, and also Figure 7. The quote 
and the contract are from the same 
interviewee.  
[Aynal Haque] was also unable to claim his 
extra pay for overtime as he had signed a 
contract that set a fixed amount for 
overtime. The fixed amount was S$3.00/
hr. His basic pay was S$2.60/hr.  
—Field notes from interview with Aynal 
Haque, worker from Bangladesh with a 
salary claim 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Note: Although minor changes were made to the contract’s text to protect the worker’s identity, no 
changes were made to wage rates, working hours, or terms of  contract that are relevant to this example. 
FIGURE 7. Example of a Work Permit holder’s employment contract which shows an 
illegal overtime pay rate.   153
Notice how the contract specifies an eight 
hour day (8am to 5pm, assuming a one hour 
lunch break), and a daily rate of  pay ($21) 
equivalent to $2.63/hour, but it also says that 
overtime is at a flat $3/hour. This contract 
c lause should be i l l eg a l under the 
Employment Act, since overtime should be 
paid at 1.5 times the hourly basic pay rate. 
Use of  coerced witnesses in absence of  
contracts. Some workers reported that 
employers use other migrant workers as 
witnesses in the absence of  necessary 
  In addition, it states that salary shall be paid within 30 days in the following month, while the Employment Act 153
requires that payment be made within 7 days after the end of  the salary period for basic pay and within 14 days of  
the salary period for overtime pay.
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documentary evidence. Interviewed workers 
believed that employers instructed, induced 
or coerced these witnesses to give false 
testimony. This is an example from the 
fieldnotes from one interview: 
There is some dispute over his basic salary. 
His employer is trying to understate his 
salary, but there is no contract or other 
documentary evidence. The employer is 
relying on witnesses to make up for [the 
lack of] documentary evidence. These 
witnesses are all employees of  the 
company but are being admitted.  
—Field notes from interview with Monir, 
worker from Bangladesh with a salary 
claim 
Note that any workers without access to their 
contracts—which was the case for most of  
our South Asian interviewees—could 
potentially have their claim undermined by 
such witness testimony. 
Manipulation of  documents af fected 
outcomes of  cases. Workers report that these 
manipulations were effective in undermining 
their claims and negatively affecting 
outcomes. As illustrated in the quotes below, 
some workers report being blamed by 
authorities for signing documents they were 
forced to sign, while others say that because 
employers had deliberately withheld receipts, 
they were unable to prove that illegal 
deductions had occurred. 
All I wanted to get back was my salary 
during my injured days, but company kept 
cheating me, and MOM blamed me for 
signing whatever company threatened me 
to sign. 
—Yan Yanjing, worker from China with an 
injury claim 
They were unable to prove that the illegal 
deductions had occurred because they 
were paid in cash and made to sign off  on 
a sheet prior to receiving the money. After 
they signed, the supervisor would take out 
a significant amount of  cash from the 
bundle (around 40 percent), claiming it was 
for housing, food, or for contract renewal.  
—Field notes from interview with Aynal 
Haque, worker from Bangladesh with a 
salary claim 
In these cases, workers claim that 
employers took advantage of  their 
vulnerability by withholding or 
manipu la t ing documents, thus 
affecting the decisions of  authorities. 
3.2.2. Documentary evidence for 
injury claims 
Workers and NPOs report a number of  
problems with documentation for injury 
claims, including employers taking all 
documentation from doctors or hospital 
visits, and a lack of  pay slips or time sheets 
for the calculation of  average monthly 
earnings.  
Withholding of  medical documentation. 
Workers report that their employers or 
supervisors would routinely keep medical 
documentation and that workers found it 
difficult to get documentation from doctors, 
even when workers explicitly requested it. In 
addition, considerable numbers of  workers 
report difficulties obtaining documentation 
from hospitals upon request. In the quotes 
that follow we can see one example of  the 
problems one worker faced when trying to 
access medical documents, and another 
example where the worker implies that his 
employer kept all medical documentation for 
reasons that are “not good”. 
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I went back [to the private hospital] in an 
attempt to get my hospital records. SGH 
wanted it. But the private hospital said that 
my records were sent to boss. When I 
asked boss, he said that he didn’t receive 
and asked me to check with the safety 
officer who accompanied me to all the 
check-ups at the private hospital. 
(Interviewer: What did the safety officer 
say?) He said he didn’t get anything!  
—Zheng Jingqiang, worker from China 
with an injury claim 
Boss is not good … Boss has kept all my 
documents and medical reports.  
— A b d u r R a h m a n , wo r k e r f r o m 
Bangladesh with injury and salary claims 
As illustrated in the following quote from a 
Chinese worker, the lack of  access to such 
evidence creates a sense of  powerlessness and 
futility, reducing the likelihood that workers 
report their claims to authorities. 
No, I don’t think I can [approach MOM]. I 
don’t even have my MC slips! I don’t dare 
to go take my MC slips because if  boss 
finds out, he will send people to beat me 
up and send me home. His attitude is very 
bad and kept wanting to settle this on our 
own and don’t involve MOM. Manager 
said last time got another worker similar 
problem, he got a lawyer and lawyer 
helped. But I don’t even have basic 
evidence like MC slip, how to get lawyer?  
—Zhang Jinglei, worker from China with 
an injury claim 
A related issue, which is covered below, is that 
some doctors fail to provide injured workers 
with adequate medical leave, apparently at the 
request of  employers. This too prevents 
workers from acquiring documentary 
evidence of  a workplace injury needed to 
bring a claim. 
 Lack of  documentation for calculation of  
average monthly earnings. The lack of  salary 
documentation also creates problems for 
wo r ke r s w i t h i n j u r y c l a i m s. S u ch 
documentation is required for the calculation 
of  average monthly earnings, which is used in 
computing medical leave wages and the 
compensation amount. The following are 
quotes from workers who claimed that their 
average monthly earnings (AME) were not 
calculated properly because of  lack of  salary 
documentation. 
[Rasel] did not have enough evidence to 
dispute the AME [average monthly 
earnings] figure, as he did not sign any 
timesheets during his short period of  
work. 
—Field notes from interview with Rasel, 
worker from Bangladesh with an injury 
claim 
Also, [the company did not] calculate the 
AME properly—[Nazrul Islam] says that 
the figure they used was lower than any of  
each individual month’s wages.  
—Field notes from interview with Nazrul 
Islam, worker from Bangladesh with an 
injury claim 
          
         3.2.3. Witness testimony 
Interviews with workers, NPOs and lawyers 
uncovered grievances about the use of  
witness testimony in injury cases, as set forth 
below.  
									 Repatriating and intimidating witness. 
Workers, NPOs and lawyers accuse employers 
of  manipulating the outcomes of  injury cases 
by repatriating and intimidating witnesses, as 
well as inducing the claimant worker’s 
colleagues to remain silent or falsely testify 
against him. Workers stated that their 
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colleagues complied with such requests 
because of  a fear of  job loss and repatriation. 
In this first quote, workers who refused to 
give false testimony to MOM were later 
deported by the employer. 
My manager and supervisor had wanted 
[two of  my colleagues] to act as false 
witnesses. They wanted them to tell MOM 
at the meeting that the three of  us had 
gotten into a fight, and I got injured. But 
they refused. They told MOM the actual 
story. They were sent home sometime in 
January to February 2016. 
— A k h t a r u z z a m a n , wo r k e r f r o m 
Bangladesh with an injury claim 
In this next quote, one witness was 
repatriated before he could make a statement 
in support of  the injured worker.  154
Two co-workers were present at the time 
of  accident, then one of  them ran away … 
Boss sent the other witness back home 
before he could go to MOM.  
— A b d u r R a h m a n , wo r k e r f r o m 
Bangladesh with injury and salary claims 
 
In the case below, the employer is accused of  
producing a false witness, and the worker 
says that the Labour Court official put the 
onus on him to prove that the witness 
testimony was false. 
The people who actually witnessed the 
problem are no longer in Singapore. I 
don’t know how to get them. The ‘witness’ 
who has been given by the company wasn’t 
even there when I was injured! He was not 
a witness at all, but I had to prove him 
wrong. 
—Humayun, worker from Bangladesh 
with injury and salary claims 
The next two quotes show that that 
interviewees believe that their fellow workers 
did not testify because they fear deportation. 
In these cases, the witnesses were not directly 
threatened, but they understood the 
vulnerability of  their job status, and assumed 
that they would be deported for defying the 
employer.  
His supervisor asked about what exactly 
happened and if  there was any witness. His 
friend who helped him saw the accident, 
but did not dare to speak up as he was 
 While MOM ACLs have the power to summon witnesses, the problem may be that witnesses have been sent 154
home before they have a chance to provide testimony. Bringing medical personnel to testify (at roughly a S$5,000 
per day rate) is unaffordable for workers. 
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afraid he would be sent home. He said that 
he knows that that has happened to a few 
others before. 
—Khorshed, worker from Bangladesh 
with an injury claim 
[Interviewer: Do you have any witnesses?] 
No witnesses because nobody support me. 
They all support boss because they 
thinking, if  they support me, boss will 
send them to Bangladesh. I understand. 
B o s s v e r y a l i b a b a [ d i s h o n e s t , 
unscrupulous].”  
—Rahman Chandu , worker f rom 
Bangladesh with an injury claim 
													 Requesting, inducing, or coercing signing of  
false testimonies. A number of  workers report 
being requested, induced or coerced to sign 
false testimonies about their injuries. The 
worker reports in this quote being locked in 
an office for 11 hours without a mobile 
phone and being coerced to sign a false 
document. 
On the eighth day after the accident, the 
safety officer asked [Kamrul Islam] to sign 
a report he had prepared about the 
accident. [Kamrul Islam] refused because it 
only mentioned his thumb injury, not his 
back injury. They [the employer and 
others] kept him in the office from 8 am to 
7 pm. Eventually he was forced to sign it. 
He has made a police report stating that he 
was forced to sign the false report. They 
took away his mobile phone during this 
period, so he could not call anyone. 
—Kamrul Islam, worker from Bangladesh 
with injury and salary claims 
In this excerpt, the worker says that his 
employer threatened to call the police if  he 
did not sign documents that he did not 
understand. 
On that same day, [Manik] went back to 
the main office and gave the letter to an 
officer. Once again, the officer took the 
letter from him. He thought that the 
company would finally agree to giving him 
proper medical treatment. Instead, the 
officer got angry and questioned why he 
went to a different doctor. The officer also 
accused him of  lying and insisted that the 
injuries became bad because of  self-
inflicted acts. The officer then returned 
with a bunch of  paperwork and requested 
for his signature. Since [Manik] did not 
understand the content and was previously 
advised by friends to be wary about signing 
documents, he disagreed. The officer then 
threatened to call the police if  [Manik] did 
not comply. In his own words, “I call now, 
I call police” (while gesturing to make a 
call using a phone), [Manik] stood firm and 
left the office.  
—Field notes from interview with Manik, 
worker from Bangladesh with an injury 
claim 
In these cases, it appears that employers are 
attempting to take advantage of  their ability 
to rebut the presumption of  a workplace 
injury through the use of  witness testimony 
(see Chapter 2). Despite the existence of  
medical evidence of  an injury, an employer 
may contest the validity of  the injury by 
bringing in witnesses to testify that they did 
not see the injury occur at work, or that it 
didn’t happen as the injured man described. 
If  an employer provides such witness 
testimony, workers must then furnish other 
evidence, in addition to medical evidence, to 
prove that the injury occurred at work. This 
appears unlikely if  witnesses who might 
otherwise testify for the worker have been 
repatriated, intimidated, or are too fearful to 
testify against their employers.  
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3.3. Employer retaliation 
 
Our interviews revealed that many workers 
report facing employer retaliation during the 
claims process. The main types of  retaliation 
reported: stalling and/or refusing to 
communicate; threats of  blacklisting, 
dismissing, repatriating, or threatening to 
dismiss or repatriate; threatening to file 
baseless counter-claims; and, forced 
confinement and/or physical abuse. 
            3.3.1. Stalling and/or refusing to 
communicate 
A substantial number of  workers report that 
their employers appear to be deliberately 
stalling or refusing to communicate, causing 
further delays to the claims process. This 
appears to be particularly harmful to workers 
as most are required to stay in Singapore on a 
Special Pass, and thus are prohibited from 
working. The worker explains in the first 
quote that he cannot make a claim because 
his employer refuses to answer his calls or 
indicate in writing the worker’s salary. In the 
second quote the worker says that he believes 
his employer has been stalling for the last five 
months. 
MOM gave me a salary paper to make a 
claim. But need boss to write down the 
salary I get every month to submit the 
claim. Boss no answer call and no want to 
write. I say I one month $950, but MOM 
officer no believe. 
—Gao Weijie, worker from China with 
injury and salary claims 
My claim has been going on for five 
months already. It is taking a lot of  time. 
Every time I go to MOM or go to my 
boss, they keep stalling and delaying. 
— Z a h a n g i r K a b i r , wo r ke r f r o m 
Bangladesh with injury and salary claims 
3.3.2. Threats of  blacklisting 
Another form of  employer retaliation 
reported is threatening to blacklist workers 
from future entry into Singapore if  they make 
a claim. In the first quote, the worker says he 
was explicitly threatened with blacklisting, 
while in the second the worker says his 
friends did not make salary claims for fear of  
being blacklisted. 
His employer wants [Monir] to be sent 
home and to suffer for making his claim. 
His employer is also threatening to 
blacklist his passport so that he cannot 
come back to Singapore to earn money.  
—Field notes from interview with Monir, 
worker from Bangladesh with a salary 
claim 
[Abdul Kalam’s] friends have been 
underpaid, but they are scared to claim 
because they think that if  they make claim, 
they will be blacklisted and cannot return 
to Singapore. Unless the underpayment 
amount is very severe, he thinks it is not 
worth the headache for the worker to 
pursue the claim.  
—Field notes from interview with Abdul 
Kalam, worker from Bangladesh with a 
salary claim 
3.3.3. Dismissing, repatriating, or 
threatening to dismiss or repatriate 
Dismissing, repatriating or threatening to do 
so is another form of  employer retaliation 
that is widely reported by workers who file or 
attempt to file a claim. We can see in this first 
quote that the workers may sometimes be 
able to report their unpaid salary claims to 
MOM before their employers are able to 
deport them. 
When [Joynal Nazrul] went to MOM, he 
met the officer and complained that they 
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[his employer company] still owed [him 
and his co-worker] six months of  salary 
and also were threatening to deport them 
the next day.  
—Field notes from interview with Joynal 
Nazrul, worker from Bangladesh with a 
salary claim 
The following quote shows that a worker was 
threatened after making an injury claim, and 
says that many of  his injured co-workers were 
deported. 
Manager angry me after he found out that 
I have lawyer and want to go Labour 
Court. He called me to tell me to relax but 
I cannot, so he said wanted to send me 
back to Bangladesh. Many people in my 
company got same problem, they all injury, 
then got send back so we all no like this 
company because no take care of  us.  
—Selim Miah, worker from Bangladesh 
with an injury claim 
This last quote shows that a worker 
understood that his fellow worker was 
repatriated after an injury despite the 
employer offering reassurances, and hence 
the interviewee feared the same would 
happen to him. 
Somebody accident, boss already last time 
was talking good, good. [Then] two days, 
four days, one month send back. Then I 
also scared. I working, Singapore money 
coming okay. I injury, company send [me] 
back. This man something problem send 
[him back] already. I also something 
problem, send already. Boss never tell me 
anything. 
—Rafiqul, worker from Bangladesh with 
injury and salary claims 
3.3.4. Threatening to file baseless 
counter-claims 
Employers also reportedly have threatened to 
file baseless counter-claims against migrant 
workers. In the following quote, the 
interviewee who went to the hospital without 
employer permission claimed that he was 
threatened with an accusation of  theft that 
was false. 
I kept working while I was injured till the 
rest of  the month. My supervisor 
threatened to cut my salary because I went 
to the hospital without informing them. 
One week later my company forced me to 
go back to Bangladesh and threatened to 
falsely accuse me of  theft.  
—Mafiz Uddin, worker from Bangladesh 
with an injury claim 
  
3.3.5. Forced confinement and 
physical abuse 
A small number of  claimant workers report 
being forcibly confined, physically abused, or 
threatened with physical abuse by the 
employer. In the first three quotes which 
follow, we have examples of  workers who say 
78
When [Joynal Nazrul] went to MOM, he met the 
officer and complained that they [his employer 
company] still owed [him and his co-worker] six 
months of salary and also were threatening to deport 
them the next day.  
—Field notes from interview with Joynal Nazrul, worker from Bangladesh with a salary claim
“
”
LABOUR PROTECTION FOR THE VULNERABLE | CHAPTER 3: KEY FINDINGS FROM INTERVIEWS 
!
that they were forcibly confined in a dorm, 
house, and an office respectively. In the later 
two quotes, one worker testifies he was hit by 
‘gangsters’,  while another testifies he 155
witnessed co-workers being hit with a 
hammer and broom by a family member 
(son) of  the employer. 
Boss reaction to injury—very bad. 
Threatened to buy me plane ticket and 
send me home. Boss put a security guard 
on me in dorms. I cannot go out. I was so 
scared.  
—Sabbir, worker from Bangladesh with 
injury and salary claims 
After [Rasel] got injured, his boss intended 
to transfer him to another worksite but he 
protested, saying that it was too painful for 
him to work. His supervisor subsequently 
locked him in a private house in Little 
India and did not give him any money for 
food or for his medical bills. 
—Field notes from interview with Rasel, 
worker from Bangladesh with an injury 
claim 
After [Abul Hossain] was discharged from 
the hospital the second time, ‘gangsters’ 
were waiting outside where they tried to 
bring him forcefully back to the office. He 
mentioned that the ‘gangsters’ pulled him 
roughly, and when he fell, hit him. … He 
was brought straight to the office where he 
was locked in an office and told that he 
would be deported the next day.  
—Field notes from interview with Abul 
Hossain, worker from Bangladesh with an 
injury claim 
Sometimes boss’s son hit workers with 
hammer or broom. Once he kicked a 
worker and caused swelling and injury. 
Worker complained to police. Boss’s son 
threatened all workers to not give evidence, 
so no action was taken and [the worker] 
was sent home. 
—Nizam Ahmed, worker from Bangladesh 
with injury and salary claims 
3.4. Enforcement 
Interviewees indicated that enforcement 
efforts are, in some areas, highly uneven and, 
in others, inadequate. These experiences are 
evident in two domains: enforcement of  
existing legislative and regulatory protections 
so that workers have adequate basic needs 
support during the claims process, and 
enforcement of  successful judgments or 
orders. 
3.4.1. Enforcement of  judgments 
and settlement orders  
Inter v iews with workers and other 
stakeholders suggest major obstacles with 
fulfilling successful judgments and settlement 
orders. Interviews revealed two major 
problems with the enforcement of  
judgments: failure to enforce successful 
judgments, and lack of  a consistent process 
for payment of  settlements, which results in 
no payment or short payment, sometimes at 
the airport when the worker is leaving 
Singapore. 
													 Failure to enforce successful judgments. If  a 
worker receives a successful judgment or 
order for compensation, the employer is 
 Workers tend use the term ‘gangsters’ to refer to either (1) employees of  repatriation agencies, services which 155
assist employers with the return of  workers to their home countires; or (2) in-house staff  of  a company who are 
responsible for worker repatriation. http://twc2.org.sg/2011/12/15/mom-warns-2-repatriation-companies/ http://
newsinfo.inquirer.net/578460/migrants-say-repatriation-firms-force-workers-out-of-singapore 
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required to make payment within 21 days. 
However, interviews with workers and NPOs 
indicate that a significant number of  
employers fail to comply with judgments and 
Labour Court orders, and as a result workers 
fail to receive their compensation due. In the 
following quotes, workers describe how their 
employers did not pay the compensation 
amount owed to them upon a successful 
judgment but yet there were no enforcement 
measures brought against the employers to 
compel them to do so.  
[MOM’s] behaviour was fine, they said they 
would help and they did, they said it would 
go to Labour Court and it did. But 
problem is that MOM is a ministry, and 
they said I deserved the money, gave the 
judgment, but they could not enforce the 
judgment to actually get me the money ... 
Because [if] MOM cannot actually do 
anything, what is the point? If  boss decide 
that he will not give the money then what 
can anyone do ... Labour Court decision 
should be enforced. How can MOM say 
pay, and boss is allowed not to pay? 
—Kamal Islam, worker from Bangladesh 
with a salary claim 
I don’t like the process. Labour Court has 
made an order for S$16,000 and boss did 
not pay it. Boss say me also [no money]. So 
now MOM has bought my air ticket and I 
have to go back to Bangladesh, and I have 
not been paid. 
—Abdul Sattar, worker from Bangladesh 
with a salary claim 
Non-compliance takes various forms. Some 
employers simply refuse to pay, some 
negotiate downwards and some declare 
bankruptcy or wind up the company to avoid 
making payment. It appears that some 
employers fail to comply out of  intransigence, 
while others are genuinely unable to pay. For 
employers who can afford to pay but refuse, 
the difficulty appears to be that enforcement 
is not provided by MOM and affordable 
options do not exist for the worker.  
													 Lack of  consistent process for payment of  
settlements. With MOM-mediated settlements 
for salary claims a lack of  procedural 
consistency exists, with reports that the claim 
amounts are sometimes paid at the company 
office, sometimes at MOM, and sometimes at 
the airport just before the migrant worker 
boards his plane to return home. Payments 
are made in cash or by cheque, and both are 
problematic: cash payment provide no 
verifiable paper trail, while crossed cheques 
require the worker to open a bank account 
(not easy for workers on Special Pass) and 
may not clear. 
The practice of  paying workers at the airport 
is reportedly due to employers’ fear that the 
worker may abscond and fail to board the 
plane. The employer’s security bond would 
then be at risk of  forfeiture. NPOs report 
that this practice leads to unnecessary stress 
and complications for migrant workers, who 
are unable to use these claim amounts to 
settle debts in Singapore before they return 
home. Workers may also find themselves 
saddled with cash amounts that are illegal to 
transport across international borders and 
unsafe to carry on their person as they travel 
home, but with no opportunity to remit the 
money at this last minute juncture. Payment 
upon departure can also lead to situations 
where, even after agreeing to a particular 
settlement amount, employers either still 
don’t pay at all, or pay less than promised. 
This excerpt from an NPO volunteer 
highlights why airport payments are 
problematic: 
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Employers are aware that the man would 
have informed his family of  his flight and 
arrival time. The family may have travelled 
a long distance en masse to receive him at 
the airport, putting the worker in a bind if  
he doesn’t board the plane, leaving him no 
room to negotiate if  he doesn’t receive the 
agreed amount, without money to return 
to the city and without a dorm to return 
to. 
  
Having accompanied men to the airport 
whenever possible I’ve been able to offer 
them a solution if  the employer doesn’t 
pay what they’re owed: finding the man a 
place to stay until the money situation is 
settled, notifying MOM, and contacting 
the employer to discuss the settlement.  
—Anne Chong, NPO volunteer 
3.4.2. Enforcement of  existing 
regulations regarding support  
Workers report uneven success when 
requesting help from MOM to enforce 
employers’ obligations to provide support 
during the claims process. Employers are 
obliged to provide accommodation, meals, 
and payment for medical care, but workers 
and NPOs report that, despite MOM 
intervention, their employers fail to do so. In 
the first quote, the worker was not allowed to 
stay at his employer provided accommodation 
and was therefore homeless for a month. In 
the following quote, a worker’s employer 
refused to give him money for his upkeep 
despite MOM’s instruction for the employer 
to do so.  
MOM gave me a letter when I filed the 
injury claim to give to company. I go office 
and give letter. I talk to boss, I say I want 
to stay in room, but boss madam say 
cannot stay. After two person came and 
they threw me out. I called police and 
police came to office, and they say [to] me, 
tonight you sleep outside, after we can 
settle and you can stay. But after one 
month, still no settle. For one month I was 
sleeping outside on the street. Also MOM 
cannot settle. They call many times 
company but never answer. 
—K amr u l Hossa in , worker f rom 
Bangladesh with injury and salary claims 
I went to MOM with manager, and MOM 
official said company must provide money 
for food and accommodation during my 
MC days. However, when I asked manager 
for the money afterwards, he just told me 
to scram and also threatened to send me 
back to China. 
—Yan Yanjing, worker from China with an 
injury claim 
In the next quote, an NPO volunteer 
describes how employers continue to refuse 
to provide medical treatment despite MOM’s 
instruction for the employer to do so.  
Despite having a letter from the doctor 
that this surgery was “immediately and 
medically necessary”, MOM could not 
convince the employer to pay and the 
worker ’s cond i t ion cont inued to 
deteriorate. 
—Lynn Leong, NPO volunteer 
Others report success in accessing MOM’s 
help in obtaining this support from the 
employer. In the first quote below, the worker 
was able to get medical treatment with 
MOM’s assistance. In the next quote, the 
worker successfully claimed his expenses 
from the employer due to MOM instructing 
the employer to do so.  
When I went to the hospital, they wanted 
me to pay, but I did not have money. So 
the doctor wrote a letter for me to pass to 
81
LABOUR PROTECTION FOR THE VULNERABLE | CHAPTER 3: KEY FINDINGS FROM INTERVIEWS 
!
my employer. I took that letter and went 
MOM instead. MOM helped me by 
pressurising my employer to pay. My 
employer paid my medical bills in the end. 
—Cai Weiwei, worker from China with an 
injury claim 
[My employer] paid my out-of-pocket 
expenses when MOM told boss to. MOM 
made them pay my receipts. 
—Farhad Haque, worker from Bangladesh 
with an injury claim 
4. CRITICAL SUPPORT GAPS 
In this section, we discuss the critical support 
gaps that undermine some of  the legislative 
protections for migrant workers. We divide 
this discussion into three parts: gaps in the 
provision of  basic needs such as food, 
housing, and medical care; gaps in the 
provision of  representation, such as legal 
representation; and the role that NPOs play 
in helping to fill these gaps. 
4.1. Basic needs: food, housing and 
medical care 
Workers with salary and injury claims, 
especially those who approach NPOs for 
help, often endure a lengthy wait for the 
resolution of  their cases. In that time, 
claimant workers can have trouble accessing 
food, housing, and medical care. A sense of  
the waiting time for resolution can be gleaned 
from one survey of  over 300 Special Pass 
holders at a TWC2 meal program whose 
claims were not yet resolved: on average, the 
injuries these workers sustained occurred 
eight and a half  months ago; for some the 
injury occurred more than two or three years 
earlier.   156
In this section, we review the gaps in the 
support needs for workers who face extended 
waits for the resolution of  their claims. We 
focus on three basic physical needs of  
workers—for food, housing, and medical care
—which, in a number of  cases, seem not to 
have been met by the appropriate channels.  
4.1.1. Gaps in the provision of  food  
As discussed in Chapter 2, EFMA regulations 
require that while a Work Permit holder is in 
Singapore his employer is responsible for his 
meals, accommodation, and medical costs 
 Harrigan, Nicholas Michael, and Chiu Yee Koh (2015) "Vital Yet Vulnerable: Mental and Emotional Health of  156
South Asian Migrant Workers in Singapore." Lien Centre for Social Innovation Social Insight Research Series, Singapore 
Management University p. 25.
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even after his Work Permit is cancelled and 
replaced with a Special Pass. Many employers 
make deductions from a worker’s salary to 
provide food, and once the man is no longer 
working, there is nothing to deduct from. 
Frugality of  employers is often matched with 
logistical challenges in providing food. Meals 
are delivered to the worksite, not the dorm, 
where injured workers may be staying during 
mealtime. Or if  the worker usually uses his 
own money to buy food and cook for himself  
at the dorm, after the injury he may not have 
money and he may have limited mobility 
making it difficult to go out to purchase food. 
For these reasons, and others, workers report 
that their employers do not comply with their 
obligations to provide meals maintenance. 
The quotes below illustrate workers’ 
experiences of  not being able to get money 
from the employer to pay for meals and 
therefore having to source for their own 
meals, in some instances, with much difficulty.  
MOM also said [that] boss should give me 
S$3 everyday for makan [food], until he 
pays me the salary. But [it is] now four 
months [later], still no money for anything 
and no salary [either]. 
— H a s a n M a h a b u r , wo r ke r f r o m 
Bangladesh with injury and salary claims 
Boss did not provide makan [food] money 
so I get food from HealthServe. But my 
accommodation is in Woodlands industrial 
dorms, so I stay on the overhead bridge 
near HealthServe most of  the week and go 
back to Woodlands by MRT [train] once or 
twice to shower. HR lady says boss no 
approve food money and my MC money 
only came after two months, so I have no 
money. 
—Zhu Jingjie, worker from China with an 
injury claim 
4.1.2. Gaps in the provision of  
housing  
Claimant workers report problems with 
access to accommodation. Some migrant 
workers say that that they feel compelled to 
leave employer-provided housing fearing 
repatriation or other types of  employer 
retaliation.  Others report being expelled 157
from employer-provided accommodation or 
b e i n g s h i f t e d t o l o w e r q u a l i t y 
accommodation.  Deducting the cost of  158
housing from the worker’s salary is common 
practice, and employers are reluctant to have 
non-working men, who may require special 
attention, taking up dormitory space meant 
for able-bodied workers. Workers who leave 
or are forced out of  employer-provided 
housing must find the means to pay rent to 
stay elsewhere, an additional expense that 
aggravates their hardship and increases their 
vulnerability. In the following quote, the 
worker was kicked out of  his dormitory by 
the employer and had to live with his brother 
who was in Singapore.  
I messaged my boss in late September 
2015 to tell him I am in discomfort and 
that I won’t be coming to work. My boss 
tells me that I should go back to 
Bangladesh to get treated. I said no, I got 
injured here in Singapore, I should get 
treated in Singapore. My boss told me to 
go back to Bangladesh, or he will get 
gangsters to send me back. In late 
 Once a claim is made, and a worker is issued a Special Pass, employers are not allowed to repatriate them. 157
However, often workers do not know this initially, and they move out of  housing due to fear. NPOs report that 
many workers only find out they can’t be repatriated after they have moved out of  the employer-provided dorm.
 It is possible that one of  the reasons for expelling workers from employer-provided accommodation, or moving 158
them to lower quality accommodation is that, if  an employer had been deducting housing from a worker’s salary, 
then once a worker stops working, it is not possible for an employer to recover this cost from the worker.
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September 2015, I moved out of  the 
dormitory to stay with my brother at 
Tampines [and pursue my claim]. 
— A k h t a r u z z m a n , w o r k e r f r o m 
Bangladesh with an injury claim 
In the following quote, the worker’s employer 
kicked him out of  the company- provided 
accommodation as punishment because the 
worker had engaged a lawyer to help him with 
his injury claim. Similarly, the next quote 
describes how a worker was kicked out of  his 
accommodation by the employer as 
punishment, in this case, for taking MC when 
he was injured.  
[Rafiqul] continued to stay at the company 
dormitory one and a half  months after his 
accident. His employer found out that he 
had engaged a lawyer, and called the 
worker to come to his place. His employer 
asked him why he was still staying at the 
dormitory if  he had a lawyer, and told him 
that he should leave. The worker 
responded that he went to MOM because 
the company had not taken care of  him. 
—Field notes from interview with Rafiqul, 
worker from Bangladesh with injury and 
salary claims 
After my injury, the company offered me 
the choice to work or not to work. When I 
was on MC, my employer asked me to shift 
from living at the dormitory to living on 
the construction site. 
—Qin Leimin, worker from China with an 
injury claim 
4.1.3. Lack of  access to necessary 
medical care 
Workers with injury claims report that they 
may not receive the medical care they require. 
Lack of  adequate medical care or delays in 
accessing necessary medical care comes in a 
number of  forms, notably: employers denying 
or delaying access to clinics or hospitals; 
workers’ inability to access treatment due to 
employers’ failure to issue a letter of  
guarantee (LOG); and workers’ inability to 
access treatment because doctors at private 
clinics or hospitals take instructions from 
employers about what treatment to deliver.  
It is important to note that legal gaps and 
administrative implementation serve to 
compound the problem. The benefits 
pursuant to WICA apply only when the 
employee’s injury has been determined to be 
a valid workplace injury. As discussed earlier, 
this may take many months to determine. 
Although the EFMA requires that employers 
provide for the employee’s basic needs, 
including medical care, during employment 
and the claims process,  and maintain 
S$15,000 in non-accident related medical 
insurance, NPOs and workers report lapses 
and a lack of  enforcement. 
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         Employers deny or delay access to clinics and 
hospitals. A significant number of  workers 
report that employers limit their access to 
medical facilities, such as clinics or hospitals. 
The following quotes i l lustrate how 
employers restrict workers’ access through 
methods such as threatening job loss, delaying 
or denying medical treatment, or giving a 
worker a painkiller instead of  taking him to 
the doctor.  
My employer did not allow me to go 
hospital or clinic … My employer keep 
telling me that he will bring me to the 
hospital later, but it never happened. My 
supervisor then gave me some medicine 
and asked me not to report this case to 
MOM. He told me that if  I do not report 
to MOM, then I will be able to keep my 
job here.   
—Kannu Radhakrishnan, worker from 
India with an injury claim 
If  you get accident, big problem is that the 
treatment [in private clinics] is bad, boss 
only let you go to private clinic, which can’t 
really help. But if  you go to government 
hospital, then big problem with boss.  
—Farhad Haque, worker from Bangladesh 
with an injury claim 
[Matin Chowdury] supervisor told him, 
“No need go doctor. I give you painkiller.” 
He laughed and waved his finger again. 
After [Matin Chowdury] went to the 
polyclinic and was written a referral letter 
to go immediately to a hospital, his 
supervisor took his letter and kept saying, 
“We go tomorrow,” but they never went. 
[Matin Chowdury] went back to the 
polyclinic a second time to get his letter 
written again, and then went to TTSH by 
himself  because he knew the company 
wouldn’t allow him to get proper medical 
care at a hospital.  
—Field notes from interview with Matin 
Chowdury, worker from Bangladesh with 
an injury claim 
         Employers fail to provide a letter of  
guarantee (LOG). An LOG from the employer 
is required when payment is not made directly 
for MRIs and tests needed for diagnostics, 
consultation, hospitalisation and surgery. 
Many workers report that they are not given 
diagnostic tests or medical treatment because 
the employer refuses to pay or fails to issue 
an LOG.   159
[Shahnaz Ferdous] X-ray appointment had 
been postponed three times because his 
employer has not issued an LOG. The 
MOM officer told his employer that the 
worker has to receive medical treatment, 
and that he must issue an LOG. As of  the 
date of  the interview, the employer still 
had not issued an LOG, and the worker 
was at a meeting earlier to inform the 
MOM officer of  that.  
—Field notes from interview with 
Shahnaz Ferdous, worker from Bangladesh 
with injury and salary claims 
MOM has said that the company must pay 
[Kamrul Islam] this since he was still 
employed by them when the accident 
occurred. MOM has asked him to get the 
MRI report and the X-ray report from the 
hospital, but the hospital has not given this 
because the company has not paid and has 
not given them a guarantee letter.  
—Field notes from interview with Kamrul 
Islam, worker from Bangladesh with injury 
and salary claims 
 It should be noted that restructured hospitals will not turn a patient away with life threatening injuries. Most 159
restructured hospitals do allow for admission without the LOG should the admitting physician deem the admission 
medically necessary. 
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Withholding WICA insurance coverage when 
the employer denies that the claim is a 
workplace injury is allowable under WICA. 
What is less clear, however, is how the 
employer’s affirmative responsibility to 
provide medical care under EFMA is 
expected to be undertaken, and how and 
when the S$15,000 non-workplace accident 
medical insurance is to be utilized.  
EFMA states that the S$15,000 non-
workplace accident insurance can be used for 
inpatient care or day surgery. EFMA also 
makes employers responsible for the general 
med ica l ca re o f  employees dur ing 
employment and the claim process, but 
doesn’t attach an insurance amount to this 
responsibility. While the insurance seems to 
be designed to help employers provide 
medical care for migrant workers with non-
workplace injury-related medical expenses 
(since workplace injuries should be covered 
by WICA insurance), there is confusion in 
application. Presumably payments for 
employee medical needs not covered by the 
S$36,000 WICA insurance or the S$15,000 
EFMA insurance are to be made from the 
employer’s pocket.  
This lack of  clarity and related gaps in 
enforcement present problems for workers 
with non-accident related medical needs. As 
one doctor who works in emergency 
medicine notes, “there are many accounts of  
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My employer did not allow me to go hospital or 
clinic … My employer keep telling me that he will 
bring me to the hospital later, but it never 
happened. My supervisor then gave me some 
medicine and asked me not to report this case to 
MOM. He told me that if I do not report to MOM, 
then I will be able to keep my job here. 
—Kannu Radhakrishnan, worker from India with an injury claim
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migrant workers who refuse emergency life-
saving treatment for conditions such as heart 
attacks, and risk permanent disability or death 
because their companies will not pay for non-
work-related illnesses”.  160
         Private medical providers following employer’s 
instructions. Interviews with workers, medical 
professionals, NPOs, and a review of  recent 
court cases,  media reports,  views 161 162
published within the medical community  163
and government circulars  suggest that 164
misconduct by a small number of  medical 
professionals under the influence of  
employers causes hardship for injured 
workers. Reports suggest a number of  
troubling issues, with the most common 
being inadequate medical leave upon 
instructions from employers so as to avoid 
the requirement to report incidents and 
accidents to the authorities.  Or the 165
approval by doctors of  light duty work when 
such may not be available due to the nature 
of  construction work.  Workers assert that 166
certain clinics and doctors refuse to allow 
them access to physical copies of  medical 
certificates.  
At [the private] clinic, [Deng] asked why he 
was given one month of  light duties and 
no medical leave despite being diagnosed 
with a fractured rib. He told the doctor he 
could barely stand, let alone perform light 
duties. The doctor said that he did not 
have the power to assign him medical 
leave.  
—Field notes from interview with Deng 
Qiangjun, worker from China with an 
injury claim 
 “Gap in health care coverage for foreign workers” The Straits Times, 17 Dec. 2015, Joanna Chan Shi-En (Dr)160
 For example, on 10 May 2016, the Court of  Three Judges heard an appeal filed by the Singapore Medical Council against the 161
decision of  a Disciplinary Tribunal to acquit Dr Wong Him Choon of  professional misconduct. The case was associated with the 
issuing of  insufficient leave to a construction worker who had a fractured hand and been inappropriately certified as being fit for 
light duties at work.
 “Foreign workers get shorter MCs because….” The New Paper 12 May 2016, Foo Jie Ying.  162
http://www.tnp.sg/news/singapore-news/foreign-workers-get-shorter-mcs-because (accessed 7 Nov. 2016)
 “The Dilemma of  Medical Leave”, Dr Alex Wong, Singapore Medical Association News, Opinion. August 2016, 163
Pages 12-13.
 On 19 June 2013, MOM and MOH issued a circular (MOH No. 17/2013) informing all registered medical practitioners of  164
their role and responsibilities in the issuance of  medical certificates in workplace injury cases. From 6 January 2014 employers 
were required to report to MOM all workplace accidents which rendered their employees unfit for work for more than three 
days, regardless of  whether these were consecutive days. This change was in response to evidence that employers could bypass 
the previous reporting requirements by breaking up medical leave of  injured employees so that it was not more than three 
consecutive days. On 16 September 2016 MOM and MOH (MOH Circular 42/2016) again reminded medical practitioners of  
their responsibilities in light of  the 10 May 2016 Court of  Three Judges decision.
 "Why are migrant workers issued inadequate medical leave", 27 June 2016, Healthserve Quarterly Newsletter, 2Q 2016. 165
http://www.healthserve.org.sg/news/2016/6/27/why-are-migrant-workers-issued-inadequate-medical-leave (accessed 7 Nov. 
2016)
 Light duty work means the worker is not eligible to claim MC wages. As explained in Chapter 2, when an injured 166
worker is issued a medical leave certificate of  three days or more, the employer is required to file an incident report. 
The employer must also pay the worker his average salary for the first two months of  medical leave, followed by two 
thirds of  his average salary for up to one year. However, if  the doctor issues a certificate allowing the worker to 
perform light duty, the employer is neither obliged to offer him light duty, nor to pay wages for that time. It is 
unlikely that the employer would be able to offer light duty in any case due to the nature of  work in construction 
and shipbuilding, nor would a worker be able to perform light duty if  the injury is debilitating. Straits Times, John 
Gee, 4 December 2014, “A Win-Win way to help injured foreign workers.” 
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If  they give me MC, they will probably 
have to report to MOM, so they called it 
light duty instead.  
—Arumugam Piramiah, worker from India 
with an injury claim 
I went to the clinic with my supervisor, so 
the doctor will inform my employer 
whenever he gives me light duties or MC. 
When I went to the clinic on my own and 
lied that my employer has reported my 
injury, the doctor gave me 17 days of  MC 
almost immediately. But after the doctor 
called my employer to inform him that he 
has given me 17 days of  MC, the doctor 
took back my MC and gave me light duties 
instead.  
—Cui Lijing, worker from China with an 
injury claim 
Workers report that private medical providers, 
generally at a private clinic or private hospital, 
appear to take direction from the employer, 
rather than prioritize the needs of  the patient. 
The following excerpt gives a sense of  the 
types of  comments workers make about 
being denied adequate medical leave (MC).  
His company delayed sending him to the 
clinic for two days after the injury. When 
he was at the clinic, he told the doctor 
both times that his MC was not long 
enough for him to recover from his 
injuries. According to him, the doctor only 
said, “I dunno. Company don’t allow.” 
Because of  this, he chose to go to 
Alexander Hospital of  his own accord. 
—Abul Hossain, worker from Bangladesh 
with an injury claim 
The issue of  inadequate medical leave, and 
potential misconduct by employers and 
private doctors was recently considered by 
Singapore’s High Court in the case Singapore 
Medical Council v Wong Him Choon [2016] 
SGHC 145 (Wong Him Choon). This case 
demonstrates how Singapore’s appellate court 
approaches inconsistencies in the way the 
doctor reconciles his ethical duties towards 
the patient and his personal interest. In this 
case, the patient was a Chinese-national 
construction worker (the Patient). Dr Wong 
Him Choon, an orthopaedic surgeon at 
Raffles Hospital (Dr Wong) had: 
(a) drilled a ‘K-wire’ into the Patient’s 
right hand and discharged the Patient 
on the same day as surgery; 
(b) issued the Patient a two-day MC 
and a certificate to state he was “fit 
for light duties” for one month from 
the first post-operative day; and 
(c) backdated the Patient’s MC for 
more than a month, to cover the 
Patient’s absence at work. 
Andrew Phang JA emphas i sed the 
importance of  perspective, in particular, the 
need to be aware of  vulnerable patients’ 
position and welfare.  In certifying the 167
Patient fit for light duties, Dr  Wong had 
exhibited an “indifference to the welfare of  
the Patient”.  He had effectively let the 168
employer “decide the extent to which the 
Patient should rest”, and appeared “keen in 
maximising the value that the employer could 
extract from the construction worker”.  169
  
In deciding that Dr Wong was guilty of  
professional misconduct under Section 53(1)
 Wong Him Choon, [4]. 167
 Ibid, [105].168
 Ibid.169
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(d) of  the Medical Registration Act,  the 170
Court overturned the findings of  the 
Disciplinary Tribunal appointed by the 
Singapore Medical Council, which had 
dismissed the charge against Dr Wong. The 
Court found that, on the facts of  the case, the 
Disciplinary Tribunal had “slipped into error” 
in focusing on whether Dr Wong had 
certified the Patient fit for light duties with 
the knowledge that such duties were not 
available.  Instead, the issue at the heart of  171
the matter was whether Dr Wong had 
certified the Patient fit for light duties without 
first establishing the existence of  such duties, 
and with the knowledge that it was incumbent 
on him, as a doctor, to ascertain the existence 
of  such duties from the Patient. 
  
O b s e r v i n g t h a t “ p u b l i c i n t e r e s t 
considerations weigh heavily in imposing 
deterrent sentences on errant doctors who are 
found guilty of  misconduct”,  the Court 172
ordered that Dr Wong face a suspension of  
six months and a censure. The tough 
approach that the Court adopted towards 
greater professional responsibility is a 
reminder that doctors must adhere to the 
professional rules that bind them, irrespective 
of  the patient’s nationality or migrant worker 
status. 
4.2. Representation 
Interviews with various stakeholders reveal 
gaps in representational support. While 
lawyers are not allowed for salary claims, they 
are allowed for WICA claims and there 
appears to be a high demand for and 
dependency on lawyers among injured 
migrant workers with WICA claims. This 
dependence appears to be fostered by some 
law firms, and is said to lead to problems 
where migrant workers sign agreements 
which run counter to their interests, such as 
following a common law route, or entering 
into contingency fee arrangements. 
 (Cap. 174, 2014 Rev Ed).170
 Wong Him Choon, [84].171
 Ibid, [117].172
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My lawyer has been very helpful. He gave me some 
papers and said that these will protect me from the 
police. My lawyer asked me to go to MOM the week 
after I had approached him, but I went that day itself 
already. The MOM case officer then gave me a Special 
Pass because my Work Permit was cut. My lawyer has 
done a lot for me, if it had not been for him, I’d be in 
Bangladesh right now. 
—Shahjahan, worker from Bangladesh with an injury claim
“
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4.2.1. High reliance on lawyers 
The WICA process is designed as a no-fault 
expeditious system that workers should be 
able to successfully navigate without legal 
representation. Both MOM and NPOs 
publicly advise workers that lawyers are not 
necessary, and NPOs generally advise workers 
to discharge lawyers for injury claims that 
appear unproblematic, with the exception of  
common law claims. Despite this, NPOs 
report that use of  lawyers by claimant 
workers is widespread.  173
Workers engage lawyers for understandable 
reasons. Many workers believe that legal 
representation is necessary to lodge the claim 
with MOM and to ensure employer 
compliance. As detailed elsewhere, many 
migrant worker encounter difficulties in the 
WICA claim process—such as an employer 
not reporting the injury, denying the injury is 
work-related, threatening repatriation, or 
refusing to provide or pay for medical 
treatment—and these problems, combined 
with worker’s general lack of  confidence in 
his own ability to navigate the claims process, 
mean that workers feel their interests are best 
protected through engaging a lawyer.  
As can be seen in the following comment, 
workers can appreciate their lawyers’ 
assistance with their cases. In this quote the 
worker credits the lawyer with preventing his 
repatriation. 
  
My lawyer has been very helpful. He gave 
me some papers and said that these will 
protect me from the police. My lawyer 
asked me to go to MOM the week after I 
had approached him, but I went that day 
itself  already. The MOM case officer then 
gave me a Special Pass because my Work 
Permit was cut. My lawyer has done a lot 
for me, if  it had not been for him, I’d be in 
Bangladesh right now. 
—Shahjahan, worker from Bangladesh 
with an injury claim 
  
Other workers report that their lawyers help 
them navigate the medical system. In the 
following quote, the worker reports that his 
lawyer directed him to a public hospital where 
he would receive appropriate medical leave 
(MC), and informed the employer to pay for 
medical treatment. 
  
Lawyer is good. Lawyer told me that SGH 
is good. I go to SGH on the same month. 
SGH gave me more MC days. Boss has to 
pay for my treatment because lawyer asked 
him to pay. ... my lawyer is good—my 
lawyer can ask boss to pay, and boss pay 
for my treatments. 
—Manmadhan Raja, worker from India 
with an injury claim 
4 . 2 . 2 . L a w y e r s e n c o u r a g e 
dependence 
However, some lawyers appear to foster and 
encourage dependence. As this NPO 
volunteer explains, law firms can insert 
themselves into the claims process, while 
offering only minimal assistance.  
  
 TWC2 (2013) Widespread but unnecessary reliance on lawyers http://twc2.org.sg/2013/07/14/widespread-but-173
unnecessary-reliance-on-lawyers/; 
TWC2 (2016) Another source of  trouble for workers: their own lawyers http://twc2.org.sg/2016/07/02/another-
source-of-trouble-for-workers-their-own-lawyers/ ; “Out of  483 injured workers we saw March to May 2013 at our 
Cuff  Road Project, 456 (94.5%) had already engaged lawyers by the time they came to us.” TWC2 (2013) 
Widespread but unnecessary reliance on lawyers http://twc2.org.sg/2013/07/14/widespread-but-unnecessary-
reliance-on-lawyers/.
90
LABOUR PROTECTION FOR THE VULNERABLE | CHAPTER 3: KEY FINDINGS FROM INTERVIEWS 
!
E v e n t h o u g h t h e w o r k i n j u r y 
compensation system is meant to be 
simple enough for the worker to file his 
own claim, a small group of  law firms has 
emerged to deal with these emergencies by 
assisting the injured man to file a work 
injury claim and thereby avoid repatriation. 
The law firms insert themselves between 
the worker and MOM. They offer a 
valuable service of  preventing the injured 
man from being repatriated, provide 
minimal assistance for the duration of  the 
no-fault claim process, and finally extract a 
percentage of  the compensation amount 
when the case is finished … Sometimes 
their legal assistants prey on the injured 
workers’ vulnerability and lack of  
understanding of  the system, soliciting for 
clients at common gathering spots for out-
of-work migrant workers, including 
hospitals and the MOM building. 
—Anne Chong, NPO volunteer 
  
Workers and NPOs report that dependence is 
sometimes fostered by providing clients with 
housing or loans for living expenses while the 
claim is in process, which offers much needed 
financial assistance but can also be used to 
dissuade the worker client from changing or 
discharging his law firm.  In the following 174
quote we can see that the worker says that he 
has borrowed money from his lawyer (or his 
lawyer’s legal assistant), but does not know 
the amount. 
  
[Johirul] says his lawyer has been helpful. 
He has written letters, has come with him 
to MOM, and has come with him for the 
pre-hearing conferences. He said his lawyer 
had given him some makan money—S$5 
or S$10 at a time. He does not know how 
much money he has taken from the lawyer. 
—Field notes from interview with Johirul, 
worker from Bangladesh with an injury 
claim 
4 . 2 . 3 . C o m m o n l a w a n d 
contingency fees 
Some NPOs report that dependence on 
lawyers can lead to lawyers encouraging 
workers to pursue their case through 
common law in the Singapore Courts, rather 
than WICA, even when such action may be 
contrary to the interest of  their clients. While 
a lawsuit can potentially result in higher 
compensation for a severely injured worker 
and thus higher fees to the law firm, the risk 
of  losing the case also exists. The common 
law route also puts the worker at a 
disadvantage in that he is no longer permitted 
to remain in Singapore, and he may 
experience difficulty monitoring the progress 
of  the case, verifying the final settlement 
amount negotiated by the lawyer or awarded 
by the court, or maintaining contact with the 
law firm.   175
A further problem with dependence on 
lawyers and the vulnerable position of  
migrant workers is that many workers enter 
into contingency fee arrangements with law 
 See for example: TWC2  (2014) Another source of  trouble for workers: their own lawyers http://twc2.org.sg/174
2016/07/02/another-source-of-trouble-for-workers-their-own-lawyers/ (accessed 2 July 2016)
 It should be noted that failure to keep the client abreast of  developments or withholding information from the 175
client runs contrary to the rules of  professional behaviour. The Legal Profession (Professional Conduct) Rules 2015, 
it is the duty of  the advocate and solicitor to keep the client reasonably informed of  the progress of  the client’s 
matter (Rule 17) and according to Rule 21, it is the duty of  the advocate and solicitor to explain in a clear manner, 
proposals of  settlement, other offers or positions taken by other parties which affect the client (worker). 
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firms. While this is an illegal practice,  it is 176
repor ted to occur wide ly, and can 
substantially reduce the size of  a successful 
settlement to an injured worker. We see in the 
following quote from a worker, that he has 
agreed to pay his lawyer 20% of  the 
compensation he receives. 
  
[Faruq Uddin] has now decided to pursue 
the claim through common law because he 
wanted to go back to Bangladesh. He is 
leaving for Bangladesh in July 2016. His 
case has not been concluded. He said he 
has not paid the lawyer anything and will 
only have to pay the lawyer 20 percent of  
any compensation he receives. 
—Field notes from interview with Faruq 
Uddin, worker from Bangladesh with an 
injury claim 
  
In conclusion, it appears that reliance on 
lawyers is a function of  the gaps in the 
provision of  assistance by other aspects of  
the claims process. As will be discuss in our 
recommendations, fewer problems with 
navigating the process, and predictable 
enforcement of  the law, would reduce 
dependency on lawyers and thus worker 
vulnerability.  
4.3. Support gaps filled by NPOs 
To fill the various support gaps earlier 
identified, many migrant workers on Special 
Passes turn to migrant worker NPOs, who 
provide basic needs support, administrative 
and liaison assistance and, occasionally, rescue 
operations.  
4.3.1. Food, housing, and transport 
support 
Basic needs support is primarily provided 
through free meal programs, medical clinics 
and emergency accommodation, as well as 
financial assistance in the form of  transport 
allowances, medical fees, and other basic 
needs. The following quotes are examples of  
instances where workers rely on NPOs and 
 Such contingency fee arrangements are arguably champertous in nature, and proscribed under Section 107(1) of  176
the Legal Profession Act (Cap. 161, 2009 Rev Ed), which stipulates that:  
“107 – (1) No solicitor shall –  
purchase or agree to purchase the interest or any part of  the interest of  his client or of  any party in any suit, action 
or other contentious proceeding brought or to be brought or maintained; or 
enter into any agreement by which he is retained or employed to prosecute any suit or action or other contentious 
proceeding which stipulates for or contemplates payment only in the event of  success in that suit, action or 
proceeding.” 
However, there is one exception to this rule. It does not extend to cases where the worker would otherwise be 
unable to afford legal representation. The Court of  Three Judges in Law Society of  Singapore v Kurubalan s/o 
Manickam Rengaraju [2013] 4 SLR 91 (“Kurubalan”) drew a distinction between “impecunious clients who would 
not otherwise be able to afford legal representation” and other litigants. The reasoning behind this is simple. The 
courts do not wish to deprive an impecunious party of  access to justice he may otherwise not have but, at the same 
time, wish to safeguard vulnerable litigants as well as the honour of  the legal profession. As Chief  Justice Menon 
elaborates: 
“… one of  the key elements in effectively representing a client’s interest is the ability of  the lawyer to maintain a 
sufficient sense of  detachment so as to be able to discharge his duty to the court. That duty is ultimately paramount 
and trumps all other duties. It follows that the considerations most engaged by the offence of  champerty are those 
concerning the administration of  justice and the related need to safeguard confidence in and the honour of  the 
profession that is tasked with the vital role of  assisting the judiciary in their mission…” (Kurubalan, [45]) 
See also The Law Society of  Singapore, “PDR 2013, PARAGRAPH 58, FEE ARRANGEMENT WITH 
C L I E N T S ” . h t t p s : / / w w w. l aw s o c i e t y. o r g. s g / D e s k t o p M o d u l e s / E t h i c s Po r t a l / a t t a ch m e n t /
PDR%202013,%20PARAGRAPH%2058%20-%20Fee%20Arrangements%20with%20Clients.pdf ” (accessed 18 
August 2016, 13:30). 
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other charitable organisations to provide 
them with daily necessities.  
I have no money for food. Daily, I have 
breakfast and dinner at Isthana [TWC2’s 
free meal program]. Once a week, on 
Tuesday, I go to Chinatown Fairfield 
Methodist church; I pray and then they 
give S$20, which I then use to eat lunch 
[for the] full week. 
—Gopalan, worker from India with an 
injury claim 
My money is my livelihood! So many 
people at home count on my money to 
live. Without money, I cannot even take 
transport to go around Singapore. Lucky 
got HealthServe, give me transport money 
($40) for this period. And provide my 
lunch and dinner.  
—Meng Weijie, worker from China with 
injury and salary claims 
4.3.2. Medical needs 
NPOs may step in with support when 
employers fail to provide medical care. 
Medical needs can vary considerably, from 
major surgery to assistance with monthly 
hospital bills. NPOs fill this gap for medical 
needs by providing financial assistance to 
subsidize workers’ medical treatment and 
through setting up clinics for workers to 
access low-cost medical care.  In the 177
following quotes workers describe NPOs 
financing their medical treatment and helping 
to pay hospital bills.  
TWC2 helped me with money for the 
shoulder surgery.  
—Humayun, worker from Bangladesh 
with injury and salary claims 
Every month S$200 TWC2 give for 
treatment ... Sometimes TWC2 helps me 
with hospital bills.  
—Raihan, worker from Bangladesh with 
injury and salary claims 
4.3.3. Advice and administrative 
assistance 
Many workers rely on NPOs for advice—
primarily on the claims process and 
employment laws in Singapore—and 
administrative assistance, including help with 
the calculation of  salaries, collection and 
collation of  evidence, writing statements, 
filling out forms, and guidance on how to 
conduct themselves during hearings. These 
quotes below describe workers’ experiences 
with NPOs during their claim process.  
 HealthServe has clinics in Geylang, Jurong, and Mandai that offer subsidized health services to injured migrant 177
workers not receiving health assistance from their employers. 
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period. And provide my lunch and dinner. 
—Meng Weijie, worker from China with injury and salary claims
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[Manik] approached a lawyer but lawyer 
did not render help as he expected. He felt 
completely lost and if  it weren’t for his 
friend and a TWC2 social worker, he 
would still be [lost].  … [Manik] now 
receives help in making the claim from a 
social worker. Prior to this, he had no 
knowledge of  the process and only 
showed up whenever MOM called him … 
[He is now] advised by a social worker at 
TWC2 and would listen to her instructions 
now to prepare for meetings with MOM 
[or the] doctor.  
—Field notes from interview with Manik, 
worker from Bangladesh with an injury 
claim 
I was very confused and desperate so I 
went to the NGOs recommended by my 
friends—HOME and HealthServe. They 
recommended that I bring my case to 
Labour Court and I raised my case there.  
—Yan Yanjing, worker from China with an 
injury claim 
4.3.4. Liaising with institutions 
NPOs assist workers through liaising with 
various institutions and institutional actors, 
including employers, doctors and hospitals, 
MOM, ICA, and the police. NPOs also 
connect migrant workers to pro bono legal 
services, and pro bono lawyers who take on 
such cases often rely on NPO assistance and 
advice throughout the claims process. NPO 
volunteers and staff  may accompany workers 
on hospital visits or to hearings. Though 
NPO staff  and volunteers are not allowed to 
attend mediation or Labour Court hearings, 
they may wait outside and use the 
opportunity to provide moral support to 
migrant workers, and to speak with lawyers, 
company representatives and MOM staff. 
The following quotes illustrate how NPOs 
assist workers by communicating with other 
parties, helping them to write letters to MOM 
or talking to the employer on their behalf.  
TWC2 wrote a letter [to MOM] for me in 
early May asking that the assessment of  my 
claim proceed without the results of  the 
MRI since I was unable to obtain a letter 
[of  guarantee] from my employer … to 
pay for the MRI. There is a follow-up 
hearing in June.  
—Ramesh, worker from India with an 
injury claim 
After that I went to HOME to ask for 
help. … After [HOME] contacted my 
employer, I got 14 days of  MC without 
any questioning.  
—Lin Leijing, worker from China with an 
injury claim 
4.3.5. Rescue 
Some NPOs also engage in rescue work, 
which usually involves interventions to free 
migrant workers from confinement and 
prevent repatriation. In the first quote below, 
the worker was confined in a room by the 
employer and had to seek the help of  an 
NPO to free himself. The next quote 
describes the experience of  a worker whose 
movement was restricted by a repatriation 
company’s staff  hired by his employer and 
how an NPO volunteer intervened to prevent 
him from being forcefully repatriated.  
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[Abdul Hossain] was brought straight to 
the office where he was locked in an office 
and told that he would be deported the 
next day. Because [Rahaman] was afraid to 
make the phone call knowing that his 
phone would be confiscated if  he did 
(there were people outside), he asked a 
friend to call TWC2. Someone came to get 
him out.  
—Field notes from interview with Abul 
Hossain, worker from Bangladesh with an 
injury claim 
Two days after my injury …   my 
supervisor called me into his office. When 
I went in, I saw many man inside the 
room, but I did not know who they were. 
Later, I found out that they are gangsters 
[from a repatriation company] and they 
took me to my dormitory. At my 
dormitory, they instructed me to take all 
my belongings and pack up. After that, 
they brought me to Serangoon. They held 
me at the Serangoon place and did not 
allow me to go anywhere.”… [My 
employer tried to send] me to the airport 
twice. But the first time, my brother called 
HOME to help intervene. The second 
time, a volunteer took me back from the 
airport. After that, I came to HOME to 
write a letter of  appeal and went to MOM.  
—Kannu Radhakrishnan, worker from 
India with an injury claim 
  
 
95
[Manik] approached a lawyer but lawyer did not 
render help as he expected. He felt completely lost 
and if it weren’t for his friend and a TWC2 social 
worker, he would still be [lost].  … [Manik] now 
receives help in making the claim from a social 
worker. Prior to this, he had no knowledge of the 
process and only showed up whenever MOM called 
him … [He is now] advised by a social worker at 
TWC2 and would listen to her instructions now to 
prepare for meetings with MOM [or the] doctor. 
—Field notes from interview with Manik, worker from Bangladesh with an injury claim
“
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5. CONCLUSION 
We conclude that, while the trajectory of  legal 
reforms for migrant workers over recent years 
has been positive, substantial room for 
improvement remains. While protections exist 
in law, and the design of  the claims system 
was meant to ensure it is low-cost and 
expedient, significant obstacles remain in 
preventing migrant workers with salary and 
injury claims from achieving remedial justice. 
Some of  these obstacles are structural, and 
relate to the work pass system and specific 
regulations tied to the Work Permit and 
Special Pass. Others are procedural, for 
example, the ways in which decision-making 
criteria and adjudication processes are either 
unnecessarily complex or unclear, leading to 
confusion on the part of  migrant workers 
and a sense of  disempowerment.  
The mediation process for the settlement of  
claims, through its focus on compromise, 
frequently fails to take into account the 
diminished bargaining power of  migrant 
workers vis-à-vis employers. In circumstances 
where a group of  workers have similar claims 
against their employer, eg in the event of  
redundancy, mediating a multi-disputant 
settlement for the workers as a group (as 
opposed to individually) may create a more 
fair and consistent outcome. This will, 
hopefully, preclude workers with near-
identical claims from receiving drastically 
different mediation settlement offers, unlike 
the claimant workers in the unfortunate 
Prosper saga.   
In general, migrant workers’ recollections of  
interactions with Ministry of  Manpower staff  
demonstrated high variance, including both 
positive as well as unpleasant encounters. 
There should be greater procedural 
consistency and attention to the ways power 
asymmetries create coercive circumstances, 
such that migrant workers under duress are 
assumed to have consented to signing blank 
documents, contracts with illegal or 
unreasonable terms, or false testimonies. 
The claims process contains two problematic 
issues relating to evidence and enforcement. 
Workers lack access to the evidence required 
to substantiate their claims, while employers 
are accused of  manipulating evidence to their 
advantage. Our research suggests the 
existence of  errant employer behaviour such 
as retaliation and violation of  law during the 
claim process. The alleged retaliation includes 
threats of  and actual attempts at blacklisting, 
dismissal and deportation, filing baseless 
counter-claims, offering inducements not to 
file claims, and confinement and/or physical 
abuse. 
The current system allows errant employers 
to derive greater benefit from violations than 
compliance due to the lack of  or light 
legislative enforcement. Errant employers’ 
failure to comply with judgments and 
settlement orders deals a severe blow to 
migrant workers, who endure financial 
hardship during a fraught and protracted 
claims process. Employers’ avoidance of  
responsibilities to provide basic needs such as 
food, housing and access to the necessary 
medical care increases the workers’ hardship. 
Penalties must be increased and strictly 
enforced to deter employers from these 
violat ions. The lack of  appropriate 
enforcement options for migrant workers 
must also be addressed, including practices 
for settlement orders that leave migrant 
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workers vulnerable to being short-changed or 
unpaid by employers. 
Additional complexities arise from the 
external interventions of  a growing number 
of  practitioners in the claims process. These 
include legal and medical practitioners, as well 
as NPO support staff  and volunteers. While 
their involvement can facilitate the claims 
process and provide vital support for migrant 
workers in distress, unethical practices by 
some legal and medical practitioners are a 
cause for concern. Doctors play an integral 
role in the injury claims process and the 
provision of  medical care. Maintenance of  
professional ethical standards and greater 
regulatory oversight are required to ensure 
that allegations of  collusion with employers 
are addressed. A dependency on legal 
representation for WICA claims continues, 
despite assurances by MOM that lawyers are 
not necessary. This dependency is partly 
fuelled by fear and confusion during the 
injury claims process, and could be reduced 
by simplifying the system, enhancing worker 
access to MOM or other non-legal guidance 
to the system, and ensuring that employers 
comply with their support responsibilities 
during the claim process.  
Finally, while our research shows that the 
various forms of  support provided by NPOs 
is positively received by migrant workers and 
serves a vital need, the continual filling of  this 
critical gap by NPOs raises longer-term 
questions about fostering dependencies on a 
sector that is generally under-funded and 
largely volunteer-driven. Greater attention 
and resources need to be directed towards 
prevention efforts and tackling the root 
causes of  salary and injury related problems 
encountered by migrant workers. Additionally, 
more can be done by authorities to support 
and liaise with such NPOs. 
Our next chapter, Chapter 4, details our 
recommendations, which are shaped by the 
key issues and legal and administrative gaps 
which have surfaced in this analysis. 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CHAPTER 4:  
RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. INTRODUCTION 
  
In this chapter we present a range of  policy 
recommendations to address the issues 
identified in Chapters 2 and 3. We believe that 
policy changes need to address four main 
factors that serve to undermine the intended 
protections of  existing legislation, regulations 
and policy: migrant worker vulnerability, 
interpretation of  legal language, violations of  
the law, and gaps in administration. 
Our recommendations were developed both 
through consolidating our legal and 
sociological analysis, and also through 
consultations with migrant workers, migrant 
worker NPOs and other experts in the fields 
of  employment law, legal aid, and healthcare. 
In each recommendation area, we reviewed 
policies and legislation in comparative 
jurisdictions, such as Hong Kong, Taiwan, 
Malaysia, United Arab Emirates, Qatar, 
Australia, and Germany. The development of  
our recommendations was also guided and 
informed by the key principles that undergird 
regional and international benchmarks and 
labour standards agreed upon by member 
states of  international institutions such as 
ASEAN, the In t e r na t i ona l Labour 
Organization, and United Nations agencies.  
2. RECOMMENDATIONS 
● The SEC will include 1) predetermined minimum contractual parameters and 2) key 
employment terms, such as basic salary, overtime pay rate, rest-day pay rate, total 
monthly deductions, the nature and scope of  work, working hours and rest days, among 
others; 
● The SEC will be made available to workers before the Work Permit is issued in a 
language the worker understands; 
● Changes to employment terms and conditions set forth in the SEC made after the 
employee’s arrival in Singapore that are less favourable to the employee must be 
authorised by MOM.  178
1 Require that before arrival in Singapore, Work Permit holders sign a Standard 
Employment Contract (SEC) that sets forth minimum standards of  the 
Employment Act (EA), Employment of  Foreign Manpower Act (EFMA), and 
other relevant legislation.
 See recommendation 3 regarding EFMA.178
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● Provide assistance packages to employers (eg the advisory services and financial 
assistance  currently available to employers to aid with compliance with the 179
Employment Act amendments regarding the provision of  key employment terms, 
itemised pay slips and record-keeping). 
● Facilitate compulsory bank or payroll accounting options for Work Permit holders, in 
coordination with employers and local banks, that are accessible and affordable, with 
waivers for balance minimums and per-transaction costs in recognition of  their low 
wages and remittance requirements.   180
● EA: Simplify rules regarding payment of  salary for basic, overtime, and rest day work to 
clarify when an employee is entitled to 1x, 1.5x and 2x basic salary pay; set mandatory 
standards and remove language related to requests (by employer or employee) to work on 
rest days, requests (by employee) of  electronic transfer of  payments, or that an employee 
may accept accommodation, amenity or service;  extend one-year time bar to three years 181
for salary claims;  and require employers to provide and maintain receipts for salary 182
payments, for payments made for actual costs of  meals, accommodation and amenities 
provided to employees, for employee medical payments, and for deductions made from 
salaries. Employers should also maintain records of  any payments workers make to 
agents.  
● EFMA: Require that any changes to the Standard Employment Contract to decrease 
basic salaries or increase deductions or allowances be reviewed and approved at MOM in 
order to be enforceable. The review and approval process should involve all parties and 
take into account the diminished bargaining power of  migrant workers who have already 
2 Require payment of  salaries and allowances by electronic transfer or through 
payroll services for all Work Permit holders. 
3 Amend EA, EFMA and WICA legislation and related regulations and policies.
 Ministry of  Manpower (2016) Employment Records http://www.mom.gov.sg/employment-practices/179
employment-records ; Ministry of  Manpower (2016) Templates and resources for KETs and payslips http://
www.mom.gov.sg/employment-practices/employment-act/employer-assistance-package  
 In 2014, MOM and POSB bank launched a one-stop process to facilitate the opening of  bank accounts for 180
Work Permit holders; their services also include a POSB Payroll Account, “a specially designed account for Work 
Permit worker to receive salary payment”. These are positive steps and more banks should consider similar 
collaborations. However, revisions to current bank charges for minimum bank balances and cash withdrawals need 
to be made for Work Permit holders in order for the scheme to work. See Tan, Amelia (2014) Easier for companies 
to open bank accounts for foreign workers, Straits Times 13 October http://www.straitstimes.com/singapore/easier-
for-companies-to-open-bank-accounts-for-foreign-workers ; see http://www.posb.com.sg/personal/deposits/for-
foreigners/posb-payroll-account
 See discussion in Chapter 2 of  ambiguities and complexities of  current language related to calculation of  salary. 181
 This limitation of  liability principle restricting wage claims to no more than one year undermines employee 182
protections set forth in the Employment Act. A standard work contract runs for an extendable two-year term. It is 
unlikely a migrant worker will sever their employment in order to bring a claim for underpayment. Instead, they will 
usually only make a claim when there has been a lengthy period of  nonpayment. Three years would be a more 
equitable limitation for wage claims for the reasons discussed in Chapters 2 and 3. 
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committed substantial resources to secure a job in Singapore.  The review process to 183
decrease contract terms should not be unilateral and should involve a tripartite approach, 
in which migrant workers are able to consult with and rely on union and/or NPO 
support.  
● WICA: Clarify and strengthen application of  the presumption that an injury is related to 
work if  it occurred at the workplace to better reflect legislative intent;  create a six-184
month time time limit for MOM’s initial determination of  the validity of  the workplace 
injury;  and create an exception to the one-year time bar on medical treatment when 185
employees have not yet received medical treatment in the first year.  186
● Provide clear information on the time and costs required, applicable rules and decision 
criteria, evidence needed, and access to guidance and/or representation. Translate into 
Bengali, Mandarin and Tamil and ensure information is accessible to Work Permit 
holders; 
● Enhance assessment of  the credibility of  employer witnesses, taking into consideration 
whether the witness works for the employer and whether the witness has an interest in 
the outcome of  the claim;  
● Ensure MOM or other officers with mediation or settlement responsibility are accredited 
by a recognised external organisation such as the Singapore Mediation Centre and have 
4 Improve claims process through access to information and enhancing 
safeguards.
 In addition to diminished bargaining power, migrant workers, unlike resident workers in Singapore, are not at 183
liberty to change jobs if  their terms of  conditions of  employment deteriorate. Resident workers usually do not have 
fixed-term contracts of  employment, and would also not have incurred significant fees and or debts for their 
employment. 
  As discussed in Chapter 2, the courts have broadly adopted a ‘pro-employee’ construction of  sections 3(1) and 184
(6) WICA. A health incident that occurs during working hours is considered a workplace injury, even when the 
employee is not working: see Allianz Insurance Co (Singapore) Pte Ltd v Ma Shoudong [2011] 3 SLR 1167 and Pang Chew 
Kim [2012] 1 SLR 15. This presumption should not be overcome by witness testimony from former work colleagues 
who say they did not see the injury, where there are reasonable grounds to believe that these colleagues are under 
pressure from their employer to give such evidence. If  an injury occurs during working hours, it should be 
considered a valid workplace injury as far as possible, unless an exception applies (eg. where the worker was under 
the influence of  alcohol or had been fighting). As discussed in Chapter 2,  more weight should be given to evidence 
other than witness testimony, such as medical evidence of  an injury. This should be accompanied by increased 
penalties for false claims. See also the discussion of  presumption-like doctrines in the US:  Robinson, T.A (2014) 
“The Role of  Presumptions Within the Workers’ Compensation Arena” Lexis Nexis https://www.lexisnexis.com/
legalnewsroom/workers-compensation/b/recent-cases-news-trends-developments/archive/2014/01/21/the-role-
of-presumptions-within-the-workers-compensation-arena.aspx?Redirected=true#sthash.hUlqi2j9.dpuf  (accessed 22 
November 2016).
 These time limits serve as guidelines and protect the parties in the system against undue delays and can be 185
waived extraordinary cases.
 Workers report that employers deny or delay treatment perhaps knowing that they are only responsible for one 186
year of  medical expenses under WICA.
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legal training, and also allow independent external mediators such as is currently the case 
in the Small Claims Tribunal;   187
● Increase access to the Change of  Employer scheme for claimants and abolish employer 
permission requirement for COE;  
○ Workers with salary claims or who are involved in investigations related to 
employer violations should be granted automatic COE as soon as the claim is 
resolved, but no later than three months after initiating a claim;  
○ Workers with injury claims and whose Work Permits have been cancelled should 
be granted COE as soon as their medical leave ends if  they have been assessed fit 
to work; 
○ Concerns over workers resorting to making frivolous salary and injury claims in 
order to qualify for COE can be addressed by a longer term move towards 
making job mobility a standard employment right that does not require employer 
or MOM permission;  
● Allow access to FCWDS for claimants on Special Pass;  188
● Enhance employer compliance with responsibilities to employees during the claims 
process, such as for the provision of  meals, accommodation and medical care, through 
the establishment and monitoring by MOM of  requirements to provide specific amounts 
per month for food and housing, regardless of  whether such allowances were agreed 
upon earlier as a term of  employment;  189
● Create a fund to compensate employees when employers:   190
○ fail to pay judgments  and settlement orders; or 191
○ fail to pay for employee meals, accommodation and medical care during the 
claims process. 
● Create time limits for injury claim decisions:  
 Independent external mediators are used by the Consumer Association of  Singapore and in the Small Claims 187
Tribunal. 
 FCWDS is the Foreign Construction Workers Directory System which allows workers to change employers 188
towards the end of  their Work Permit period. See www.fcwds.com.sg. MOM should ensure that workers are able to 
access this scheme and the COE without paying high recruitment fees. 
 Clarify and publicise employer responsibilities during the claims process. Clarify and monitor specific amounts 189
employers must pay for meals per day/month and accommodation per day/month. 
 This fund can be established from the foreign worker levy, security bond, or other fees. Levy fees could continue 190
to be charged of  employers after a migrant worker’s Work Permit is cut but before the claim is resolved. This 
amount of  additional levy could help support the establishment of  the fund. In Hong Kong, the Protection of  
Wages on Insolvency Fund provides payment of  a migrant worker's salary arrears and other amounts owed if  
employers wind up their companies, including “pay for untaken annual leave, pay for untaken statutory holidays, 
wages in lieu of  notice and/or severance payment owed by their employer”; Guide to the protection of  wages on 
insolvency ordinance and points to note for making application to the portection of  wages on insolvency fund 
http://www.labour.gov.hk/eng/public/pdf/wsd/PWIO%20guide_eng.pdf;  
China Labour Bulletin (2011) Hired on Sufferance, p.55, also makes this recommendation. 
 This includes settlement agreements registered with MOM, Labour Court judgments or orders, Employment 191
Court Tribunal judgments and Notice of  Assessment orders under WICA, among others.
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○ Require that the NOA or initial determination of  liability (the validity of  the 
workplace injury) be determined within six months from the date a claim is 
lodged;  192
○ Require that the Average Monthly Earnings is established and agreed upon by all 
parties prior to issuing the NOA; 
○ Require that the NOA includes the insurance company reference and policy 
number.  
● Extend MOM hours and create alternative sites so workers can access information or file 
claims on Sundays and evenings;  193
● Require health care providers or their surrogates (those instructed to report on their 
behalf) to report to MOM when a Work Permit holder is issued more than three days 
MC or is hospitalised for 24 hours;  If  the doctor issues a Light Duty certificate, the 194
doctor should ensure that light duty is available and appropriate.  195
● Employ independent safety supervisors on worksites and strengthen employee 
representation on workplace safety and health committees;  196
● Increase surprise worksite safety audits by MOM, external auditors, and/or inspectors.  197
5 Improve claims reporting mechanisms and injury prevention.
 Use similar time limits in the Singapore Courts as a model for the claims system. These time limits serve as 192
guidelines and protect all parties against undue delays.
 For example, in order to provide easy access to support for foreign workers in Taiwan, the Ministry of  Labor 193
(MOL) established a 24-hour toll free “1955” Consultation & Protection line in 2009 to assist them in areas 
including: complaints, free legal consultations, referrals for protective placements, assistance with medical care and 
information on government services. By 2013 the service had expanded to 18 lines and 44 operators speaking 
migrant languages. In addition, there are physical Counselling and Service Centers operated by local governments 
(subsidised by MOL) to further assist them. Source: “Protection of  the Rights for Foreign Workers”, Council of  
Labor Affairs (now MOL), Revised Jan. 2014, Section 5, p. 9.
 In 2012 the ILO published guidelines for establishing and improving national reporting systems in a publication 194
called "Improvement of  National Reporting, Data Collection and Analysis of  Occupational Accidents and 
Diseases". Under 9.2, Arrangements for Reporting, the ILO highlighted that in countries where the number and 
costs of  accidents can affect employer costs, there can be underreporting. They recommend adopting "control 
elements", such as separate reporting from both the employer and medical provider. P. 43.
 Light duty certificates are issued by the treating doctor to advise on an injured employee’s fitness for work. The 195
doctor may specify modified or restricted duties which do not interfere with a worker’s recovery from an injury. 
Often light duties are not available for Work Permit holders employed in construction and marine worksites. This 
recommendation would create a check on the provision of  light duties by requiring that the doctor specify with the 
employer the nature of  the light duty work available so as to ensure it is medically appropriate and does not interfere 
with the worker’s recovery.
 Workplace Safety and Health Act (Chapter 354A) Part VII, Safety and Health Management Arrangements 196
section 29(2) states that “Every workplace safety and health committee of  a workplace shall comprise 
representatives of  employees of  the workplace as well as employers.”
 These audits could improve safety as well as check compliance with other employer responsibilities. For example, 197
these could include checks on whether employees are insured under WICA, or that employees on “light duties” are 
fit to be on site or are being given light duties. See Workplace Safety and Health Act (Chapter 354A), Part IX, 
Inspections and Other Powers of  Enforcement and Part VII, Safety and Health Management Arrangements. 
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● For salary claims: the IPA, SEC and any other properly signed contract; key employment 
terms; time cards; pay slips; evidence of  hours worked; rate of  pay; and payment 
received. Legislation or guidance protocols should direct an adverse inference and ensure 
penalties if  employer fails to provide these documents. 
● For injury claims: the incident report, MCs, medical records, scans. Legislation or 
guidance protocols should direct an adverse inference if  employer fails to provide these 
documents and ensure penalties against employers who fail to report injuries within ten 
days or fail to provide employee access to medical care. 
● Utilise the power to order discovery of  these documents, and enforce sanctions for 
failure to produce or maintain legally mandated records. 
● Require an affordable and expedient forensics analysis in cases where the authenticity of  
a document or signature is reasonably in question.  
● Create an affordable avenue for medical witness testimony.  198
● Medical facilities should ensure that patients have access to their medical documents. 
● Publish written Labour Court decisions and judgments  through the MOM website (or, 
in the alternative, the law reports), to create a body of  precedents available to all parties 
who wish to access them; 
● Provide all parties with information from MOM’s investigations; 
● Open settlement, mediation, Labour Court and ECT sessions to a limited number of  
observers nominated by any party to the dispute; 
● Permit migrant workers to be accompanied by volunteer non-legal representatives during 
mediation and adjudication proceedings. Such assistance or support could include a 
McKenzie friend,  an ombudsman,  NPO representatives, social workers or 199 200
counsellors,  volunteer students, a friend or family member, or other representatives, as 201
determined by MOM or the Employment Claims Tribunal;  
6 Ensure Work Permit holders have access to the full range of  documentation 
that may be needed to bring a claim.
7 Increase transparency and effectiveness of  the mediation and adjudication 
process.
 The Singapore Medical Council (SMC) should help establish a scheme, similar to the Law Society’s pro bono 198
scheme, to provide affordable access to medical testimony. SMC should also ensure that doctors clearly record who 
gives information about the accident when the patient is first seen.
 Where there is an unrepresented party, a McKenzie friend is someone allowed to assist by attending hearings 199
with the party, advising them on non-legal issues and helping with administrative tasks. Ng, A (2007) “Law 
undergrads in court’s pilot scheme” Today, 5 January https://law.nus.edu.sg/about_us/news/2007/
TODAY050107.pdf  
 Ombudsmen in this context could help claimants understand and navigate the claims process. An ombudsman is 200
generally appointed by a public agency and is independent of  the parties involved in the dispute. 
 The mediation process in family dispute resolution in the Family Court system can serve as a model, where 201
social workers or counsellors are allowed in mediation sessions to support parties. Judges sit as mediators in Family 
Court. 
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● Ensure all ACLs and adjudicators have legal training;  202
● As an alternative, consider moving Labour Court for injury claims out of  MOM and 
integrating it into the Singapore Courts system, to create more institutional formality, ie, 
a similar model to the new Employment Claims Tribunals for salary claims.  
● Provide workers with insurance cards in order to directly access medical care up to a 
limited amount;  
● Require employers to pay for medical treatment and procedures that the doctor deems 
medically necessary for diagnosis or treatment without a Letter of  Guarantee (LOG);  203
● Maintain a central register of  all Work Permit holders’ insurers accessible to healthcare 
providers to clarify insurance coverage; 
● Require use of  the National Electronic Health Record (all case notes, investigations, and 
discharge summaries) for healthcare providers serving migrant workers to facilitate 
continuity of  care and access to medical records; 
● Establish a government fund or subsidy for migrant workers whose medical expenses 
exceed the S$36,000 insurance coverage limit and whose employers are unable to pay.   204
● Publicise services that NPOs, hospitals and other community, religious and charitable 
organisations provide to migrant workers in need.   205
● Create a central resource center that provides healthcare providers with information on 
the injury claim process, injury and MC reporting guidelines, employer responsibilities, 
and information on medical, legal and charitable assistance for migrant workers for 
migrant workers.  
● Enhance education to increase understanding by members of  the Singapore Medical 
Council, the Law Society and the General Insurance Association of  Singapore about 
migrant workers issues, employer responsibilities before and during the claim process, 
and worker access to medical and legal resources. 
● Extend pro bono or legal aid services to migrant workers through the Law Society or the 
Ministry of  Law. 
8 Improve access to medical care for Work Permit holders.
9 Enhance stakeholder engagement and education.
 To ensure an understanding of  how to weigh evidence and witness testimony. 202
 Medical treatment and procedures include X-rays, scans or MRIs to determine the extent of  the injury necessary 203
for diagnosis, guide medical treatment, and as evidence regarding injury claim.
 This would improve migrant workers access to essential care for serious injuries and ease the hospital’s debt and 204
the employer’s financial burden. 
 Require hospitals to provide migrant workers with an information sheet about resources upon discharge.205
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● Improve regulatory oversight and censure of  practitioners by professional bodies such as 
the Singapore Medical Council, the Law Society and the Monetary Authority of  
Singapore.  
● Create a multi-stakeholder committee to provide feedback to MOM on ways to 
streamline claims processes.  206
● Create a dedicated unit and no-cost mechanisms to help Work Permit holders enforce 
judgments.   207
● Require employers to deposit a minimum sum or percentage of  claim amount for each 
claim to MOM or a Public Trustee.  208
● Require employers to pay judgments and settlement orders directly to MOM or a Public 
Trustee.  209
● Extend liability for judgments and settlement orders to company directors in exceptional 
circumstances.  210
● Create a system for tracking individuals and companies who:  
● Fail to pay judgments and settlement orders;  
10 Strengthen enforcement regime. 
 A multi-stakeholder claims process committee could be modeled on the Non-Injury Motor Accident/Personal 206
Injury Motor Accident (NIMA/PIMA) committee that provides recommendations to the courts regarding 
guidelines and procedures. 
 Former Nominated Member of  Parliament (NMP), Siew Kum Hong suggested the creation of  a dedicated unit 207
to help workers enforce their Labour Court orders. He suggested the costs for rendering such services could be 
recoverable from employers as legal expenses that can be used to fund this unit’s operations. See Singapore 
Parliamentary Debates, Official Report (18 November 2008) vol 85 at col 968 (Siew Kum Hong).
 This amount will be returned in full if  the claim is unsuccessful. 208
 Former Nominated Member of  Parliament (NMP), Siew Kum Hong, suggested expanding the powers of  209
Labour Court to make orders for employers to pay the sum of  an award to a Labour Court account held for the 
worker; the Labour Court will then, in turn, pay the worker. This suggestion assumes that employers are less likely to 
withhold the ordered amount when it is payable to the Labour Court instead of  the worker. This seems a fair 
assumption, given the fact that withholding payment would mean MOM (rather than just the worker) would be 
aware of  the breach of  its orders, and in a better place to effect enforcement. He suggested MOM may be in a 
better position to take on the initial costs, as the sum owed to it would enjoy priority as a debt due to the 
Government under Section 10(1) of  the Government Proceedings Act. In the case of  WICA compensation, the 
amount would be paid to the Public Trustee to pay the lawyer’s itemised legal fees and pay the rest to the claimant. 
This would help to avoid the current situation where the total compensation amount is paid to the lawyer, who then 
pays out a certain amount to the claimant after subtracting legal fees without oversight. Stakeholders and workers 
report that lawyers currently have the opportunity to take substantial fees. See Singapore Parliamentary Debates, Official 
Report (18 November 2008) vol 85 at col 968 (Siew Kum Hong).
 Directors should only be held personally liable for sanctions if  they refuse to pay a judgment or order in 210
exceptional circumstances, ie, where it becomes apparent that they were not acting in good faith, and had no 
reasonable commercial grounds for believing their actions would benefit the company. Some practitioners take the 
view that directors may close a company in an effort to avoid liability to employees, and then reopen another similar 
company shortly thereafter. 
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● Have a record of  winding up companies and reconstituting new ones. Make these 
individuals and companies subject to additional reporting requirements to ensure they 
comply with their responsibilities in a timely manner. 
● Extend the Special Pass period for Work Permit holders until judgments are enforced.  211
● Penalties should be increased and strictly enforced for employers who:  
○ Fail to pay judgments and settlement orders; 
○ Fail to pay or underpay employee salaries;  
○ Engage in contract substitution and manipulation of  documentation (eg forged 
signatures on contracts or pay slips); 
○ Fail to report workplace injuries within stipulated timelines; 
○ Fail to meet their responsibilities in paying for meals, accommodation and 
medical care of  employees;  
○ Repatriate or attempt to repatriate workers with claims or potential claims; 
○ Coerce or attempt to coerce migrant worker claimants and their witnesses;  
○ Demand and collect kickbacks from workers. 
 Enforcing a Labour Court order is problematic when the worker’s Special Pass is not renewed after the order is 211
issued. This point was addressed by then Acting Minister for Manpower Gan Kim Yong in a Parliamentary Debate 
on the 2008 amendments to the Employment Act. Gan explained that MOM generally allows workers to remain in 
Singapore for a short period of  time to enforce their claims because complex claims take longer to resolve, and the 
worker would have insufficient financial support to support himself  in Singapore. In such cases, MOM would remit 
the monies when they are received from the employers. If  prosecution against employers were at the discretion of  
MOM and not the worker’s right, the worker would be left in an uncertain and precarious position, unable to 
influence or decide the course of  action taken on his behalf. 
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3. CONCLUSION 
This set of  recommendations is meant to 
serve as a starting point for a robust 
engagement and redoubled commitment to 
the goal of  improving access to justice for 
migrant workers. To strengthen these 
recommendations, we suggest: 
● Continued stakeholder consultations 
with policy-makers and knowledge 
specialists in the relevant areas, 
including labour and migration law, 
healthcare, migration studies, and 
supply chain management in the key 
industries under review; 
● Engagement with regional and 
international migrant worker NPOs 
and researchers; and 
● Extensive consultation with migrant 
workers, including focus groups to 
determine priority areas, feasibility, 
and the empirical realities that may 
impede certain recommendations or 
lead to other potentially unfavourable 
consequences. 
These recommendations are intended to 
address the major factors which appear to 
undermine the protective intentions of  
existing legislation. Standard Employment 
Contracts, requiring electronic transfer of  pay, 
removing ambiguous language related to 
requesting overtime, and strengthening the 
enforcement regime would bolster existing 
law. Improving access to information about 
the claim system, and increasing the 
transparency of  mediation and adjudication 
would help to close gaps in the administration 
of  the law. Improving claims reporting, 
ensuring workers have access to all required 
documentation, providing workers with 
insurance cards, allowing workers access to 
necessary medical treatment without a Letter 
of  Guarantee, and allowing claimant workers 
to change employer without permission of  
their current employer, would address 
problems of  migrant worker vulnerability and 
ensure access to basic rights despite workers’ 
structural weakness. Finally, enforcement of  
existing laws, particularly with respect to 
contracts that violate the Employment Act, 
forgery of  salary documents, i l legal 
deductions, and failure of  employers to meet 
their legal responsibilities, would help prevent 
errant employers from violating the law to the 
disadvantage of  migrant workers. 
It is our hope that this report will enrich and 
create more opportunities for multi-
stakeholder discussions among policy makers, 
corporate leaders, migrant workers and 
migrant worker advocates, as well as the wider 
community, about the best methods to ensure 
Singapore’s employment laws serve to protect 
the most vulnerable in society. Through this 
discussion, we hope to foster a deeper 
understanding of  the complex and sometimes 
troubling experiences of  migrant workers in 
Singapore and contribute to the development 
of  a more just and equitable society for all.  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APPENDICES 
Appendix 1. Background on qualitative interview methodology 
The team members who conducted the 
interviews were trained in interview 
techniques and research ethics. Interviewers 
used a set of  standard questions, and were 
given the discretion to ask supplementary 
questions based on the interviewee’s 
response. They then wrote up field notes. All 
field notes were anonymised: names were 
replaced with pseudonyms ref lecting 
interviewee’s nationality, and then uploaded 
onto a web-based qualitative data analysis 
software, Dedoose Version 7.1.3.  212
Two lead researchers with academic 
experience in qualitative analysis and 
members of  the team who had gone through 
training on conducting qualitative data 
analysis conducted the analysis. Theoretical 
and investigator triangulation was employed 
in the coding process to increase validity of  
findings and reduce investigator bias.  The 213
lead researchers and key team members 
conducted an initial round of  coding the field 
notes to identify a preliminary list of  codes 
for use by the data analysts. After the first 
round, the analysts reconciled interpretations 
of  the codes, determined the relevance of  the 
pre-set codes, identified further emerging 
codes and produced an updated codebook. 
The analysts then applied the updated 
codebook to a second round of  coding of  
the field notes. The coded-up content was 
then cross-checked by a different analyst to 
ensure inter-coder reliability in the application 
of  the codes were applied. The lead 
researchers, together with the authors, then 
went through the coded-up content to 
identify generalised stakeholder perspectives, 
which are discussed in the findings. 
 Dedoose Version 7.1.3, web application for managing, analyzing, and presenting qualitative and mixed method 212
research data (2016). Los Angeles, CA: SocioCultural Research Consultants, LLC (www.dedoose.com)
 Denzin, Norman. The research act in sociology: A theoretical introduction to sociological methods. London: Butterworths, 213
1970. Denzin, Norman. Sociological methods: A sourcebook. McGraw-Hill Companies, 1978.
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Appendix 2. Interview questions for migrant workers  
Below are the questions in English. In addition, all interviewers and interviewees had access to 
written translations of  the questions in Bengali, Chinese, and Tamil. 
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Appendix 3. Brochure (English version) to guide workers with salary or injury claims 
On the following pages is the current draft (in 
English) of  the ‘Workers' Guide to MOM 
Labour Court". It is still in draft format, and 
will be finalised for the public launch in Feb 
2017. For the launch, the brocher will be 
reviewed further my NPOs, lawyers, and 
MOM, and translated into Chinese, Bengali, 
and Tamil. 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WOR
KER
S’ G
UIDE
 TO
MOM
 LAB
OUR
 COU
RT
WHAT IS THE  
LABOUR COURT?
1
A court set up by the Ministry of Manpower (MOM) to 
hear salary and injury claims made by workers.
Do all claims go to the Labour Court?
Not every salary or injury claim will go to the Labour Court as 
some employers and employees may agree to settle earlier 
before the matter proceeds to Labour Court. 
Do I need a lawyer?
No lawyer is needed. For salary claims, you must represent 
yourself while for injury claims, you may appoint a lawyer. 
How long does the process take?
Usually 3 to 9 months before the final judgment is made. Some 
cases have taken as long as 15 months to conclude. 
A court set up by the Ministry of Manpower (MOM) to 
hear salary and injury claims made by workers.
The seriousness of your claim, your evidence, and your 
employer’s willingness to accept your claim. 
Depends on the strength of your evidence, and the law. 
You will probably be asked to accept an amount lower 
than your claim. Overall, you are entitled to your 
claim if MOM decides that your claim is valid.  
What factors affect the speed of my claim?
What will the results of my claim be?
WHAT IS THE  
LABOUR COURT?
2
FOR INJURY CLAIMS
YOUR RIGHTS 
and what you should know
3
You can claim for:  
MC wages (including overtime) while you 
were on medical / hospitalisation leave 
Medical bills for the treatment of your 
work injury 
Compensation for any permanent 
incapacity (your “points”)
Your employer is liable to compensate you fully even if you were 
injured in the toilet on your worksite, during meal times, or the 
way to work in company-provided transport. 
FOR SALARY CLAIMS
You can claim for underpayment or non-payment of: 
Basic monthly salary 
Weekday and Saturday overtime hours at 1.5x 
your basic rate 
Sunday and Public Holiday overtime hours at 2x 
your basic rate 
Annual leave which you were entitled to but 
did not take 
Salary in lieu of termination notice
YOUR RIGHTS 
and what you should know
FOR SALARY CLAIMS
You are entitled to your full monthly basic wage 
each month even if full-time work was not made 
available by your employer. Bring your Work 
Permit to prove your period of employment. 
It is illegal for your employer to deduct savings money, work 
permit renewal costs, or training costs from your salary. You can 
claim for illegal deductions if you can (1) prove the deductions 
were made and (2) prove the deductions were illegal. You will 
need to bring time cards, payslips and/or receipts.
One-year time bar. File your claim early. You cannot claim for 
non-payment/underpayment of salary or for illegal deductions 
if these occurred more than one year before your claim date.
Overtime rates are either 1.5x or 2x the basic rate. Even if 
your contract says a lower rate (e.g. $2/hour), your employer is 
required by Singapore law to pay overtime at a rate of 1.5x. 
Similarly, Sundays or rest days and public holidays must be 
paid at 2x your basic rate.
4
FOR INJURY CLAIMS
HOW TO PREPARE 
before going to labour court?
5
Try to find people, such as your colleagues, who 
are willing to say in Labour Court that they saw 
you get injured at work. These people are your 
witnesses. 
Bring any SMS, phone records or photos of your 
injury or worksite. 
Try to obtain the original medical documents 
from the clinics and hospitals where you were 
treated, including your medical leave and hospital 
leave (MC) documents.
FOR SALARY CLAIMS
First, show how much your employer was supposed to 
pay you. 
Next, show that you were not paid this amount.  
You should be entitled to receive the difference 
between what you should have been paid and what 
you were actually paid.  
Calculate exactly the amount that is owed to you 
and explain to the Labour Court Judge how you 
arrived at this amount.
If your employer presents forged documents to MOM, you can 
consider filing a police report and/or getting a forensic analysis of the 
forged documents by Health Sciences Authority (HSA) to prove that 
the documents were forged. TWC2 can assist you.
DURING 
THE HEARING
FOR INJURY CLAIMS
Tell the Court exactly when the accident occurred and 
how it occurred.  
Give evidence to prove that the accident did in fact take 
place.  
Remember to give all the details early on, don’t wait till 
later in the hearings to present new evidence.  
It is very important to tell your story truthfully and 
consistently – the court will be comparing what you say 
with your statement in the WICA claim.
6
(1) What do I have to prove?
(2) What do I say?
You will have to prove to the Judge that the accident took 
place at the workplace and that you have suffered injuries for 
which you should be compensated. 
If the employer does not want to 
compensate you, it is likely that he will try 
to present his story that you were not 
injured at the workplace, or that you were 
not injured as you described.  
The employer may also call witnesses to 
say the accident did not occur as you say.
(3) What might my boss say?
7
DURING 
THE HEARING
FOR INJURY CLAIMS
(4) What would help my case?
It is helpful if witnesses who saw the accident or 
photographed you at the site or saw you afterwards, will come 
to Court to explain what they saw. 
Bring your timecard or toolbox report showing that you 
worked on that day and a hospital report showing that you 
went to the hospital on that day or soon thereafter.
You may have the opportunity to ask the witnesses and/or 
your boss some questions.  
The Judge may also ask you questions at any point in time.
(5) Would i get to ask questions?
DURING 
THE HEARING
FOR INJURY & SALARY CLAIMS
8
You will present your story, and your employer will present his.  
Speak slowly and allow the translator to translate each 
sentence. Others in the Court will be recording your words, so 
be sure to speak accurately. 
If possible, try to find someone with good English to help you 
write your story and arguments on a piece of paper.
(1) What is the process?
(3) What would the judge do?
The Judge will give you instructions and advice. Follow them.
(2) what if the witness/boss is lying?
If you feel the witnesses or boss is lying in Court, remember or 
write down notes of what they said.  
When it is your turn to talk, ask them questions to show the 
inconsistencies or untruthfulness in their story. Refer to your 
notes to remember all the questions you want to ask.
(4) Can i tell the judge my issues?
Either at the start or at the end of the hearings briefly tell the 
Judge the various issues you currently face (for example, the 
need for an MRI or for housing and meal allowance).  
Do not talk excessively about your family, your debt or your 
personal problems. The Court is focused only on the details of 
your claim and does not encourage such discussion.
9
AFTER 
THE HEARING
WHAT HAPPENS?
The Judge will issue a decision or Order within about a month 
from the date of your final hearing.
WHAT IF I SUCCEED?
If you are successful in your claim, the Order will state the amount 
of money that your employer must pay you within 21 days. 
If no money was awarded to you or if you are unhappy with the 
amount awarded, you can appeal the Labour Court’s decision 
to the High Court.
WHAT IF I’M NOT SATISFIED?
WHAT HAPPENS IF I APPEAL?
If you appeal, you need a lawyer ’s help which is expensive. You 
will also have to return to your home country and wait for your 
lawyer to finish your case. You should only appeal if you have 
new evidence to show or new arguments to make. 
10
AFTER 
THE HEARING
WHAT IF BOSS REFUSES TO PAY?
(2) Engage a lawyer to help you enforce the Order. The lawyer 
may write letters of demand and/or begin a Writ of Seizure 
and Sale (WSS).  
(3) Engage the services of a private debt collection company. 
TWC2 can assist you. 
Cost = Usually charge fees of around 20% to 40% of 
the payment. 
There is no guarantee that they will be able to 
recover the whole of the amount that is due to you. 
Cost = About $400 to file a WSS. 
You will likely need to return to your home country 
and the lawyer will contact you if successful.  
The lawyer will bank transfer you any payment 
obtained.
(1) Approach MOM. 
Cost = $0.
11
DOCUMENTS CHECKLIST
INFORMATION TO PREPARE
Date of incident, time of incident 
Exact location of site where injury occured 
Owner of site where injury occured 
Name, job title and contact numbers of your: 
Supervisor 
Manager 
Foreman 
Safety supervisor 
Other workers who saw the incident or your 
injury or who you informed about your injury
injury CLAIM 
NECESSARY MATERIALS
Medical bills 
Medical or hospital certificates (MCs) 
Medical reports from all the clinics / hospitals / specialists 
that you visited for your injury 
Records of physiotherapy sessions, if any 
Safety report / injury report / incident report, if any 
All the documents required for salary claims (to calculate 
your salary)
A. Basic Information
12
INFORMATION TO PREPARE (CONT.)
injury CLAIM 
NECESSARY MATERIALS
B. What happened?
The activity you were doing at the time of injury 
Description of injury — for example: fracture, sprain or burn 
Description of what happened immediately after your injury 
Description of the immediate response by your supervisor / 
manager / others around you
C. What treatment did you get?
Treatment given on site and name of person providing 
treatment 
Name, job title and contact numbers of the person(s) who 
accompanied you to the clinic / hospital 
Date, time, location and description of the first treatment you 
received 
Date, time, location and description of the subsequent 
treatments you received 
All the medical diagnoses you received 
Dates and duration of MCs (medical & hospital leave)
D. What is the current status?
Current status of injury (Are you waiting to receive medical 
treatment?) 
Whether the injury incident was reported to MOM or to 
anyone else. If so, who reported and when was the incident 
reported?
13
SALARY CLAIM 
NECESSARY MATERIALS
DOCUMENTS CHECKLIST
INFORMATION TO PREPARE
In-principle approval (IPA) letter 
Employment contracts, if any 
Financial documents: payslips, salary vouchers, salary 
envelopes, bank book, and any bank transfer receipts 
made by your employer 
Police reports of harassments and forgeries, if any 
Your employer’s written notice of termination 
Timesheets  
(Good to have) A log or spreadsheet that clearly lists the 
days/hours that you worked and provides an itemised 
breakdown of the amount that is owed to you. 
Job start date and date of termination 
Date of approval of your Work Permit 
Names and contact number of other workers who 
were not paid (they can serve as your witnesses)
14
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Appendix 4. Prevalence of  injured Work Permit holders experiencing difficulties with 
the existing claims system 
The MOM reported 12,729 workplace 
injuries  involving more than 24 hours of  214
hospitalisation or more than three days of  
medical leave in 2013. TWC2 through its 
Cuff  Road Project (TCRP) provided meals  215
for 1,125 Bangladeshi and Indian workers 
who had been injured in 2013  and were 216
awaiting the outcome of  their injury claims.  217
These workers were assisted by TCRP 
because they were having difficulties with the 
claims system and were not adequately 
supported by their employers. As a group, 
they represented about 8.8% of  all reported 
workplace injuries in Singapore that year. It 
should be noted that the 8.8% considers only 
foreign workers in the numerator while the 
denominator covers total workplace injuries 
among resident and foreign workers. 
Therefore, the percentage among Work 
Permit holders with injuries is higher.    218
To help provide a clearer indication of  the 
incidence of  difficulties among Work Permit 
holders, we identified the industry sectors 
where the majority of  these injured 
Bangladeshi and Indian workers were 
employed and compared this to total injury 
levels in similar sectors.   This is shown in 219
the following table.   
!  
TABLE 3.  TWC2 Cuff Road assistance levels relative to workplace injuries 
1. Number of workers injured in 2013 and subsequently supported by TWC2’s Cuff Road 
Project while awaiting resolution of injury claims.
1,125
2. Proportion & number of these workers employed in companies undertaking or contracting to 
the construction & marine sectors, and in landscaping or cleaning activities. a
90.9% 
1,023
3. Total reported injuries in marine, construction, architecture & engineering, cleaning and 
landscaping, and metal manufacturing industriesb in 2013.
5,089
4. Proportion of injured workers supported by TWC2 20.1%
 Total of  major and minor injuries and occupational diseases. Sources, MOM & WSH Institute. 214
 TWC2 maintain data on the users of  the services provided by their Cuff  Road Project (TCRP). For information 215
on the statistics see “Cuff  Road Project 2013: Statistics”, TWC2, 6 April 2014. 
 As there can be a long period between the time of  injury and resolution of  claims, workers injured in 2013 were 216
used for this analysis.  Most of  these workers visited TCRP in 2013 and 2014, together with a few in 2015.  Similar 
numbers of  workers injured in 2014, 2015, and 2016 have utilised TCRP assistance.
 Many of  these workers were on Special Passes awaiting resolution of  medical claims and were experiencing 217
difficulties. They had problems with the system and/or were not being adequately supported by their employers as 
required under law while they were awaiting case outcomes. There will be some workers in these numbers with 
injury claims that are ultimately deemed ineligible or who may be exploiting the system. Sometimes workers do this 
to avoid premature termination especially when large placement fee debts are incurred. 
 If  resident worker injury numbers are taken out of  the denominator then the percentage must rise. 218
 Even though many of  the injuries experienced by the TCRP recipients are associated with companies in 219
construction and marine activities, we could not be sure their injuries would be reflected in the total injury numbers 
for only these two sectors. We therefore broadened our reported 2013 injury base to include the engineering, 
metalwork manufacturing, cleaning and landscaping sectors which commonly provide inputs or services to the 
construction and marine industries. Metalwork manufacturing includes the manufacture of  basic metals, fabricated 
metal products,  machinery & equipment and electrical machinery & apparatus.
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a The percentage is based on identifying the industry from company names. This was possible in the majority of  cases.  
b WSH Institute, Workplace Safety and Health Report 2013. Major and minor Injuries and confirmed occupational diseases by 
industry. Supplemented by Ministry of  Manpower (2016)  Workplace Injuries by Industry and Degree of  Injury, 2013; Workplace 
Safety and Health Indicators by Industry, 2013;  Confirmed Cases of  Chronic Occupational Disease by Type of  Disease and 
Industry, 2013;  http://www.mom.gov.sg/workplace-safety-and-health/wsh-reports-and-statistics  (accessed 22 November 2016). 
Metal  
As can be seen in the table, some 91% of  
Work Permit workers with 2013 injuries and 
assisted by TWC2 were employed in 
companies contracting to or undertaking 
construction & marine activities, or in 
landscaping or cleaning jobs. These workers 
accounted for about one in five (20.1%) of  all 
workers injured in Singapore in the 
construction, marine, architecture & 
engineering, cleaning, landscaping, and 
metalwork manufacturing  industry sectors in 
2013.    
When in te r pre t ing th i s pe rcen tag e 
consideration needs to be given to a number 
of  factors. Firstly, some workers supported by 
TWC2 would have had their injury claims 
ultimately deemed ineligible  for various 220
reasons such as being non-workplace injuries 
or possibly self-inflicted.  While this would 221
overstate the percentage somewhat, there are 
other reasons that result in understatement. 
Aside from injured resident employees being 
included in the denominator (mentioned 
above), the injured foreign workers in the 
numerator only includes Bangladeshi and 
Indian workers who sought support from 
TWC2’s Cuff  Road Project. There are other 
NPOs providing similar types of  support  222
to workers of  these and other nationalities. 
For example, Work Permit holders from 
China are not included, and some would have 
also experienced difficulties  when making 223
claims and hence increase the percentage. 
There could be other foreigners such as 
Malaysians who may have problems with the 
system but are much less likely to be assisted 
by Singapore-based NPOs, and there will, of  
course, be some injured low-income resident 
employees who also experience difficulties.      224
While we cannot be precise about the exact 
percentage of  injured foreign low-wage 
employees experiencing difficulties with 
injury claims or related employer support 
under the current system, the number and 
persistence of  foreign workers seen by TWC2 
alone provides evidence that there is a 
problem.    
 
A review by TWC2 in 2014 of  a sample of  268 WICA claims by workers using TCRP revealed that 7.5% had 220
been assessed as not eligible for compensation.  
 Sometimes workers do this to avoid premature termination especially when large placement fee debts have been 221
incurred. 
 For example, HealthServe operates the Geylang Food Project. 222
 Chinese workers represented 30% of  those interviewed for this study. 223
 Singapore citizens and permanent residents are however more able to access support through their families and 224
use programs such as the Special Relief  Fund.    
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